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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
While interest rates determine the costs for borrowing and lending money credit spreads denote 
the additional charge reflecting the fact that debtors are default-prone. Hence, both interest 
rates and credit spreads drive the costs and returns of everyday life items such as mortgages 
and saving plans. Both factors are of considerable significance for financial and non-financial 
institutions as well as for the general public as a whole. In the following thesis we study the 
modeling of interest rates and credit spreads. We also analyze the use of so-called financial 
derivatives to price and manage interest rate risk as well as credit risk, especially discussing the 
counterparty credit risk that derivatives themselves might exhibit. 
Financial derivatives are assets whose value is derived from the value of another (underlying) 
asset. Take for example a call option on the stock of a company. Such an option gives the 
right to buy the stock in the future for a pre-defined price. The value of such an option is 
thus derived from the value of the company’s equity.1 Most prominent example of interest 
rate derivatives are interest rate swaps, contracts in which two parties agree on swapping 
future interest payments, e.g. floating rate against a fixed rate relating to a predefined 
notional amount. Financial derivatives take many forms and are “limited only by the imagination 
of man” (Berkshire Hathaway, 2002, p. 13). Standardized derivatives such as equity options 
are exchange-traded. The lion’s share of financial derivatives is, however, less standardized 
and is traded bilaterally, i.e. over the counter (OTC). Following the financial crisis and the 
                                                 
1 Notice that in turn the value of the company’s equity can be interpreted as a call option on its assets and is 
thus derived from the value of the latter (see Merton, 1974). 
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resulting regulatory changes an increasing portion of financial derivatives is being traded 
through central counterparties (see ISDA, 2015). 
The discourse around financial derivatives – especially the ones traded OTC – has been 
controversial at best. On the one hand, they are celebrated as financial innovations, allowing 
risk to be borne by those best positioned to do so. After all, derivatives such as interest rate 
swaps enable not only banks but also corporates and pension funds to offset unwanted risks, 
guaranteeing a certain level of financial performance.2 On the other hand, derivatives have 
been associated with “excessive and opaque risk-taking” (BCBS, 2013) and even “market 
manipulation” (Stulz, 2010). They have drawn criticism of financial market “gurus” like 
Warren Buffer and George Soros, describing them as “time bombs”, “financial weapons of mass 
destruction” and “toxic instruments”.3 While facilitating a more liquid transfer of risk derivatives 
introduce counterparty credit risk, because derivative traders can default on their claims. This 
is why the “web of linkages” (Stulz, 2010) derivatives build across financial institutions has 
made financial markets more fragile, considerably attributing to the financial crisis that began 
in 2007. 
The role of derivatives in the financial crisis indeed led to fundamental adjustments in 
regulation of banks in particular and financial markets in general.4 Still, since Warren Buffer 
made his scathing statements about OTC derivatives in 2002 they seem to have only gained 
in popularity at least until the financial crisis. Figure 1 illustrates how outstanding notional 
amounts of financial derivatives skyrocketed since the late 90s. This evolution mirrors an 
increased interest in reducing (hedging) financial risk (especially arising from interest rate 
changes) combined with an enhanced capability in speculation activities. This evolution has 
                                                 
2 See for example the analysis around credit default swaps (CDS) by Stulz (2010) or the publication of 
ISDA (2014b) on end user activity in the OTC market. 
3 The quotes are taken from the financial report of Berkshire Hathaway (2002) in which Charlie Munger and 
Warren Buffer explain their exit from the derivatives business, and from an article written by Soros (2009) in 
which he pleads for banning “naked” credit default swap (CDS). 
4 See the margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives by BCBS (2013). 
  
3 
been accompanied by a new “science”, trying to price derivatives and capture the dynamics 
of the underlying financial risk factors in mathematical terms. Computational finance has 
also been subject to a very controversial discourse. Financial models such as the Black-
Scholes model for pricing options have helped researchers receive the “Nobel Prize”5 in 
economic sciences, being praised for “[paving] the way for economic valuations in many areas and 
[facilitating] more efficient risk management in society”.6  On the other hand, others have deprived 
this research branch of any scientific notion, accusing it of “charlatanism” and in increasing 
system blindness, also referred to as “model dope”.7 
While thoroughly deep-diving into a range of different technical and managerial aspects 
especially around interest rates and credit spreads we aim on maintaining a bird’s view with 
regards to the overall discourse. We especially intend to contribute to the discussion on 
derivatives between the poles of being “innovations” and “time bombs” on the one hand, 
and the discussion around the scientific notions and the value added offered by financial 
models on the other. 
 
                                                 
5 Officially referred to as Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. 
6 See the press release of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science (1997) for awarding the prize to Robert 
Merton and Myron Scholes. Comments in brackets [.] have been added by the author.  
7 See MacKenzie and Spears (2014) for a discussion on the role of copula models in pricing Credit Debt 
Obligations (CDO), analyzing the existence of “model dope”. Mikosch (2005) discuss the use of copula 
functions. Haug and Taleb (2011) analyze the non-use of the Black-Scholed formula for equity options. See 
Taleb (1997) for a  more general critic of derivative pricing. 
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Figure 1: Outstanding Notional Amounts of Over the Counter (OTC) Derivatives 
The figure illustrates the outstanding notional amount of OTC derivatives as given by 
the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) (www.BIS.org). The notional amount 
illustrated includes foreign exchange (FX) derivatives, commodity contracts, credit 
default swaps (CDS) as well as interest rate derivatives.8 
We will start by looking into a classic example of an end user that uses derivatives to offset 
financial risks, analyzing how interest rate swaps can be used to immunize pension funds 
against interest rate changes without affecting the strategic asset allocation. We will elaborate 
on popular asset liability management (ALM) tools used in practice and will analyze the 
possible value added offered by stochastic interest rate models. Our analysis is narrowed to 
the presumably promising model offered by Cairns (2004), proclaiming to model interest 
rates realistically under the risk-neutral measure. For this purpose we develop a novel 
procedure to structure so-called overlays of interest rate swaps. We then analyze the hedge 
effectiveness offered by the overlays when the Cairns model is used to measure sensitivity, 
comparing its performance with a more conventional measure, the duration-based PV01 – 
also referred to as DV01 – metric. 
                                                 
8 Notice that while notional amount is an appropriate indicator of popularity of OTC derivatives, netted 
exposure would be a more adequate metric in indicating risk as it considers netting or collateral agreements. 
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We will then turn to the counterparty credit risk exhibited by financial derivatives, giving a 
compact overview in modeling and managing credit valuation adjustment (CVA), a metric 
that has emerged as a standard method for pricing counterparty credit risk. We also discuss 
the regulatory and accounting landscape behind counterparty credit risk and CVA which also 
flows into a critical analysis of the prevailing discourse. Besides thoroughly discussing key 
technical and managerial aspects around counterparty credit risk and CVA we aim to achieve 
a novel overall evaluation of regulatory efforts on the one hand, and lobbying activities on 
the other. We also synthesize the implications for derivative traders, discussing the 
challenges around pricing CVA and the corresponding limits of risk-neutral valuation, 
especially when it comes to constructing adequate hedges. 
Finally, we discuss the specific case of credit default swaps (CDS), financial instruments in 
which the splits between being an “innovation” and a “time bomb” is most evident. In this 
context we revisit the key characteristics of CDS contracts, and discuss approaches for 
modeling credit risk in general and credit spreads in particular. We show that while CDS can 
be used to mitigate (counterparty) credit risk they are not excluded from exhibiting such risk 
themselves. This is mostly evident if the credit quality of the protection seller and the 
reference entity are interdependent, i.e. if wrong way risk is present. For this purpose we 
revisit an approach offered by Brigo and Capponi (2010) to capture this feature. Besides 
decomposing the approach into its bits and pieces, and elaborating on aspects Brigo and 
Capponi (2010) left relatively open, we also offer a respective computational tune up for the 
model. Subsequently we run a critical evaluation of the Brigo and Capponi (2010) approach 
in particular, and CVA modeling in general. We analyze both the capability of such models 
in delivering an arbitrage-free framework as well as in its use for inter- and intra-
organizational communication. Besides revealing key challenges, risks and limitations, we 
also aim on shedding light on possible benefits and insights offered by such approaches. 
  
6 
1.2. THESIS SUMMARY 
The thesis is structured in two main parts. Part 1 is dedicated to a specific issue around 
interest rate risk management, while Part 2 deals with topics around counterparty credit risk 
management. In the following we give an abstract for each chapter. 
Part 1 covers interest rate risk management, consisting of one chapter: 
‒ Chapter 2: Managing Interest Rate Risks of Pension Funds – An Application of the Cairns 
Model:9 Long-term portfolios consisting of asset and liabilities such as pension funds 
often exhibit significant sensitivities to changes in interest rates. Due to the 
separation of responsibilities and the otherwise unwanted complication, interest rate 
risk management of these portfolios is often done with a so-called derivative overlay 
(as part of asset liability management, ALM). The interest rate sensitivity is 
immunized by adding corresponding derivatives – mostly interest rate swaps – 
without affecting the strategic asset allocation. 
The use of stochastic models in this process is particular and ALM in general is 
limited. One of the main reasons behind this is the lack of respective approaches that 
combine arbitrage-free valuation with realistic modeling of short- and long-term 
interest rate dynamics, a gap the interest rate model of Cairns (2004) proclaims to 
address. We have therefore chosen to apply the Cairns model to the practical 
challenge of immunizing a pension fund against interest rate risk. 
We start by giving an overview on ALM in general and interest rate risk management 
in particular, revisiting the duration-based PV01 metric for measuring interest rate 
                                                 
9 Chapter 2 is an adaptation of previous work of the author published in Balder and Schwake (2011). This 
means that some elaborations, especially in the computational part, are identical. Chapter 2 also uses materials 
already published by the author in Mahayni and Schwake (2013), especially regarding some of the exemplary 
calculations. 
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sensitivity. We describe the key mechanisms of interest rate swaps, elaborating on 
their use in ALM strategies. 
After revisiting the two-factor version of the Cairns model and its main features, we 
derive respective model-based sensitivity measures. We subsequently discuss the use 
of the extended Kalman filter approach in calibrating the parameters of the model.  
This is followed by a comparison of the hedge effectiveness offered by the Cairns 
model with the one given by the PV01 metric. For this purpose we introduce a novel 
rule-based and model-independent algorithm that immunizes pension fund-like 
portfolios against interest rate risk by structuring an overlay of appropriate swaps. 
The hedge effectiveness offered by both overlays is analyzed in a backtesting 
environment and in a Monte Carlo simulation scheme. While we do identify slight 
advantages offered by the Cairns model we are not able to justify its use through 
hedge effectiveness solely, especially if we bear the sophistication of its application in 
mind (compared with the PV01 approach). We, however, conclude that the Cairns 
model can offer an appropriate framework for analyzing investment strategies and 
facilitating respective discussions, especially because it can combine risk-neutrality 
with realistic modeling. 
Part 2 covers counterparty credit risk management, consisting of the two following chapters: 
‒ Chapter 3: Pricing and Managing Counterparty Credit Risk in Theory and Practice. It is at 
the latest since the financial crisis in general and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
particular that the “default-free scheme” has been finally falsified. It has become 
clear that derivative traders are default-prone and that the risk of them defaulting 
impacts derivative prices. The increased significance of counterparty credit risk has 
also drawn the attention of regulators, standard setters and auditors. Those have in 
turn further stressed the significance of the subject matter through more punitive 
rules and regulations. This pressure seems to have pushed derivative traders – 
especially financial institutions – to step up their procedures around pricing, 
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managing and mitigating counterparty credit risk. Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) 
has emerged as a standard method for pricing counterparty credit risk. CVA can be 
interpreted as the cost of hedging the counterparty credit risk of the respective 
position. This introduces a new derivative instrument, usually referred to as 
contingent credit default swap (C-CDS) that, in return to a premium, insures the 
(stochastic) exposure at default. The pricing of a C-CDS (i.e. CVA valuation) usually 
turns out to be a much more elaborate task than pricing the default-free derivative 
itself. 
Chapter 3 intends to give a compact overview in modeling and managing CVA, 
accompanied by a critical analysis of the prevailing discourse. This analysis is the 
heart of the chapter, which aims at exploring the challenges around CVA from 
different angles rather than offering a comprehensive description of all relevant 
aspects. It aims on achieving an overall evaluation of regulatory efforts on the one 
hand, and lobbying activities on the other. 
After giving an overview on counterparty credit risk and CVA literature we study the 
quantification of CVA from a theoretically consistent perspective as well as based on 
a more practical approach. We then turn to the accounting and regulatory landscape, 
revisiting key requirements around counterparty credit risk and CVA risk. 
Subsequently, we give an overview on charging CVA and discuss its allocation across 
an organization in order to allow for adequate incentives. We also discuss the 
possibility to reduce counterparty credit risk, especially through collateralization and 
hedging activities. 
Our analysis enables us to show how financial institutions are heavily driven by 
regulatory requirements that originally aimed to actually mirror how they “do 
business”. We elaborate on how banks not only measure and manage CVA 
according to detailed requirements, but also on how such regulations considerably 
affect the way banks price their products. 
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We also show the limits of arbitrage-free valuation, especially when it comes to 
practical implementation of CVA pricing models or constructing adequate hedges. 
We conclude that clinging to use market implied parameters or elaborate models that 
need overcomplicated calibration without reflecting on their economic sense might 
not only imply mere model and valuation risks, but also significant financial risks at 
the latest when it comes to hedge CVA. 
‒ Chapter 4: Pricing Credit Default Swaps with Wrong Way Risk – Model Implementation and 
Computational Tune Up.10 One possibility for investors to mitigate counterparty credit 
risk is to buy protection in form of a credit default swap (CDS). If the credit quality 
of both protection seller and reference entity are positively interdependent, such a 
“protection” becomes questionable if not worthless. Brigo and Capponi (2010) were 
among the first to propose an arbitrage-free framework to price CDS considering 
this wrong way risk in conjunction with symmetric pricing. 
We start by describing the key mechanisms of CDS contracts, and giving an 
overview on the “competing” approaches for modeling credit risk in general and 
credit spreads in particular. We place the promising approach of Brigo and 
Capponi (2010) within the category of reduced form credit risk models that use 
copula functions to model default dependency. The approach is subsequently 
decomposed into its bits and pieces, allowing a discussion around its benefits and 
pitfalls. We also provide a step-by-step implementation guide, going into detail on 
aspects that Brigo and Capponi (2010) left open, especially the computation of the 
conditional survival probability of the reference entity. We illustrate how the 
fractional Fourier transformation (FRFT) can be used for this purpose, and propose 
a respective computational tune-up through a heuristic approximation. We then use a 
                                                 
10 Chapter 4 is an adaptation of previous work of the author published in Grominski et al. (2012), ). This means 
also that some elaborations, especially the computational part, are identical. 
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case study with real market data to demonstrate the use of the model and the insights 
it delivers. 
Finally, we run a critical evaluation of the Brigo and Capponi (2010) approach in 
particular, and CVA modeling in general. We analyze both the capability of the 
model in delivering an arbitrage-free framework as well as in its use for inter- and 
intra-organizational communication. We show how the model can be used to 
facilitate discussions around the specific case of CVA for CDS contracts with 
considerable wrong way risk. We argue, however, that less elaborate models might 
display more appropriate solutions, avoiding over-complication and higher model 
risks, especially if wrong way risk is assumed to be less significant. After all, while 
Brigo and Capponi (2010) do offer a coherent and risk-neutral framework, they do not 
specify the needed duplication strategy. The lack of instruments to calibrate a risk-
neutral correlation matrix and of a possibility to hedge own credit risk puts a 
question mark on the practicability of the model. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT FOR PENSION FUNDS – AN 
APPLICATION OF THE CAIRNS MODEL 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Funded retirement arrangements like pension funds and life insurance products have 
extreme long-term claims, exceeding 50 or even 60 years. These liabilities are mostly 
financed by bonds with maturities way shorter on the asset side. Besides the duration gap 
produced by the lack of liquid long-term bonds, the providers and asset managers of such 
products have to deal with the risk of interest rates maturing in decades. Due to the 
separation of responsibilities and the otherwise unwanted complication, interest rate risk 
management of these portfolios is often done with a so-called derivative overlay (as part of 
asset liability management, ALM). The interest rate sensitivity is immunized by adding 
corresponding derivatives – mostly interest rate swaps – without affecting the strategic asset 
allocation. 
A common practice in measuring interest rate sensitivity is using the PV01-approach. This 
duration-based metric measures interest rate risk as the change in value due to a shift of the 
interest rate curve. Based on a vector of PV01 metrics an interest rate swap overlay is usually 
introduced in order to (statically) hedge interest rate risks. Although this method might seem 
suspiciously easy for the academic world, it is quite wide spread under practitioners.  
A key motive behind the limited use of theoretically more elaborate models (e.g. stochastic 
interest rate models) is the lack of respective approaches that combine arbitrage-free 
valuation with realistic modeling of short- and long-term interest rate dynamics. While 
celebrated interest rate models such as the ones introduced by Cox et al. (1985), Heath et 
al. (1992) or Miltersen et al. (1997) offer arbitrage-free valuation of derivatives, they are 
presumably less capable in modeling realistic dynamics, especially when it comes to long 
time horizons. On the other hand, actuarial models such the approaches of Wilkie (1995) or 
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Yakoubov et al. (1999) put more emphasis on modeling realistic dynamics but abandon the 
arbitrage-free framework. 
In the meanwhile the risk-neutral model-family for interest rates introduced by Cairns (2004) 
simultaneously models short- and long-term interest rates. Adequately calibrated, the Cairns 
model proclaims to deliver realistic simulation of the whole term structure, making it 
especially promising for the case of pension funds. We have therefore chosen to put the 
model to the test by applying it to structuring swap overlays, and comparing it with the 
popular PV01-approach. 
For this purpose we introduce interest rate sensitivity measures based on the two-factor 
version of the Cairns model. For the construction of the swap overlays we introduce a novel 
algorithm that is rule-based and model independent. Given an interest rate model, the 
algorithm decomposes the interest rate sensitivity of portfolios containing assets and 
liabilities. It then adds swaps to the portfolio in order to immunize it against interest rate 
risks. A subsequent linear optimization defines the optimal notional amounts needed to 
ensure interest rate risk is fully hedged. Using a realistic pension fund portfolio structure we 
compare the hedge effectiveness delivered by the Cairns model with the one offered by the 
PV01-approach. The comparison is done both in a backtest environment and using a Monte 
Carlo simulation scheme. 
The remaining parts of Chapter 2 are structured as follows. Section  2.2 gives an overview of 
interest rate risk management as part of asset liability management (ALM), starting with 
respective definitions and a literature summary given in Subchapter  2.2.1. Being a key and 
popular measure of interest rate risk used in ALM strategies we dedicate Subchapter  2.2.2 to 
the PV01 metric. The basis mechanisms behind the use of interest rate swaps are revisited in 
Subchapter  2.2.3. Section  2.3 then moves to stochastic interest rate models, starting with a 
respective literature summary, given in Subchapter  2.3.1. Subchapter  2.3.2 then describes the 
main features of the chosen Cairns model for interest rates, while Subchapter  2.3.3 revisits 
the methodology chosen for estimating the model parameters (extended Kalman filter). In 
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Subchapter  2.3.4 we derive the sensitivity measures (“Cairns deltas”) that will be used to 
quantify and manage interest rate risk. Section  2.4 introduces a novel procedure for 
structuring an interest rate swap overlay. In Section  2.5 we use a realistic use case to illustrate 
the application of the Cairns approach for modeling and managing interest rate risk within 
pension funds, comparing its performance with the one offered by the PV01 approach. 
After giving an overview on implementing and calibrating the model (given in 
Subchapters  2.5.1 and  2.5.2), we illustrate the structuring of an interest rate swap overlay in 
Subchapter  2.5.3. We test its performance using a backtest approach as well as a Monte 
Carlo simulation scheme, in Subchapter  2.5.4 and Subchapter  2.5.5., respectively. We 
conclude the analysis in Section  2.6. 
Notice that this Chapter is an adaptation of previous work of the author published in Balder 
and Schwake (2011), and that some elaborations, especially the computational part, are 
identical. 11 This Chapter also uses materials already published by the author in Mahayni and 
Schwake (2013), especially some of the exemplary calculations. In order to avoid redundancy 
we will refrain from continuously referring to both papers. 
                                                 
11 Balder (2014) also published an adopted version of Balder and Schwake (2011). 
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2.2. OVERVIEW ON ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT 
2.2.1. DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Asset liability management (ALM) refers to the simultaneous coordination of assets and 
liabilities, aiming on capturing the overarching risk profile. This rather broad term is usually 
reserved to the management of financial assets and liabilities, mostly relevant for financial 
institutions, insurance companies and pension schemes.12 We will focus on the latter and will 
narrow our analysis to interest rate risk management. We acknowledge that ALM within 
pension funds might also cover further risk factors such as inflation, credit spreads and 
longevity risk.13 Still, interest rate risk is presumed as most relevant, leading even to possible 
analogy between the terms ALM and interest rate risk management (IRR) in practice jargon 
(see for example Brick, 2014). 
In the case of pension funds liabilities consist of pension payments to retired plan members 
or ones that will retire in the future.14 These liabilities behave similarly to long-term bonds, 
exhibiting a (relatively high) sensitivity to interest rates. Assets held by pension funds are 
predominantly “fixed income” securities with additional investments in “riskier” markets 
                                                 
12 The definition is inspired amongst others by Sodhi (2005) and Fabbozi et al. (2005). For pension funds one 
also uses the term liability driven investment, LDI (see Ryan, 2013). 
13 This short list of risk factors is not exhaustive. For credit spread modeling we refer the reader to Chapter 3 
of this thesis. For modelling longevity risk see for example Mahayni and Steuten (2013). 
14 Pension payments are paid out according to a predefined procedure. One speaks of “defined contribution” 
(DC) plans, when the pension plan sponsor (e.g. a company) is only obliged to pay pre-determined 
contributions into the fund (e.g. periodically). All remaining investment risk is borne by the pension 
members (e.g. employees). Defined benefit (DB) plans refer, on the other hand, to pension schemes that 
contain (partially) guaranteed payments. Thus, strictly speaking our analysis is limited to DB pension funds. 
The definition of DC plans follows the one used in International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) given 
in IAS 19.7, while the definition of DB plans is derived by negation. 
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such as equities and real estate.15 Still, one usually focuses on fixed income securities when it 
comes to interest rate risk, because of their relatively high portfolio portion and the 
ambiguous interest rate sensitivity of other asset classes. 
In a broader sense ALM strategies offer the foundation for the optimal asset allocation of 
the core portfolio (see also Ryan, 2013). Such optimization schemes will need to consider the 
dynamics of both the liabilities and the assets in an integrated manner, providing answers 
with regards to future contributions and changes in the asset allocation (see Fabozzi et al., 
2005). Prominent examples for such “full-fledged” solutions are given by Mulvey et 
al. (2000) as well as Gondzio and Kouwenberg (2001). The former proposes a stochastic 
planning model, aiming on maximizing the expected wealth while minimizing the risk of the 
pension fund collapsing. They make the case that borrowing (e.g. from the fund sponsor) 
can be optimal at certain situations. Gondzio and Kouwenberg (2001) analyze Dutch 
pension plans, offering a so-called decomposition-based algorithm that is implemented on a 
particular parallel computer. 
A review of stochastic ALM models is given for example in Sodhi (2005), who covers 
models for banks, insurance companies as well as pension funds. He also notes that such 
approaches face methodological and computational challenges. First, they struggle with 
offering a methodologically sound framework to model all the different aspects (e.g. interest 
rates, mortality rates, salary variances etc.), ensuring consistency within the model as well as 
with financial theory. Second, considering a large number of different factors and scenarios 
implies substantial difficulty in solving the optimization problem. Gondzio and 
Kouwenberg (2001) for example report on modeling “4,826,809 scenarios, 12,469,250 
constraints and 24,938,502 variables” stating that it “is the largest stochastic linear program ever solved.” 
There is one further considerable challenge which surrounds the role of models in decision 
                                                 
15 The asset allocation differs significantly from region to region. According to Towers Watson (2015) 
Australian pension schemes invest more than 50% in equity, while the respective figure at Swiss plans is less 
than 30%. 
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making. As put by a fund manager quoted in Fabozzi et al. (2005), the complexity of such 
models makes them appear as a “black box to the investment committee”.  
These challenges give at least a partial explanation why “static” approaches are common in 
ALM strategies (Ryan, 2013). Most prominent examples, especially when it comes to 
managing interest rate risks, are “cash flow matching” and “duration matching“. In the 
following we will give a short description of both techniques. For a more comprehensive 
review we refer the interested reader for example to Fabozzi (2000). Ryan (2013) gives an 
overview regarding the historical development of both methods and ALM for pension funds 
in general. 
Cash flow matching – also referred to as dedication – is attributed amongst others to 
Leibowitz (1986). It follows a rather straightforward logic; one dedicates inflows to expected 
outflows. In its simplest form the technique seeks a set of fixed income securities with 
coupon and notional (re-)payments that mirror the projected withdrawals and pension 
disbursements. Most obvious advantage of this rather conservative approach is its ability to 
robustly mitigate interest rate risk and liquidity risk, while allowing for quite a simple asset 
allocation. Its most considerable pitfall is its absent feasibility. While pension liabilities have 
maturities that exceed 30 years, most liquid fixed income securities (e.g. sovereign bonds) 
have way shorter time to maturities (e.g. 10 years). Moreover, by prescribing the asset 
allocation, the technique limits any possibility of actively managing the assets. 
In contrary to dedication, duration matching aims on immunizing the portfolio against interest 
rate changes through matching the sensitivities of assets and liabilities. The duration concept 
goes back to Macaulay (1938). Its use in managing interest risk is attributed amongst others 
to Redington (1952). More prominent examples of analyzing this static approach were given 
later, e.g. by Fisher and Weil (1971). Duration measures sensitivity to changes in the level of 
interest rates. It is a tractable and easily computed metric that can facilitate discussions 
around the overall interest rate risk of a given portfolio. However, it fails – per definition – 
to capture convexity effects, e.g. exhibited by a bond price when interest rate changes are 
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more material. For this purpose, second order approximations, e.g. dollar convexity 
measures (see Fabbozi, 2000, pp. 68-77), have been proposed. More importantly duration-
based approaches have a significant theoretical shortfall. Not considering possible non-
parallel shifts (i.e. changes in the shape) of the term structure implies inconsistency with 
arbitrage-free valuation, meaning that duration delivers a misleading measurement of risk 
(see Ingersoll et al., 1978).16 A possible solution was introduced by Chambers and 
Carlton (1988) and Ho (1992), proposing the use of duration vectors – also referred to as 
key durations, measuring the sensitivity to yields with differing maturities. 
2.2.2. PV01 AS A MEASURE FOR INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY 
A particular key duration-based measure is PV01 – also referred to as DV01 (dollar value) – 
which measures sensitivity as the change of the present value (PV) due to a shift of the 
interest rate curve by 1 basis point (01). Sensitivity is thus measured as the valuation change 
– here of a zero bond – due to a parallel shift of the interest rate curve of 1 basis point. A 
zero bond with the notional amount ?̈?𝑁 has the following sensitivity to changes in the interest 
rate 𝑟𝑟 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃01 = 110.000 ∙  𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)  
= 110.000 ∙  𝜕𝜕�?̈?𝑁𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)�𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)  
= −104 ∙ (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡) ∙ ?̈?𝑁 ∙ 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) 
(2.1) 
where 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) stands for the value at time 𝑡𝑡 of the zero bond that matures in 𝑇𝑇. Notice that by 
decomposing the portfolio into a stream of cash flows one can estimate a vector of PV01 
metrics. For this purpose the cash flow positions are decomposed into a series of zero 
                                                 
16 This is due to the fact that one can construct “duplication portfolios”, generating structurally superior payoff 
profiles. 
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coupon bonds (ZCB), each with a notional value ?̈?𝑁𝑖𝑖 and maturity 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 . One then generates a 
PV01 metric for each ZCB. This allocates a sensitivity measure to each relevant maturity, 
capturing possible convexities in the spirit of Chambers and Carlton (1988). 
This will be illustrated in the example given in Table 1 below. For this purpose we assume a 
(very) simplified portfolio, consisting of a single obligation with a face value of 50 million 
units, maturing in 5 years. This liability is financed by a single ZCB with a face value of 51 
million units, maturing in 2 years. The vector of PV01 metrics (as well as the total sensitivity) 
is given in Table 1. 
Time period 
𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 
Yield 
 𝒓𝒓(𝟎𝟎,𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊) Discount factor 𝑷𝑷(𝟎𝟎,𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊) Cash flows ?̈?𝑵𝒊𝒊 Present Values (𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 ∙ 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰) PV01 
  1.0000    
1 1.2% 0.9881    
2 1.3% 0.9745 51.000.000 49.691.090 -9.938 
3 1.6% 0.9535    
4 1.7% 0.9348    
5 1.9% 0.9102 -50.000.000 -45.509.188 22.755 
    Total PV01: 12.816 
Table 1: Example for Computing a Vector of PV01 Metrics for a Single Liability 
The table gives a step-by-step guide for PV01 computation using Equation (2.1). In the first 
column the (maturity) time periods are given. The respective (exemplary) sport rates (observed in 
time period 0) are given in column II. Using the sport rates the discount factors are computed 
and given in column III. The (decomposed) cash flows of the portfolio are given in column IV. 
The present value and the PV01 metric are calculated and given in columns V and VI, 
respectively.17 
2.2.3. HEDGING WITH INTEREST RATE SWAPS: BASIC MECHANISMS 
Interest rate risk can be managed via a variety of respective derivative instruments. Most 
prominent example is given by interest rate swaps (IRS). Further examples are floors, caps 
                                                 
17 The example was first presented in Schwake and Mahayni (2013, p. 66). 
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and swaptions (see for example Brigo and Mercurio, 2006). One speaks of overlay 
management if derivatives are being used “on top”, i.e. without affecting the (active) asset 
allocation. In the following we will illustrate how interest rate swaps can be used in hedging 
interest rate risks of portfolios containing assets and liabilities. The objective of the overlay 
strategy is to seek swaps that allow the sensitivity of the asset side to be equal to the 
sensitivity of the liability side, i.e. to immunize the overall portfolio. 
Interest rate swaps (IRS) refer to contracts in which counterparties agree to exchange 
interest payments in a predefined frequency (e.g. monthly) for an agreed upon time period. 
For example while one counterparty pays a fixed rate (in relation to a predefined notional 
amount) the other party pays in return a floating rate (e.g. based on 3 months-Euribor).18 
The compatibility of IRS in hedging is easily seen by duplicating the interest rate derivatives. 
The value at time 𝑡𝑡 of a swap settling in 𝑡𝑡0, maturing in 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 while paying a fixed rate 𝑐𝑐 can be 
written as: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡0) −∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛), 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛]𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=0 . (2.2) 
The swap can thus be duplicated in the following manner. The fixed leg is seen as a portfolio 
of zero coupon bonds with 𝑐𝑐 as their face values. The floating leg is duplicated using a 
position in a bond maturing with the swap in 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛, and a contrariwise bond maturing at the 
end of the forward period in 𝑡𝑡0. In a payer (receiver) swap a short (long) position is built up 
in 𝑡𝑡0 and a long (short) position is built up in 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛. 
The values of both separate legs can thus be written as 
                                                 
18 Interest rate swaps could be constructed to allow for swapping fixed against fixed payments or floating 
against floating payments. Other examples on interest rate swaps (including illustrations) are given in 
Section  3.2. 
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 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡0) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛), 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛] 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡) = �𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖),                     𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛]𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=0
. 
(2.3) 
This means that the fixed leg will have sensitivities towards interest rate changes on every 
payment date of the swap. Yet the more significant sensitivities (for a given time period) will 
arise from the floating leg. A (spot) swap will demonstrate such sensitivity at its maturity, 
while forward swaps will have significant sensitivities at maturity as well as at their first fixing 
date. 
These mechanisms will be illustrated in the following example which builds on the simplified 
framework we used in Subchapter  2.2.2 above. For this purpose we assume a (very) 
simplified portfolio, consisting of a single forward receiver swap. The first fixing date will be 
in 2 years, and the settlement date will take place in 3 years-times, maturing in 5 years from 
now. Table 2 summarizes the decomposed cash flow positions of the swap, using the 
duplication strategy discussed above (see Equation (2.3)). 
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Time period 
𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 
Yield 
 𝒓𝒓(𝟎𝟎,𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊) Discount factor 𝑷𝑷(𝟎𝟎,𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊) Cash flows 𝑵𝑵𝒊𝒊̈  Present Values (𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 ∙ 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰) PV01 
  1.0000    
1 1.2% 0.9881    
2 1.3% 0.9745 -50,000,000 -48,716,754 9,743 
3 1.6% 0.9535 1,149,101 1,095,247 -329 
4 1.7% 0.9348 1,149,101 1,073,560 -429 
5 1.9% 0.9102 51,149,101 46,513,608 -23,257 
    Total PV01: -14,271 
Table 2: Example for Computing a Vector of PV01 Metrics for a Forward Receiver Swap 
The table gives a step-by-step guide for PV01 computation using Equation (2.1). In the first 
column the (maturity) time periods are given in years. The respective (exemplary) yields (observed 
in time period 0) are given in column II. Using the yields the discount factors are computed and 
given in column III. The (decomposed) cash flows of an exemplary forward receiver swap are 
given in column IV according to the duplication strategy (see Equation (2.3)). The present value 
and the PV01 metrics are calculated and given in columns V and VI, respectively.19 
By looking at the sensitivities exhibited by the single liability in the first part of the example 
(see Table 1) and the sensitivity metrics given by the receiver swap (see Table 2) it becomes 
clear why swaps are interesting in hedging interest rate sensitivities of portfolios with a 
duration gap. Although we have not defined a set of swaps that immunizes the portfolio 
against interest rate sensitivities the sensitivity structure offered by the explanatory swap 
basically mirrors the sensitivity structure of the underlying portfolio, already offering a 
(partial) hedge. 
The mechanisms can be summarized as follows:  
• Receiver (payer) swaps reduce (increase) the overall sensitivity to interest rate 
changes – also referred to as reducing (increasing) the duration. 
                                                 
19 The example was first presented in Schwake and Mahayni (2013, p. 67). 
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• Forward receiver (payer) swaps increase (decrease) the sensitivity at the first 
settlement date (end of the forward period) while decreasing (increasing) the 
sensitivity towards the maturity time period of the swap 
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2.3. MODELING INTEREST RATE DYNAMICS 
2.3.1. REMARKS AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Due to the challenging characteristics of interest rate instruments numerous models have 
been developed in order to mathematically capture the dynamics of term structures (i.e. yield 
curves), following these key objectives: 
a. Arbitrage-free and risk-neutral valuation of interest rate derivatives 
b. Realistic modeling of interest rate changes (motivated by Figure 2 below), e.g.: 
i. Dynamics should fit observed historical data 
ii. Interest rates should be non-negative, yet possibly getting close to zero 
iii. Interest rates should be a mean reverting 
iv. Term structures should exhibit a variety of shapes (incl. non-parallel movements) 
v. Long periods with both relatively high and low interest rates should be possible 
At the latest since the work of Black (1976) have option theory and the increasing need for 
derivatives pricing given this research branch a considerable push. Most of the celebrated 
models in this context focus on the valuation of short- and middle-term contingent claims, 
i.e. fulfilling objective (a) rather than objective (b). In the following we will give a short recap 
on prominent examples of stochastic models for interest rates. This summary is largely 
inspired by Brigo and Mercurio (2006) who offer a comprehensive and detailed description 
and analysis of all models, and to whom we refer the interested reader. For the use of 
interest rate models for pricing application see also Hull (2006), and Björk (2009). Andresen 
and Piterbarg (2010 a, b, c) present a more up-to-date and recent analysis of arbitrage-free 
models in three comprehensive volumes. For stochastic basis spread modeling refer to 
Mercurio and Xie (2012). For multi curve modeling and OIS discounting see Hull and 
White (2012b). 
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Prominent examples of so-called short rate models were given by Vasicek (1977), 
Rendleman and Bartter (1980), and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (Cox et al., 1985). These 
approaches are motivated by the fact that the prices of zero coupon bonds are completely 
driven by the probabilistic dynamics of the instantaneous short rate.20 Modeling the short 
rate in a risk-neutral manner will thus enable us to model the whole term structure. The most 
significant pitfall of the models mentioned is that the endogenous term structure delivered 
by the model is not confirmed by (exogenous) market implied ones. A solution has been 
proposed through arbitrage-free short rate models, offered for example by Hull and 
White (1990), Black et al. (1990) as well as Black and Karasinski (1991). Brigo and 
Mercurio (2006) also analyze the shifted CIR model (CIR++), offering an analytically 
tractable approach that fits to current market information. 
 
Figure 2: Historical Evolution of Swap Rates Term Structures 
The figure illustrates historically observed evolution of the term-term structures of 
swap rates (Euribor)21 between June 1999 and June 2010. 
                                                 
20 In Appendix B we revisit the risk-neutral valuation paradigm offered by Harrison and Pliska (1983), showing 
how the dynamics of the instantaneous short rate explain the distribution of zero coupon bond prices. 
21 In line with the practice common during the years observed (especially prior to the financial crisis) the 
Euribor curve contains yields of varying tenors (e.g. 3 months, 6 months etc.). 
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Heath et al. (1992) proposed an arbitrage-free approach to model instantaneous forward 
rates. In contrast to short rate models, the approach is more general and aims to describe the 
dynamics of the whole yield curve directly. The model offers an adequate framework for 
studying the properties of arbitrage freedom, and has gained substantial interest in academic 
literature. The models of Brace et al. (1997) and Miltersen et al. (1997) focused on modeling 
observed (not theoretical) interest rates (e.g. Libor rate). Adding stochastic features to the 
volatility term as in Wu and Zhang (2002) or the introduction of a stochastic basis between 
tenor dependent term structures as in Mercurio (2010) are some of the main adaptations 
done in order to deliver more accurate risk-neutral pricing. 
Although the above mentioned models partially satisfy some of the requirements around 
realistic modelling (e.g. mean reverting), their primary focus remains in achieving arbitrage-
free valuation, offering pricing frameworks for derivatives. In a parallel stream, approaches 
of Wilkie (1995) and Yakoubov et al. (1999) have put more emphasis on the actuarial (risk 
oriented) interest of realistic modeling, i.e. focusing on objective (b) rather than objective (a). 
These time-discrete approaches are not designed for the valuation of interest rate 
instruments and their short-term risk management. 
Cairns (2004) introduced a family of models that aims on satisfying both objectives, i.e. 
allowing for arbitrage-free valuation and realistic modeling of interest rates with diverse 
maturities. This makes the Cairn models promising with regards to managing interest rate 
risk in long-term pension funds. We have, therefore, decided to narrow our analysis to this 
approach, especially studying its ability in delivering a consistent framework for ALM as well 
as any value add it offers if compared to popular static approaches (i.e. duration-based 
PV01). 
2.3.2. THE CAIRNS APPROACH: MODEL FRAMEWORK 
Based on the framework of Flesaker and Hughston (1996), Cairns (2004) introduces a family 
of models that aim to satisfy both the arbitrage-free evaluation and the realistic modeling of 
interest rates with diverse maturities. In the following we will shortly revisit the approach 
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and its main characteristics. For previous work on the family models offered by Cairns see 
also Lutz (2006) and Pfeiffer et al. (2010). 
Cairns (2004) denotes the price at time 𝑡𝑡 of the zero coupon bond 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇), maturing in 𝑇𝑇 as 
follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) =  ∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡
∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0 . (2.4) 
These bond prices are a function of the specified martingale family 
 
𝐻𝐻(𝑢𝑢, 𝑥𝑥) = exp �−𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 + �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
−
12 � 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒−�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1 � 
(2.5) 
for some parameters 𝛽𝛽, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛,𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 , … ,𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛 and 𝑛𝑛 correlated 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 factors with 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  standing for the 
respective correlation coefficient. The 𝑛𝑛 factors are a function of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck 
process, driven by the same number of independent Brownian motions 𝑍𝑍𝚥𝚥�  
 
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖�𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍𝚥𝚥� (𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (2.6) 
with 𝜇𝜇 standing for an additional constant parameter per factor. The matrix 𝐶𝐶 =  (𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖;𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛  is 
defined in such a manner that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶’ represents the correlation matrix for the processes, 
𝑋𝑋1(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡), 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶’ = (𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖;𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛 . The solution of the stochastic differential equation equals 
 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(0) + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓
𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍𝚥𝚥� (𝑠𝑠)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (2.7) 
Given suitably parametrized values for the constants, 𝛽𝛽, 𝛼𝛼, 𝜎𝜎,𝜌𝜌, 𝜇𝜇 and an appropriate number 
of factors, Cairns (2004) shows that the model satisfies the following: 
a) All interest rates are positive 
b) All interest rates can get close to zero 
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c) The model is mean reverting 
d) Long periods with both relatively high and low interest rates are possible 
e) Par yields for long-term bonds should have realistic probabilities of reaching both 
high and low values 
f) The model is preferably time homogeneous 
g) The constant parameters in the model need no regular recalibration 
While most of these characteristics have already been targeted by other models, points (d) 
and (e) are the unique ones that distinguish the Cairns-model at most. For the derivation of 
these characteristics the 𝛼𝛼-parameters are vital. These are the parameters that drive the 
mean-reverting Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes. Given at least one rather low 𝛼𝛼-term will lead 
to one factor 𝑋𝑋 being subject to long-term cycles, feeding through to long-term cycles in 
interest rates. Furthermore, such a parameter would allow par yields on long-term bonds to 
vary over a wide range. Meanwhile, Cairns (2004) shows that the 𝛽𝛽-term can be interpreted 
as a long-term forward interest rate. 
In the following we will narrow the analysis to the two-factor version of the model, i.e. 
having 𝑋𝑋1 and 𝑋𝑋2 factors. As noted by Cairns (2004) two factors already enable the 
demonstration of key features of the multi-factor version.22 Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics 
of the term structure under the use of the two-factor version. While Subfigure (a) 
demonstrates the ability of generating various changes with respect to the curvature of the 
term structure, Subfigure (b) illustrates the overall dynamics, incl. the ability of modeling 
relatively low as well as relatively high yield curves without re-calibrating the model. 
                                                 
22 Jamshidian and Zhu (1997) for example show that three factors explain 93% to 94% of interest rate 
dynamics. They also show that two factors already explain up to 91% of variations in the yield curve, while 
one factor will exhibit an explanatory power of 68% to 76%. Interestingly, Rebonato (1998) indicates that 
one factor models can already explain up to 92% of the dynamics, while two factors might capture 99.1% of 
the variations. 
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As discussed in Cairns (2004) the measure under which the term shown in Equation (2.4) is 
a martingale can either be interpreted as a real-world measure ℙ or a risk-neutral measure ℚ. 
Using the risk-neutral measure ℚ will allow endogenously generated prices to fit market 
prices, standing in line with no arbitrage theory. Theoretically speaking we should opt to use 
the risk-neutral measure ℚ as we are seeking to hedge interest rate risk, i.e. use exogenous 
price information. Our focus is however not limited to “pricing”. We are interested in 
shedding light on the value added offered by the model in managing interest rate risk of 
long-term portfolios, emphasizing the need in generating realistic dynamics of interest rates. 
For this purpose we choose a historical calibration method (i.e. under the real-world measure 
ℙ) as will be discussed in Subchapter  2.3.3. 
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Figure 3: Simulation Results using the Cairns Model 
Own calculation with two state variables using the following parameters: 𝜇𝜇1 =  −2;𝜇𝜇2 =  6;𝛼𝛼1 = 0.6;𝛼𝛼2 = 0.06;𝜎𝜎1 = 0.6;𝜎𝜎2 = 0.4;𝜌𝜌12 = −0.5;𝛽𝛽 =  0.04. In (b) 400 paths of spot rates were 
simulated using the state variables given in (c) and (d). In (a) the state variables have the 
following values: A: 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = (1,3)’, B: 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = (−1,5)’, C: 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = (0,3)’,  
D: 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = (−2,3)′, E: 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = (1,−1)’, F: 𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) = (−8,−4)’. 
  
  
31 
2.3.3. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
In the following we show how the parameters of the two-factor version of the Cairns model 
can be estimated. We subsequently display the robustness of the approach chosen. 
We base the estimation of the parameters of the Cairns model on the so-called extended 
Kalman filter approach. For this purpose we adopt the algorithm described by Lutz (2006). 
The approach has also been analyzed for example by Babbs and Nowman (1999) to calibrate 
generalized Vasicek term structure models. Duan and Simonato (1999) have applied it to 
affine term structure models, and Chen and Scott (2003) have narrowed the analyses to Cox-
Ingersoll-Ross models. In the following we will briefly revisit the main steps of the 
calibration algorithm. For a more comprehensive elaboration we refer the reader to 
Lutz (2006). 
We first define a measure- and a transition formula. Let 𝑦𝑦 stand for the q-number of spot 
rates available. Whereas each spot rate has a maturity of 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 , = 1, … , 𝑞𝑞. The model-value of 
these spot rates is given as 
 
𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) = − 1𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 1𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 log�∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ��������������������
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋(𝑢𝑢);𝜃𝜃)
. (2.8) 
The so-called measure formula describes the relation between the realized and the modeled 
rates is defined as 
 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃) + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 ,    𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁�0,𝑅𝑅(𝜃𝜃)� 
with 𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃) = �𝐺𝐺1(𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃)⋮
𝐺𝐺𝑞𝑞(𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃)� 
(2.9) 
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and 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡(𝜃𝜃) = ��𝜈𝜈12 ⋯ 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 ⋯ 𝜈𝜈𝑞𝑞2��. 
The vector 𝜃𝜃 contains 8 + 𝑞𝑞 parameters �𝜇𝜇1, 𝜇𝜇2,𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝜌𝜌12,𝜎𝜎1,𝜎𝜎2, 𝜈𝜈1, … , 𝜈𝜈𝑞𝑞� that need to be 
estimated. Because of the normality of 𝐺𝐺(𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡),𝜃𝜃) we first linearize the measure function. 
Using 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖
𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)� =  𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢, the gradient ∇𝑓𝑓= 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥; 𝜃𝜃) = � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥; 𝜃𝜃), 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥; 𝜃𝜃)� 
is defined as 
 
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥; 𝜃𝜃) = 1𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 �∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0 ∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0 + ∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
∞
𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗
∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 �. 
(2.10) 
The linearized measuring equation can be written as 
 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 ≈ 𝐺𝐺�𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1; 𝜃𝜃� + 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1�𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 − 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 , 
with 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = � 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓1 𝐺𝐺1�𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1;𝜃𝜃�⋮
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓1
𝐺𝐺𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1; 𝜃𝜃�
      𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓2
𝐺𝐺2�𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1; 𝜃𝜃�
⋮      𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓2
𝐺𝐺𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1; 𝜃𝜃�� ∈ ℝ𝑞𝑞×2. 
(2.11) 
We are interested in the process of two factors under the real-world measure ℙ. As stated by 
Lutz (2006), due to the time-discrete version of Equation (2.7) the two factors (𝑋𝑋) have a 
multivariate normal distribution and can be written as 
 
𝑋𝑋�𝑡𝑡 + ∆𝑡𝑡|𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)� = �𝜇𝜇1(1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼1∆𝑡𝑡)
𝜇𝜇2(1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼2∆𝑡𝑡)������������
=:𝐹𝐹0(𝜃𝜃)
+ �𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼1∆𝑡𝑡0 0𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼2∆𝑡𝑡������������
=:𝐹𝐹1(𝜃𝜃) �
𝑋𝑋1(𝑡𝑡)
𝑋𝑋2(𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡) 
= 𝐹𝐹0(𝜃𝜃) + 𝐹𝐹1(𝜃𝜃)𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡) 
with 𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡) ∼ 𝑁𝑁�0,𝑄𝑄(𝜃𝜃)� 
(2.12) 
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and 𝑄𝑄(𝜃𝜃) = � 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗
�1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�Δ𝑡𝑡��
𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1
2
. 
Starting with a given parameter 𝜃𝜃 and an unconditional expected value for the risk factors 
𝑥𝑥0|0, and the covariance matrix for the factors 𝑃𝑃0|0,  the calculation steps are as follows: 
i. The information in 𝑡𝑡 − 1 is used to calculate the ex-ante proxies for 𝑡𝑡 as follows 
 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡0(𝜃𝜃) + 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1(𝜃𝜃)𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡−1|𝑡𝑡−1, (2.13) 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1(𝜃𝜃)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1|𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡1(𝜃𝜃) + 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 . (2.14) 
ii. Given the new information 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, the forecasting error 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 and the covariance matrix 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 can be estimated using the following equations, respectively 
 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝐺�𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1; 𝜃𝜃�, and (2.15) 
 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1|𝑡𝑡−1𝐷𝐷′𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡. (2.16) 
iii. The proxies can then be corrected as follows: 
 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1|𝑡𝑡−1𝐷𝐷′𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1−1�������������
𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡
𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡, and (2.17) 
 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡 = �𝐼𝐼 − 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1. (2.18) 
iv. The value of the log likelihood function is calculated in the following manner 
 Log𝐿𝐿(𝑦𝑦,𝜃𝜃) = −1
2
∑ 𝑛𝑛log(2𝜋𝜋) + log�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1� + 𝜖𝜖′𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1−1𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡. (2.19) 
The steps i - iv are repeated until 𝜃𝜃� = 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥log𝐿𝐿(𝑦𝑦,𝜃𝜃) is found, i.e. until the likelihood 
function is maximized. 
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Testing the Calibration Approach 
In order to test the consistency of our calibration technique we ran an in-sample test. We 
calibrated the model parameters based on simulated interest rate curves. Given the starting 
values with lower and upper bounds as seen in Table 3 we simulated the spot yields with the 
following yearly maturities: 1-10, 20, 30, 40 and 50. The measuring error for each maturity 
𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜐𝜐2) was simulated with 𝜐𝜐 = 0.001. In each one of the 300 simulations, 25 monthly 
interest rate curves were generated. These curves where then used to calibrate the model 
(using the extended Kalman filter approach). The average of the calibrated parameters and 
their standard deviations are also given in Table 3. We conclude that although the calibration 
results show some room for improvement (especially with regards to 𝜇𝜇1 and 𝜇𝜇2), they still 
suffice for our purpose.23 
 𝝁𝝁𝟏𝟏 𝝁𝝁𝟐𝟐 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏 𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐 𝝈𝝈𝟏𝟏 𝝈𝝈𝟐𝟐 𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐 𝜷𝜷 𝛎𝛎 
Simulation input          
Parameters -1.20 0.87 0.48 0.07 -0.62 0.43 0.44 0.06 0.001 
Calibration input          
Start values -2.00 -2.00 0.30 0.05 -0.60 0.50 0.40 0.04 0.001 
Lower bound -4.00 -4.00 0.20 0.02 -0.80 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.000001 
Upper bound 10.00 10.00 0.80 0.20 0.80 0.60 0.60 0.08 0.01 
Calibration results          
Mean -1.56 2.17 0.38 0.15 -0.84 0.62 0.50 0.06 0.001 
Standard deviation 3.09 1.49 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Table 3: Results for Testing the Capability of the Kalman Filter Approach in Calibrating the Cairns Model 
The table summarizes results of testing the applicability of calibrating the two-factor version of the 
Cairns model using the extended Kalman filter approach. For this purpose a Monte Carlo 
simulation was conducted based on the input parameters seen in the third row of the table. Based 
on the simulated term-structures the model was calibrated, starting with the values seen in the fifth 
                                                 
23 Separate calculations have shown that 𝜇𝜇1 and 𝜇𝜇2 have a negligible impact on the sensitivity measure we will 
introduce. Balder (2014) for example ignores these parameters all together. 
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row while being restricted by the given lower and upper bounds. The results of the calibration 
(mean and respective standard deviation) are given per parameter in the last two rows of the table. 
2.3.4. MEASURING INTEREST RATE SENSITIVITY  
In the following we propose a possible sensitivity measure using the Cairns model. The 
objective is ultimately to use this measure in a respective immunization strategy in the spirit 
of delta hedging as for example discussed in Jarrow and Turnbull (1994). In contrast to the 
short rate or market models described above, the Cairns model is not able to represent bond 
prices as a function of an (instantaneous) interest rate. This eliminates the possibility of 
estimating the sensitivity of bond prices with respect to interest rates. We therefore offer the 
derivative with respect to the risk factors 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 as an alternative and label it as Cairn delta ∆𝑖𝑖 (in 
short, delta). 
Using the basic dynamics for the Cairns model seen in Equation (2.4) gives the following 
first derivative with respect to factor 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 
 
∆𝑖𝑖= 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝜕𝜕𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 = 
�∫ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒
−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞
𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡
��∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0 �
�∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0 �2
−
�∫ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒
−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞
0
��∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡 �
�∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0 �2 . 
(2.20) 
Figure 2 shows the usual course of the delta measure as a function of time to maturity, 
allowing for an additional “zoom”, illustrating the sensitivities in the short-term in more 
detail. In the case of the two-factor version of the model, 𝑋𝑋1 and 𝑋𝑋2 drive the bond prices 
that are in return a function of the mean-reverting parameters 𝛼𝛼1 and 𝛼𝛼2, respectively.  
Notice that the delta-values first rise (absolutely), reaching a "maturity level". This level 
seems to vary from one factor to another. At some point in time the sensitivity measures 
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converge to zero. It becomes apparent that the second risk factor captures longer time 
cycles, feeding ultimately into the dynamics of long-term interest rates, affirming the 
observation made by Cairns (2004) that one relatively low value for the parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 (in this 
case 𝛼𝛼2 = 0.03) will allow for this feature. This means for example that bonds with maturities 
of 10 years are way more sensitive to changes in 𝑋𝑋2 than in 𝑋𝑋1. 
 
Figure 4: Sensitivity Measures of Bond Prices Using the Cairns Model as a Function of Time to Maturity 
Using the two-factor version of the Cairns model the figures display the course of the 
first derivative of bond prices with respect to 𝑋𝑋2 and 𝑋𝑋1. The remaining (constant) factors 
of the model are: 𝜇𝜇1 = −2.12,𝜇𝜇2, = 8.89; 𝛼𝛼1 = 0.44; 𝛼𝛼2 = 0.03;  𝜎𝜎1 = 0.43;  𝜎𝜎2 = 0.60;  𝜌𝜌12 = −0.59;  𝛽𝛽 = 0.03. 
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2.4. PROCEDURE FOR STRUCTURING AN OPTIMAL SWAP-OVERLAY 
In the following we will illustrate how a set of interest rate swaps is defined in order to 
immunize a pension-fund-like portfolio, i.e. how to structure a swap overlay that minimizes 
the volatility of the “funding-status” (present value of the assets / present value of the 
liabilities). We assume that the pension fund is closed, meaning that no additional 
contributions are expected, i.e. inflows stem only from held assets. 
We start by decomposing the portfolio into its netted cash flows. These cash flow positions 
can be seen as a set of zero coupon bonds (ZCB) that need to be hedged individually, e.g. if 
we have 50 yearly cash flows we will need 50 hedge instruments to achieve an optimal hedge. 
For each ZCB we derive the interest rate sensitivity ∆𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠  as follows 
 ∆𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 = ∆𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚,   𝑚𝑚 ∈ [1, … ,𝑀𝑀] (2.21) 
whereas 𝑀𝑀 is the time of maturity of the portfolio and 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚 stands for the netted cash flow at 
time period 𝑚𝑚. In our example ∆𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚 is calculated using Equation (2.20), where 𝑖𝑖 stands for the 
risk factor considered (i.e. either 1 or 2 as we are applying the two-factor version of the 
Cairns model). One can of course replace ∆𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠  through the PV01 measure given in 
Equation (2.1). 
In line with common practice we aggregate the cash flow sensitivities into buckets, i.e. we 
reduce the number of ZCB and thus the number of hedge instruments needed. The 
theoretical rationale behind buckets would be that interest rate sensitivities of neighboring 
time periods (especially with long-term maturities) exhibit a relatively high correlation, e.g. 
yields with time to maturity between 10 and 15 years will be subject to similar dynamics. The 
practical rationale would be that liquid interest rate swaps are available for a set of maturities, 
predefining the bucket structure. 
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This means that for each bucket 𝑗𝑗 the sensitivities are calculated in the following manner 
 
∆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡= � ∆𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗
∙ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚,    𝑗𝑗 ∈ [1, … , 𝑝𝑝], 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,2] (2.22) 
with the vectors 𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 containing the starting and ending time periods of the 𝑝𝑝 time 
buckets considered. 
In Algorithm 1 below we give the pseudo code to define the swaps needed for the overlay, 
given a portfolio cash flow 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹� , i.e. the code defines the number of swaps, their settlement 
dates, maturity dates and respective swap rates.24 The index 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1, … , 𝑝𝑝] takes on the value 
1 once the bucket 𝑖𝑖has been immunized and 0 otherwise. 
For each chosen interest rate swap 𝑗𝑗 and time period 𝑖𝑖 we define 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  as follows 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  = � 1𝑐𝑐(1 + 𝑐𝑐)0             
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = first settlement date                
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = payment date prior maturity
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = maturity                                      elsewhere.                                             
(2.23) 
For each bucket ℎ and each swap 𝑙𝑙 (and delta 𝑘𝑘) we then define 
 
𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏,Δ𝑘𝑘 = � Δ𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑙𝑙 ∈= [1, …𝑚𝑚], ℎ ∈ �1, … , ?̈?𝑁𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡�, 𝑘𝑘 ∈ [1,2]𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙
𝑖𝑖=𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙
. (2.24) 
The final step is solving the following linear equation and finding the optimal values of the 
vector ?̈?𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 ∈ (−∞, +∞), containing the notional values of the swaps: 
                                                 
24 The algorithm is inspired by Bemmann (2008). It, however, differs in its criteria for choosing the relevant 
buckets and the respective swaps. More importantly, it does not remain in the stepwise optimization, but 
uses a linear optimization for to achieve the hedge. 
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. (2.25) 
Algorithm 1 : An algorithm for choosing 𝒑𝒑 swaps to net interest rate sensitivity 
Calculate ∆�𝟏𝟏 and ∆�𝟐𝟐 (e.g. as in Equation (2.20)) 
for 𝒊𝒊 =  𝟏𝟏 to 𝒑𝒑 do 
for  𝒊𝒊 = 𝟏𝟏 to 𝒑𝒑 do 
if 𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊  =  𝟎𝟎 then           (with 𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊, 𝒊𝒊 ∈ [𝟏𝟏, … ,𝒑𝒑] taking on the value 1 once bucket 𝒊𝒊 has been netted, 0 
otherwise.) 
Calculate the delta values for each bucket to be netted 
∆�𝟏𝟏(𝒊𝒊) = ∆𝟏𝟏,𝒊𝒊𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃= � ∆𝟏𝟏,𝒎𝒎𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒓𝒃𝒃 ∙ 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒃𝒃𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊
𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊
 
∆�𝟐𝟐(𝒊𝒊) = ∆𝟐𝟐,𝒊𝒊𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃= � ∆𝟐𝟐,𝒎𝒎𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒓𝒓𝒃𝒃 ∙ 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒎𝒎𝒃𝒃𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒆𝒊𝒊
𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒊𝒊
 
end if 
end for 
Calculate ∆𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏
𝒋𝒋 = min(∆�𝟏𝟏) and ∆𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒃𝒃 = max(∆�𝟏𝟏)  
if ∆𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏
𝒋𝒋 < 𝟎𝟎 and ∆𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒋𝒋 > 𝟎𝟎 then 
Construct an appropriate forward swap 
set settlement date: 𝒃𝒃𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊 = 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒋𝒋 
set maturity date: 𝒃𝒃𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 = 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃 
set swap rate: 𝒃𝒃 = 𝑷𝑷�𝒃𝒃,𝒃𝒃𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊 �−𝑷𝑷(𝒃𝒃,𝒃𝒃𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 )
∑ 𝑷𝑷(𝒃𝒃,𝒃𝒃𝒛𝒛)𝒏𝒏𝒛𝒛=𝟏𝟏  
else 
∆𝒏𝒏𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃
𝒍𝒍 = 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎��∆𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 �, �∆𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒊 �� 
Build an appropriate spot swap 
set settlement date: 𝒃𝒃𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊 = 𝟎𝟎 
set maturity date: 𝒃𝒃𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 = 𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒃𝒍𝒍 
set swap rate: 𝒃𝒃 = 𝟏𝟏−𝑷𝑷(𝒃𝒃,𝒃𝒃𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊 )
∑ 𝑷𝑷(𝒃𝒃,𝒃𝒃𝒛𝒛)𝒏𝒏𝒛𝒛=𝟏𝟏  
end if 
end for 
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Given 𝑝𝑝 buckets - each containing one time period - the swap overlay of 𝑝𝑝 swaps would 
basically mirror the cash flows of the portfolio, netting the payments and thus hedging all 
interest rate risks. Using such an overlay the portfolio would be perfectly "immune" to 
interest rate risks. 
While in the example given above the procedure is constructed to hedge two sensitivity 
parameters, the algorithm can be generalized to hedge 𝑙𝑙 factors. In particular this means that 
we can apply the algorithm to (one) PV01 measure in order to define a respective optimal 
overlay. 
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2.5. CASE STUDY 
2.5.1. REMARKS 
In the following we will illustrate the use of the algorithm proposed in the previous 
Section  2.4 to structure an interest rate swap overlay for an exemplary (but realistic) pension 
fund. The case study will allow the analysis of possible value added offered by using model-
based – instead of duration-based – sensitivities in hedging. Besides examining the hedge 
effectiveness of both approaches, our analysis aims on shedding light on further challenges 
and advantaged offered by applying the two-factor version of the Cairn model in managing 
interest rate risk. 
We base our analysis on a realistic pension-fund structure, leaning on the portfolio illustrated 
by Bemmann (2008). The pension fund has a typical liability structure that is assumed to be 
given (e.g. using the base case scenario of previous actuarial modeling). The pension fund is 
assumed to be fixed and observed in the year 2000. While the bulk of the liabilities will 
mature in 2010 to 2030 years, a substantial portion of the liabilities exhibits a maturity 
between 30 and 50 years. The net present value of liabilities as seen in the year 2000 is 
€ 536.50 mm. The portfolio is funded by fixed income securities (bonds) that exhibit a net 
present value of € 464.69 mm in year 2000. We assume that the majority of the assets will 
mature in the next 10 years, leading to a significant duration gap. We further assume that the 
pension fund does not accept any additional contributions, i.e. inflows stem only from held 
assets. Finally, we introduce a cash account with € 71.82 mm, initializing the funding status 
at 1. 
2.5.2. PREPARATIONS – MODEL CALIBRATION 
We start by calibrating the parameters of the Cairns model. Again, we acknowledge the need 
to calibrate the model to fit market implied information (i.e. under the risk-neutral measure 
ℚ), especially when it comes to pricing and hedging. We have, however, deliberately decided 
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to base the calibration on historical data to test the ability of the model in offering realistic 
dynamics of interest rates. For this purpose we apply the extended Kalman filter approach 
described in Subchapter  2.3.3 to 10 years of historical data from the European swap market 
as illustrated in Figure 2 above. In particular the calibration uses monthly swap rate curves 
from June 2000 to June 2010. In each curve the yields of the following 20 yearly maturities 
are drawn: 1-12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, and 50. The following Table 4 summarizes the 
calibration results per parameter, also exhibiting the maximum log likelihood value achieved 
 𝝁𝝁𝟏𝟏 𝝁𝝁𝟐𝟐 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏 𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐 𝝈𝝈𝟏𝟏 𝝈𝝈𝟐𝟐 𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐 𝜷𝜷 log𝑳𝑳 
Calibrated parameters -2.12 8.98 0.44 0.03 0.43 0.60 -0.59 0.03 16,677 
Table 4: Calibration Results of the Cairns Model using Historical Interest Rate Curves 
The table summarizes the estimations of the constant parameters of the two-factor version of the 
Cairns model. The estimation has been done using monthly Euribor curves seen in Figure 2. The 
calibration method is based on the extended Kalman filter approach. 
Recall that the extended Kalman filter approach assumes normally distributed measuring 
error for each maturity 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜐𝜐2). In our case this means that in addition to the eight 
parameters seen in Table 4 the calibration approach also delivers 20 standard deviation 
values 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1 − 12, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50} as seen in Figure 5. It becomes apparent that 
the two-factor model is especially able to deliver a good-fit for the dynamics of yields with 
yearly maturities between 9 and 15. For short-term yields as well as for maturities exceeding 
30 years, the calibration seems to deliver somewhat less accurate results. This might result 
from the fact that the calibrated model integrates only two risk factors. Three and more 
factors might minimize the measuring error. 
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Figure 5: Volatility of the Measuring Error Used in the Calibration of the Cairns Model 
The graph illustrates the estimated standard deviation (volatility) 𝜐𝜐 of the measuring errors 
𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜐𝜐2) per maturity 𝑡𝑡 while calibrating the two-factor version of the Cairns model to 
historical data (Euribor curves from June 2000-June 2010). 
2.5.3. STRUCTURING AN OPTIMAL SWAP-OVERLAY 
Following the procedure described in Section  2.4 we start by decomposing the portfolio into 
netted (yearly) cash flow positions (that can be interpreted as separate ZCB with differing 
notional amounts and maturities). We then apply the model-based sensitivity measures given 
in Equation (2.20) to the ZCB positions, measured in ∆1 and ∆2. The result is shown in 
Figure 6. In parallel we also apply the PV01 measure given in Equation (2.1), accordingly. 
Figure 6 demonstrates the different dependencies, the two deltas have on time to maturity. 
Both ∆1 and ∆2 exhibit decreasing sensitivity parameters with increasing time to maturity. 
This stands in line with the higher volatilities of shorter interest rates (made visible in Figure 
2). In the years following 2010, ∆2 seems to be significantly larger than ∆1, showing the 
responsibility of the second risk factor for the longer-term interest rate dynamics. The 
figures resemble the common course of sensitivities, pension funds usually exhibit. 
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a) Delta 1 of the Portfolio (I) 
 
b) Delta 2 of the Portfolio (I) 
Figure 6: The Course of Interest Rate Sensitivity of an Exemplary Pension Fund (I) 
The figures illustrate ∆1 (delta 1) and ∆2 (delta 2) exhibited by the netted cash flows of the 
exemplary pension fund. 
In line with the procedure described in the previous section we assume a pre-defined bucket 
structure, given in Table 5. In practice such a structure would be a function of the liquidity 
of the swap market, i.e. building buckets around the time horizons for which spot and 
forward swaps can be easily traded. Further considerations of possibly higher volatility of 
short-term yields might play a further role in defining the buckets. One must, however, 
acknowledge that the final structure will not be free of arbitrariness. 
Bucket Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Begin 2001 2002 2003 2006 2011 2016 2021 2031 2041 
End 2001 2002 2005 2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Table 5: Predefined Bucket Structure 
The table summarizes the exemplary (and simplified) bucket structure to be used in the case study. 
9 buckets with a decreasing granularity are assumed. While the first two buckets consist only of 
one year of cash flow each, the 9th bucket entails 9 years. 
Given the yearly sensitivities and the bucket structure we design two swap overlays; one 
based on the Cairns deltas, and one based on the PV01 measure. For this purpose we run 
Algorithm 1 twice to define the needed swaps for each overlay. The respective notional 
amounts are found by running the linear optimization scheme, following Equation (2.25). 
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Table 6 summarizes the chosen swaps if the model-based deltas are used. As expected the 
number of swaps equals the predefined number of buckets. The total notional amount of the 
swap overlay is € 440.38 mm. In comparison, using the PV01 measure would deliver a 
notional amount of € 419.35 mm. The smaller notional amount is due to the fact that the 
PV01-approach hedges only one sensitivity measure (not two risk factors).25 
Swap Life time Receiver/Payer Notional (€ mm) Swap Rate 
Swap I 2003-2021 Receiver 142.24 6.31% 
Swap II 2006-2031 Receiver 149.20 6.36% 
Swap III 2021-2041 Receiver 20.99 6.02% 
Swap IV 2000-2011 Payer 24.67 5.92% 
Swap V 2000-2031 Payer 42.88 6.12% 
Swap VI 2000-2041 Receiver 33.62 6.10% 
Swap VII 2000-2002 Payer 8.52 5.34% 
Swap VIII 2000-2001 Receiver 0.07 5.04% 
Swap IX 2000-2016 Receiver 18.20 6.05% 
Table 6: Swap Overlay Structure Using the Cairns Model 
The table summarizes the swaps chosen to immunize the pension fund against interest rate risks. 
Their settlement date, maturity date (life time) and swap rate are defined by Algorithm 1. The 
notional amounts are an output of the linear optimization given in Equation (2.25) which also 
defines the feature “receiver” or “payer” according to the sign (-/+) of the amount chosen. 
The plotted gray bars in the Figure 7(a) and Figure 7(b) show the sensitivities remaining after 
the introduction of the overlay. These figures show the extreme sensitivities that are built up 
on the level of the payment dates. After all, the algorithm treats sensitivity on bucket level. 
                                                 
25 In order to match the cash flows the portfolio, an overlay of 50 swaps would be needed. Using the algorithm 
described in the previous chapter such an overlay would have a total notional amount of € 589.67 mm. 
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c) Delta 1 of the Portfolio (II) 
 
d) Delta 2 of the Portfolio (II) 
Figure 7: The Course of Interest Rate Sensitivity of an Exemplary Pension Fund (II) 
The figures exhibit ∆1 (delta 1) and ∆2 (delta 2) before and after the hedge on the level of the 
payment dates. On this level extreme sensitivities might be built (like the negative bar seen in 
the year 2021) while on bucket level the sensitivities are hedged. 
2.5.4. HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS – BACKTEST APPROACH 
Following the approach given in Bemmann (2008) we “backtest” the effectiveness of the 
hedging strategy, i.e. we retrospectively test the effectiveness delivered from June 2000 to 
June 2010. 
The backtesting approach works as follows. We evaluate the assets and liabilities using the 
respective curve at each subsequent period, using an annual frequency (starting with June 
2001). We assume no re-investments, i.e. all inflows (interest payments from bonds and 
swaps and notional repayments) are transferred into the cash account. The cash account is 
used to settle all outflows (interest payments and pensions). Throughout the backtesting 
period the swap overlay is assumed not to have been re-adjusted. 
Notice that we base our backtesting approach on the same sample used to calibrate the 
parameters of the Cairns model, i.e. allowing for an in-sample test of the internal consistency 
of the model. We acknowledge that a proper out-of-sample analysis would be needed to test 
the prediction power of the model. Yet, we are more interested in testing the capabilities of 
the model in capturing realistic dynamics and in consistently being able to measure the 
  
47 
respective sensitivities, leaving analysis regarding the prediction power of the model for 
future work. 
 
a) Funding Status with and without an Overlay 
 
b) Funding Status with a Cairns- and a PV01 Overlay 
 
c) Portfolio Value and Overlay Value 
Figure 8: Backtesting Results for a Swap-Overlay Structure 
The figures display the results of backtesting the structured swap overlay. Subfigure (a) illustrates 
the funding status with and without an overlay. Subfigure (b) compares the hedge effectiveness 
delivered by using the Cairn deltas on the one hand and the PV01 metric on the other. Subfigure 
(c) illustrates the change in the value of the underlying portfolio (consisting of assets and 
liabilities) in comparison with the change in the value of the swap overlay. 
The results of the backtest are given in Figure 8. The underlying portfolio seems to have 
been relatively vulnerable, especially to the more recent decline in interest rates (seen in 
Figure 2). This development would have influenced the funding status of the portfolio 
massively as seen in Figure 8(a). The funding status of the non-hedged portfolio would have 
reached approximately 0.7. It becomes evident that both overlay structures (by either using 
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the Cairns deltas or by using the PV01 approach) deliver a similar and effective hedge, 
stabilizing the funding status around 1. This is possible because the changes in the value of 
the overlay mirror the changes in the underlying portfolio, seen in Figure 8(c).26  
We conclude that the backtest approach is able to confirm the internal consistency of the 
model and to ensure the robustness of the offered algorithm. 
2.5.5. HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS – MONTE CARLO SIMULATION APPROACH 
In a final step we use a Monte Carlo simulation scheme to analyze the dynamics of the 
underlying portfolio and effectiveness of the overlay under a complete distribution function. 
For this purpose we simulate 5.000 values for two risk factors (𝑋𝑋1 and 𝑋𝑋2), generating 
discount factors with maturities 1 - 50 years. The simulation is based on the parameters 
calibrated and given in the Table 4 above. Per scenario we evaluate the underlying portfolio 
and the swap overlay (which is assumed to be left unadjusted). 
Table 7 summarizes the distribution parameters of the funding status for the strategies in 
comparison. While the average and median values deliver no differences, the hedge 
effectiveness becomes evident through the comparison of the minimum and maximum 
values. While a non-hedged portfolio exhibits a funding status ranging from 0.74 to 1.49, the 
PV01-overlay would shrink that range to 0.9562 - 1.0132. The Cairns-overlay would then 
minimize the range to 0.9587 - 1.0090. This is also apparent when comparing the short fall 
probabilities. Using the target funding status of 0.98 the Cairns-overlay decreases the 
probability from 77% to 7%, while the PV01-overlay still has a short probability of 10%. 
                                                 
26 We acknowledge that asset managers would probably readjust such static hedges frequently (e.g. on a 
monthly basis). Still, our static approach is able to deliver a quite robust hedge so that we at this part did not 
see the necessity for a dynamic hedging strategy. 
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Swap Cairns overlay PV01 overlay No overlay 
Minimum 0.9587 0.9562 0.7417 
Maximum 1.0090 1.0132 1.4866 
Median 0.9966 0.9958 1.1236 
Average 0.9939 0.9933 1.1336 
Standard Deviation 0.0077 0.0085 0.1559 
Prob.( coverage < 1) 77% 74% 20% 
Prob.(coverage < 0.98) 7% 10% 17% 
Prob.(coverage < 0.96) 0% 0% 13% 
Table 7: Distribution Parameters of the Simulated Funding Status in Comparison 
The table illustrates the results delivered by the Monte Carlo simulation scheme, summarizing the 
different distribution metrics for the three strategies: 1) structuring an overlay based on Cairns 
deltas; 2) structuring an overlay based on PV01 measures, 3) leaving the underlying portfolio 
without a hedge. The overlay is structured according to the procedure given in Subchapter  2.4. 
The simulation is based on the parameters calibrated and given in the Table 4 above. 
The delivered results are illustrated in Figure 9. Subfigures 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) show the 
histograms of the different strategies, strengthening the stated results. SubFigure 9(d) plots 
simulated funding status of the non-hedged portfolio and hedged portfolio in comparison, 
showing the hedge efficiency and the avoided volatility. 
The results delivered reconfirm that the algorithm offered is model consistent. This means 
that if the model parameters are accurately calibrated, the demonstrated strategy would 
deliver a plausible hedge. Although quite insignificant, immunizing against two factors 
(deltas) would deliver slightly better results than hedging a vector of PV01 metrics. 
More importantly, having a model in place allows portfolio managers to run a Monte Carlo 
simulation. Even if the simulation scheme is not fully integrated in the optimization 
procedure portfolio managers can leverage on such approaches to “open up possibilities […] to 
reason on, to be aware of fat-tail risk, risky events” (Fabozzi et al., 2005). Monte Carlo simulation 
thus offers a tool-kit for portfolio managers to analyze risks, offering a framework to discuss 
risks and respective mitigation actions. 
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a) Distribution of the Funding Status with an Overlay (Cairns) 
 
b) Distribution of the Funding Status without an Overlay 
 
c) Distribution of the Funding Status with an Overlay (PV01) 
 
d) Hedged and Unhedged Funding Status in Comparison 
Figure 9: Monte Carlo Simulation Results for a Swap-Overlay 
The figures illustrate the results delivered by the Monte Carlo simulation scheme: Subfigures (a), 
(b) and (c) show the histograms of the different strategies, strengthening the stated results. 
Subfigure (d) plots resulting funding status of the non-hedged portfolio and hedged portfolio. 
The overlay is structured according to the procedure given in Subchapter  2.4. The simulation is 
based on the parameters calibrated and given in the Table 4 above. 
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2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have started by going through the spectrum of ALM strategies in general and interest 
rate risk management of pension funds in particular, concluding that the practical use of 
stochastic models is limited. Static approaches such as the duration-based PV01 measure 
seem to be structurally preferred by asset managers despite their theoretical pitfalls. A key 
motive behind the limited use of stochastic models is the lack of respective approaches that 
combine arbitrage-free valuation with realistic modeling of short- and long-term interest rate 
dynamics, a gap Cairns (2004) proclaims to address. We have therefore chosen to apply the 
Cairns model to the practical challenge of immunizing a pension fund against interest rate 
risk, analyzing its ability in actually closing that gap. 
After revisiting the two-factor version of the Cairns model and its main features, we derived 
respective sensitivity measures (deltas). We then discussed the use of the extended Kalman 
filter approach in calibrating the parameters of the model. By going through these steps we 
hoped to shed light on the relevant complexities and implementation challenges. 
At the heart of our analysis was the comparison of the hedge effectiveness offered by the 
Cairns model with the one given by the popular PV01 metric. For this purpose we 
introduced a rule-based and model-independent algorithm that immunizes pension fund-like 
portfolios against interest rate risk by structuring an overlay of appropriate swaps. Using a 
realistic example of a pension fund we subsequently ran the algorithm twice, structuring two 
possible overlays, one using model-based sensitivities (Cairns overlay) and one using the 
PV01 measures (PV01 overlay). 
First, the hedge effectiveness offered by both overlays was analyzed in a backtesting 
environment in which both overlays exhibited similarly satisfying results. Second, a Monte 
Carlo simulation was applied. By observing a wider range of respective scenarios the 
simulation scheme was able to identify the slight advantage offered by the Cairns model. The 
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use of the model can thus not be motivated by higher hedge effectiveness, especially if we 
bear the sophistication of its application in mind (compared with the PV01 approach). 
As made apparent by the Monte Carlo simulation using a model-based approach offers 
further advantages as summarized in the following statement cited in Fabozzi et al. (2005): 
“[I]t allows one to simulate dynamic investment strategies. It gives you the distributions, the 
confidence levels. 
By reducing uncertainty, modeling allows better decision making. Using powerful modeling 
tools, management can analyze scenarios and observe, through computer simulations, the 
future consequences of decisions.”  
Having that said, the Cairns model offers a possible framework for such analysis, facilitating 
discussions around investment and especially because it can combine risk-neutrality with 
realistic modeling. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
PRICING AND MANAGING COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we looked into modeling and pricing interest rate derivatives, 
implicitly assuming that no further risk factors are material. We have in particular assumed, 
either that the counterparties dealing with such OTC derivatives are default-free or that their 
default will have no considerable effect on the derivative’s value. Our assumption seems to be 
aligned with the prevailing view, at least prior to the financial crisis. This becomes apparent 
when looking at prominent textbooks in financial risk modeling and derivatives pricing such 
as Hull (2006), Björk (2009), Rebonato (2002) or vastly cited publications such as Miltersen 
et al. (1997) or Brace et al. (1997) – just to name a few – in which counterparty credit risk is 
either mentioned as by-the-way-issue or is missing completely. 
Although from a risk management and a regulatory perspective there seems to have been – 
at least to a certain degree – an awareness for the inherent credit risk in OTC derivatives, e.g. 
the regulatory framework Basel II required financial institutions to capitalize the default risk 
inherent in their OTC portfolios, the incorporation of this element in pricing theory has 
been sporadic at best. 
It is at the latest since the financial crisis in general and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
particular that the “default-free scheme” has been finally falsified. It has become clear that 
derivative traders – also AAA-rated investment banks – are default-prone and that their 
default considerably impacts prices. Major financial institutions claim to have started pricing 
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and managing counterparty credit risk on a systematic basis before the crisis.27 Still, it was 
the credit deterioration and the overall spread volatility during the financial crisis that finally 
inaugurated counterparty credit risk as a significant risk factor that must be incorporated in 
pricing.28 This has been empirically confirmed for example by Arora et al. (2012) and 
becomes apparent if we look at the increasing number of publications that are dedicated to 
modeling, pricing and managing counterparty credit risk such as Brigo and Pallavicini (2008), 
Gregory (2009), Brigo and Capponi (2010) or Lipton and Sepp (2009) and textbooks such 
Cesari et al. (2009), Canabarro (2010), Gregory (2012), or Brigo et al. (2013a). This list is non 
exhaustive and can be extended if necessary. 
The significance of counterparty credit risk has also drawn the attention of the regulators, 
standard setters and auditors, who in return further stressed the significance of the subject 
matter. Being material, counterparty credit risk has to be incorporated in fair value 
measurement, directly affecting profit and loss (P&L) statements and their volatility. 
According to the more recent regulatory framework Basel III, financial institutions are 
henceforth required to capitalize this additional volatility, significantly increasing the minimal 
regulatory capital needed. 
The standard method for pricing counterparty credit risk is through a separate so-called 
credit valuation adjustment (CVA). CVA can be interpreted as the cost of hedging the 
counterparty credit risk of the respective position. This introduces a new derivative 
instrument, usually referred to as contingent credit default swap (C-CDS) that, in return to a 
premium, insures the (stochastic) exposure at default. The pricing of a C-CDS (i.e. CVA 
valuation) usually turns out to be a much more elaborate task than pricing the default-free 
derivative itself. After all, CVA depends not only on expected exposure – which is by itself 
sufficiently complex – but also on credit risk and the on the interconnection between both. 
                                                 
27 Cesari et al. (2009) who worked for a major European Investment Bank claim for example to have started 
with a systematic modeling of counterparty credit risk in 2005. 
28 See similar arguments for instance in Gregory (2009) or Brigo and Capponi (2010). 
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This means that closed-form solutions for CVA remain an exception. In addition, portfolios 
containing different classes of derivatives (e.g. interest rate and equity derivatives) underline 
the fact that C-CDS is probably one of the most complicated derivatives to price, especially 
if further aspects such as netting and collateral are considered. Bear in mind that derivative 
traders are not only interested in valuing CVA, but also in hedging and managing it. 
The higher awareness and the regulatory pressure seem to have pushed derivatives traders to 
step up the mitigation of counterparty credit risk. Being the most efficient way of reducing 
counterparty credit risk, collateral agreements, seem to have become more popular.29 
Counterparties are not only entering new collateral agreements, they are also amending 
existing ones by reducing thresholds and adjusting the types of eligible collateral. By 
amending such agreements the inherent counterparty credit risk – and thus CVA (as well as 
further exposure-dependent adjustments) changes, adjusting in return the overall value of 
the respective OTC derivatives portfolio.30 This underlines the necessity of models to 
compute the effects of such amendments in order to reach mutual agreements and fair 
compensations. 
The following Chapter 3 intends to give a compact overview in modeling and managing 
CVA, always accompanied by a critical analysis of the prevailing discourse. This analysis is 
the heart of the chapter, which aims on exploring the challenges around CVA from different 
angles rather than offering a comprehensive description of all relevant aspects. For a more 
                                                 
29 See the margin surveys conducted annually by the International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 
for example ISDA (2014a), especially pp. 6-7. 
30 Notice that further factors, especially funding issues have to be considered as main drivers in such an analysis 
as well. Due to the fact that uncollateralized exposure has to be funded (e.g. due to the fact that the hedge 
portfolio, i.e. the duplication strategy of the default-free derivative, is fully collateralized) and the fact that 
funding costs of financial institutions have significantly increased, there is a similar on-going discussion on 
incorporating funding effects through a separate metric, funding valuation adjustment (FVA). Due to the 
complexity of the issue we will continue our analysis by focusing on counterparty credit risk and will touch 
on FVA only if necessary. For further reading on funding of OTC derivatives and FVA see for example 
Morini and Prampolini (2011), Hull and White (2012a) or Burgard and Kjaer (2013) as well as Pallavicini et 
al. (2011). 
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comprehensive description on all aspects around CVA we refer the reader to 
Gregory (2012). For a more technical focus on modelling counterparty credit risk we refer 
the reader to Cesari et al. (2009) or Brigo et al. (2013a), all of which have inspired the 
elaborations and analysis throughout the chapter. 
Section  3.2 starts with an overview of key terms and definitions, linking these to relevant 
previous research and literature. Section  3.3 then lays the foundations for quantifying CVA, 
starting with the general pricing framework in Subchapter  3.3.1, and then moving to a more 
practical approach in Subchapter  3.3.2. Subchapter  3.3.3 takes us through a step-by-step 
approach to estimate the expected exposure profile, and Subchapter  3.3.4 elaborates on the 
techniques of estimating the probabilities of default. Section  3.4 describes and analyzes the 
regulatory and accounting requirements behind the CVA discourse, starting with describing 
the regulatory landscape in Subchapter  3.4.1. A critical analysis of relevant accounting 
standards is then given in Subchapter  3.4.2 whilst Subchapter  3.4.3 focuses on relevant 
regulatory requirements. A conclusion of the analysis regarding counterparty credit risk and 
CVA regulation is given in Subchapter  3.4.4. Section  3.5 moves to discuss and analyze key 
aspects in managing CVA risk. Subchapter  3.5.1 starts with looking into pricing CVA and 
analyzes the role and effectiveness of central units that manage CVA, also referred to as 
CVA desks. Key aspects around mitigating CVA risk through collateralization and hedging 
are discussed critically in Subchapter  3.5.2 and Subchapter  3.5.3, respectively. 
Subchapter  3.5.4 gives a concluding statement with regards to managing and mitigating CVA 
risk. 
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3.2. PRELIMINARIES, DEFINITIONS AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
Counterparty Credit Risk 
Given two debt securities (bonds) from two issuers that have differing credit quality – and all 
other things held equal – it is apparent that an investor will pay less for the bond of the 
riskier issuer. This difference is associated with a (higher) risk premium the investor 
demands. After all, there is a higher probability that the investor will face (credit) losses. 
Consentingly the credit insurance – and thus the hedge strategy – will also be more 
expensive. In an analogous manner it is obvious that an investor will pay less (or offer worse 
conditions) for a derivative that is traded over the counter (OTC) if the counterparty has a 
higher risk of defaulting. Notice that counterparty credit risk refers only to OTC derivatives, 
and does not apply to exchange-traded derivatives. 
Despite the obvious similarities, counterparty credit risk differs from credit risk mainly in 
that the value that can potentially be lost is stochastic due to underlying market risk factors 
driving the derivative value, and in it being bilateral. This means that both counterparties are 
default prone and that the value of many derivatives (e.g. interest rate swaps) can be either 
positive or negative. In the following we will describe the motivation behind it. 
We will assume an investor and a counterparty trading an OTC derivative. The following 
Table 8 summarizes the effects due to a default of either the investor or the counterparty. A 
default of the counterparty will affect the investor only if the net present value (NPV) from 
the investor’s perspective is positive. If the NPV from the investor’s perspective is negative 
and the counterparty defaults there will be no effect as the former will still be able to meet 
the obligations to the latter. Analogously if the investor defaults before the counterparty 
while the NPV from the latter’s perspective is positive, the latter will incur a loss. The 
bilateral aspect comes into play by interpreting the losses the counterparty incurs as gains of 
the investor and vice versa. 
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 NPV of  the Derivative at Default 
Positive (Asset) Negative (Liability) 
Counterparty defaults 
before the investor 
Loss for the investor - 
Investor defaults before 
the counterparty 
- Loss for the 
counterparty 
Table 8: Default-Dependent Losses in OTC Derivatives Transactions 
The matrix summarizes the effects due to the default of either the investor or the counterparty, 
depending on the net present value (NPV) of the OTC derivative being either positive or 
negative from the Investor’s perspective. 
The losses incurred by either the investor or the counterparty should not be interpreted as 
mere book value impairments. The direct impact such mechanisms can display is better 
illustrated if such losses are interpreted in terms of replacement costs for possible hedge 
positions. 
For illustration purposes we assume a bank dealing two simplified interest rate swaps (IRS) 
with two counterparties as seen in Figure 10. Both positions are assumed, again for 
simplification reasons, to be uncollateralized. The bank pays a fixed rate to counterparty A 
while receiving a floating rate (three-month Euribor). This position (payer swap) is 
(perfectly) hedged through an opposite position (receiver swap) with counterparty B, in 
which the bank pays the same floating rate and receives the same fixed one. 
Let us assume that at a given time period the receiver swap has a positive value. If 
counterparty B defaults in that time period the bank will lose its hedge. In order to obtain a 
new hedge for its position with counterparty A, the bank will need to enter into an identical 
receiver swap with a new counterparty C that will in return demand a fair compensation. 
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Assuming sterile conditions, counterparty C will demand at least the value of the (default-
free) receiver swap.31 The loss incurred by the bank is absorbed to a certain extent by the 
recovery rate the bank is – under normal conditions – expected to receive from the 
bankruptcy assets of counterparty B. 
 
Figure 10: Perfect Hedge Position to Illustrate the Effects of Replacement Risk 
The following figure illustrates a simplified perfect hedge. While dealing an payer interest rate 
swap with counterparty A the bank closes an opposite receiver swap with counterparty B. 
Pricing Counterparty Credit Risk – The Unilateral Case 
In order for the investor to price the counterparty credit risk arising from the OTC 
derivative with the counterparty, she needs to look at the scenarios in which she observes 
(relevant) defaults of the counterparty, to estimate the expected exposure, and to allocate a 
(risk-neutral) conditional probability to these defaults with a respective recovery rate. 
Thus, for pricing of counterparty credit risk the current value of the derivative is not 
sufficient. The investor needs an estimate of what can be lost in the future (given a default of 
the counterparty). Expected exposure estimation has thus to take the following into 
consideration; possible evolution of relevant risk factors (e.g. interest rate curves in case of 
                                                 
31 Notice that this remains a simplified illustration as in reality the bank will need some time to find a new 
counterparty while the value of the swap is stochastic, meaning that the losses of the bank can even be 
greater. In a real market environment counterparties will price further aspects as funding and of course 
counterparty credit risk if the derivative is not collateralized. We will return to this topic when we discuss the 
estimation of expected exposure, especially the assumptions around the close-out amount in 
Subchapter  3.3.2.  
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IRS), the specific terms of the deal (e.g. amortization structure of the IRS) as well as possible 
interconnection between the underlying market risk factors and the probability of the 
counterparty defaulting. 
CVA is usually referred to as unilateral when the own credit risk is being ignored, i.e. when 
the counterparty doing the computation is assumed to be default-free. For the investor to 
compute a unilateral CVA (UCVA) means to observe only the scenarios in which the 
counterparty might default while the NPV is positive from her perspective. 
Sorensen and Bollier (1994) were among the first to explore pricing UCVA as also discussed 
by Cherubini (2005), Brigo and Mercurio (2006) as well as Arvanitis and Gregory (2001). 
These works focused mainly on counterparty credit risk for one IRS, while netting aspects 
were subsequently introduced for example by Brigo and Masetti (2005). The main results 
being that the expected exposure can be approximated using swaptions with different 
maturities. 
Taking possible interdependencies between credit risk and interest rates, Brigo and 
Pallavicini (2008) modelled UCVA using Monte Carlo simulation methods. A main product 
of this work is the consideration of wrong way risk (WWR), i.e. the possibility to be 
negatively affected from counterparty credit risk and market risk simultaneously.  
In order to better understand wrong way risk we will assume interest rates (e.g. three-month 
Euribor) and credit spreads of the counterparty to be positively correlated. If the investor 
has a long interest rates position with the counterparty (e.g. a payer swap), she will be “hit 
twice” if credit spreads and exposure rise simultaneously. Put in other words, the risk of the 
counterparty defaulting is highest when the investor needs her most. A further example, 
commonly used in illustrating wrong way risk is for the investor to buy a put option (over 
the counter) on the stock of the counterparty from the counterparty. The positive 
interdependence between the put price (i.e. exposure) and the default risk of the 
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counterparty are most evident. Consistently one speaks of right way risk (RWR) if exposure 
and credit spreads are conversely interdependent. 
Brigo and Bakkar (2009) discussed pricing counterparty credit unilaterally for energy-
commodities. Brigo and Chourdakis (2009) explored pricing it for energy-commodities, and 
Brigo et al. (2011b) delivered a framework for equity products. 
DVA and Bilateral CVA 
As already elaborated in the previous chapter, assuming a counterparty to be default-free – in 
our case that being the investor – is definitely nontrivial. In order for the (counterparty 
credit-) risk adjusted price to be symmetric, both counterparties have to consider their own 
credit risk while computing CVA. Looking at Table 8, we see that if the investor defaults 
while owing the counterparty, the former will reap a profit. This might seem counterintuitive 
in terms of making a profit through one’s own default. But from a shareholders’ perspective 
not having to repay an obligation of one’s own firm (in the course of filed bankruptcy) is 
indeed beneficial. Still, it remains in dispute whether an institution should price a profit it will 
be making only by defaulting, especially because that implies a gain from possible own-credit 
deterioration. 
Accounting standard setters seem to advocate the consideration of own credit risk as 
required by IFRS 13 in combination with IFRS 9 as well as ASC 820 (previous FAS 157). 
From a regulatory (prudent) perspective (under Basel II and Basel III), financial institutions 
are however required to neglect own credit risk for regulatory capital computation 
purposes.32 
The metric for taking one’s own counterparty credit risk is usually referred to as Debt 
Valuation Adjustment (DVA). Laterally reverse to UCVA we thus get a unilateral DVA 
                                                 
32 We refer the interest reader to Subchapter  3.4.2 and Subchapter  3.4.3 of this work for more elaborate 
discussion around DVA and relative accounting and regulatory requirements. 
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(UDVA). A DVA from the investor’s perspective is hence UCVA from the counterparty’s 
perspective. For example in their UCVA model (also incorporating wrong way risk and right 
way risk) Hull and White (2011) discuss the analogous adaptation for DVA purses. 
Adjusting the UCVA by a DVA (both from one counterparty’s perspective) gathers up to a 
so-called bilateral CVA (BCVA), defined as follows33 
 BCVA =  UCVA –  UDVA. (3.1) 
Notice that BCVA can display either a positive or a negative adjustment, depending on 
exposure expectations and on whose credit riskiness is higher, the investor or the 
counterparty. 
First-to-Default CVA 
The main fallback of the bilateral CVA is that possible interdependencies between the credit 
risk of the investor and the counterparty is not accounted for. Already implicitly explored by 
Duffie and Huang (1996) an explicit modeling of what we will refer to as first-to-default CVA 
was introduced by Brigo and Capponi (2010).34 Pricing CVA for credit default swaps (CDS), 
Brigo and Capponi (2010) took possible correlations between the credit risk of the involved 
counterparties into consideration. This approach has subsequently been extended to 
consider netting and collateral by Brigo et al. (2013b).35 First-to-default CVA has also been 
underlined by Gregory (2009) or Brigo and Morini (2011).36 
                                                 
33 See for instance Gregory (2009) or Albanese et al. (2013). 
34 In his PhD thesis Capponi (2009) elaborates on some of the main results that were later published in Brigo 
and Capponi (2010). 
35 Chapter 4 of this thesis is dedicated to modeling the framework of Brigo and Capponi (2010), offering a 
step-by-step modeling approach and a computational tune-up. 
36 What we refer to as first-to-default CVA is referred to Brigo and Capponi (2010) or Gregory (2009) as 
bilateral CVA. The term first-to-default CVA stems from Albanese et al. (2013). 
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Analogously to BCVA the first-to-default CVA – also abbreviated as FTDCVA – can either 
be positive or negative. Besides exposure expectations and the credit riskiness the latter 
depends on the interdependence (i.e. correlation or contingency) between the probabilities 
of default of both counterparties. 
As mentioned by Albanese et al. (2013) first-to-default CVA has some theoretical pitfalls. 
The metric decreases if the credit of the computing counterparty deteriorates, almost 
vanishing at default. Compared to unilateral CVA a more significant shortcoming of the 
first-to-default CVA is its unhedgebility. After all, hedging a first-to-default CVA involves 
hedging DVA, an almost impossible task, dependent on selling one’s own credit risk.37 
The main fallback is however a practical one. Modeling a unilateral CVA is by itself a 
sophisticated task. Adding possible interdependencies between the credit risks of both 
counterparties that have to be modelled (and calibrated) will make things even more 
complicated (if not unfeasible). 
As mentioned, from a regulatory perspective financial institutions are required to base their 
equity computations on a UCVA while accounting standards specifically require the 
consideration of DVA. The bilateral CVA framework seems in this respect to offer a 
practical compromise in which DVA can be “switched off and on”, depending on the 
respective computation purpose. 
  
                                                 
37 For a more elaborate discussion around pricing DVA see Subchapter  3.4.2. 
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3.3. COMPUTING CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENT 
3.3.1. GENERAL PRICING FRAMEWORK FOR CVA 
Before moving to the more practical (unilateral) CVA and DVA we will in the following start 
with the more general pricing framework based on the so-called first-to-default CVA as for 
example introduced in Brigo and Capponi (2010).38 
For this purpose we will return to the two defined parties, dealing an OTC derivative; the 
investor (name “0”), and a counterparty (name “2”).39 The computations are always done 
from the investor’s perspective. We define 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡
ℚ{𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)} as the counterparty credit risk-free 
value at time 𝑡𝑡 of an OTC derivative maturing at time 𝑇𝑇 (under the risk-neutral measure ℚ). 
The aim is to define a separate metric that adjusts this term for (bilateral) counterparty credit 
risk. 
We are interested in observing the scenarios in which the default of the counterparty implies 
a loss to the investor and vice versa. Each party will bear a loss due to the default of the 
other side only if the value of the derivative is positive from its perspective, i.e. if the 
derivative is in the money (ITM). Put in other words, the default of a counterparty is relevant 
if the derivative is a liability held by the counterparty. 
Let 𝜏𝜏0 and 𝜏𝜏2 stand for the default time periods of the investor and the counterparty, 
respectively. For the sake of academic completeness we will define the probability space and 
the different relevant variables as used by Brigo and Capponi (2009). The computations are 
assumed to be conducted in the probability space (Ω,𝒢𝒢,𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 ,ℚ). Again, ℚ is the risk-neutral 
measure, and 𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 is a filtration driving the whole market. ℱ𝑡𝑡 is a further subfilteration 
                                                 
38 As mentioned, Grominski et al. (2012) have already published main results presented in this thesis. 
39 Notice that name 1 is reserved for a possible reference entity, e.g. relevant in a credit default swap (CDS). 
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standing for all observable market quantities exept for default events, hence ℱ𝑡𝑡 ⊆ 𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 ≔
ℱ𝑡𝑡 ∨ℋ𝑡𝑡 .
40 ℋ𝑡𝑡 stands for the subfilteration standing only for all default events. The stopping 
time is defined by the time period of the first default, i.e. 
 𝜏𝜏 =  {𝜏𝜏0, 𝜏𝜏2}. (3.2) 
Given a default event, i.e. 𝜏𝜏 is a stopping time of ℱ𝑡𝑡, then the stopped filtration is given by 
 ℱ𝜏𝜏 =  𝜎𝜎(ℱ𝑡𝑡 ∪ {𝑡𝑡 < 𝜏𝜏}, 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0). (3.3) 
If 𝜏𝜏 is a stopping time of 𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 , then the stopped filteration is given by 
 𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏 =  𝜎𝜎(𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 ∪ {𝑡𝑡 < 𝜏𝜏}, 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0). (3.4) 
Following Brigo and Capponi (2009) we define the following mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive scenarios 
 A =  {𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ T}    B =  {𝜏𝜏0 ≤ T ≤ 𝜏𝜏2} C =  {𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏𝜏0 ≤ T}    D =  {𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑇𝑇 ≤ 𝜏𝜏0} E =  {T ≤ 𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏2}    F =  {T ≤ 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏𝜏0}. 
(3.5) 
𝐴𝐴 stands for the scenarios in which the investor defaults before the counterparty which 
defaults before the maturity of the derivative. 𝐶𝐶 stands for similar scenarios in which the 
counterparty defaults first. 𝐷𝐷 (𝐵𝐵) stands for the scenarios in which the counterparty 
(investor) defaults before maturity, while the investor (counterparty) outlives the derivative. 
In 𝐸𝐸 and 𝐹𝐹 both counterparties outlive the derivative. Notice that a simultaneous default is 
excluded, i.e. it is assumed that the investor and the counterparty will not default at the same 
time, technically formulated as 
                                                 
40 Brigo and Capponi (2009) define ℋ𝑡𝑡 =  𝜎𝜎({𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝑢𝑢} ∨ {𝜏𝜏1 ≤ 𝑢𝑢} ∨ {𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑢𝑢}: 𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑡𝑡), thus capturing the 
default events of the counterparties and the reference portfolio. For further elaboration on their specific 
models see also Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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 ℚ(𝜏𝜏0 = 𝜏𝜏2) = 0. (3.6) 
Brigo et al. (2013a, p. 281) argue that this assumption is verified by most models, referring 
the reader to one prominent exception, the multivariate exponential distribution used by 
Marshall and Olkin (1967). For the introduction of simultaneous defaults in CVA pricing see 
also Gregory (2009). 
We define 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷0 and 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷2 as the loss given default ratios for the investor and the 
counterparty, respectively. Notice that 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 =  1 −  𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 stands for the recovery rate. 
Let 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) be the net present value (NPV) of the derivative at time period 𝑡𝑡 and 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡) the 
respective collateral amount received, we define the net exposure 𝐸𝐸 at time 𝑡𝑡 as follows 
 𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡)  =  𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡),0}. (3.7) 
Analogously we define negative exposure 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 as follows 
 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛{𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡), 0}. (3.8) 
Let 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) stand for the discounting factor for time period 𝑇𝑇 at time 𝑡𝑡. Brigo and 
Capponi (2009) deliver a proof that the counterparty credit risk-adjusted value of the 
derivative can be defined as follows 
 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡
ℚ{𝜋𝜋�(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)}    =  𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)}                           − 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷21𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏2)𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏2)}                                + 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷01𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏0)𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏0)}. 
(S.1) 
(S.2) 
(S.3) 
(3.9) 
Bearing in mind that all quantities are given from the investor’s perspective Equation (3.9) 
clarifies that the counterparty credit risk-adjusted derivative value is a function of three 
complementing terms. 
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 As mentioned above (S.1) stands for the risk-neutral contract value when no 
relevant defaults occur. In that case the risk-neutral value is driven by the discounted 
contractual cash flows. 
 (S.2) stands for the correction term, taking relevant defaults of the counterparty into 
consideration, i.e. standing for the CVA term. The term can also be explained as the 
risk-neutral expectation for losses, put in terms of discounted and LGD-adjusted 
positive exposure if the counterparty defaults. 
 Analogously (S.3) stands for the correction term, taking relevant defaults of the 
investor into consideration, i.e. standing for the DVA term. Notice that while S.2 
incorporates scenarios in which the exposure is positive from the investor’s 
perspective, S.3 takes only scenarios into consideration in which the exposure is 
positive from the counterparty’s perspective.  
The first-to-default CVA can be written as follows41 
 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 =  𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷21𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏2)𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏2)}                       −𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷01𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏0)𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏0)}.  (3.10) 
As stated by Brigo and Capponi (2010) it becomes apparent that the valuation of CVA 
involves the valuation of a short position in a call option (the DVA term) and of a long 
position in a put option (the CVA term). Both options refer to the remaining exposure and 
have a strike of zero. 
Equation (3.10) is the value of a hedge portfolio, offering a perfect protection against 
counterparty credit risk arising from both the counterparty and the investor. Notice that for 
the investor such a strategy would imply not only buying a protection on the exposure but 
                                                 
41 Notice that Brigo and Capponi (2009) refer to the term as the general bilateral credit valuation adjustment. 
We on the other hand stay with the term first-to-default CVA, standing in line the elaborations given in 
Subchapter  3.2. 
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also selling protection on her own credit risk, quite a complicated task if not an impossible 
one. We will analyze the implication of DVA in general and its hedging in particular in 
Subchapter  3.4.2. 
Using the same notation for FTDCVA we will in the following define the unilateral CVA. 
For this purpose we assume the investor to be credit risk free. We are thus only interested in 
the scenarios in which 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑇𝑇. The unilateral CVA can thus be written as follows: 
 𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 =  𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ�𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷21𝜏𝜏2≤𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏2)𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏2)�.  (3.11) 
The price process of UCVA can also be given through the following risk the risk-neutral 
expectation of the credit losses given in Equation (3.11).42  
 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) =  LGD2 �𝔼𝔼𝑢𝑢ℚ{𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑢𝑢))𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢)|𝜏𝜏2 = 𝑢𝑢 }𝑑𝑑ℚ(𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑢𝑢).𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡
 
 (3.12) 
where ℚ(𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑡𝑡) stands for the risk-neutral default probability of the counterparty. As for 
instance noted by Cesari et al. (2009, p. 217) Equation (3.12) represents the price process of 
a C-CDS.43 The value of such a C-CDS is the function of the risk-neutral probability of 
default and the respective recovery as well as the exposure. 
3.3.2. PRACTICAL PRICING FRAMEWORK FOR CVA 
Looking at Equation (3.12) it becomes apparent that the exposure is conditional on the 
default event and the survival of the counterparty, i.e. exposure and credit risk are 
interdependent. As stated above interdependence between exposure and credit risk is 
                                                 
42 Pykhtin and Zhu (2007) were among the first to use similar notation (in their case of unilateral CVA). 
43 They note that the value of the C-CDS at time 𝜏𝜏2 equals the exposure 𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏2). One could however argue that 
the value has to take the recovery into consideration, i.e. equaling LGD2𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏2). 
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relevant, because of possible right-way/wrong-way risk. Modeling interdependence between 
credit and exposure as well as between the credit risks of the counterparties involves 
however elaborate Monte Carlo simulation schemes.44 It also presumes the possibility to 
estimate the (risk-neutral) parameters of such interdependency using market information. It 
is worth stating that assuming no right-way/wrong-way risk at least for interest rates and 
foreign exchange derivatives seems to be an acceptable assumption as noted for example by 
Pykhtin and Zhu (2007).45 One can of course think of a variety of examples where right-
way/wrong-way risk would play a significant role also for interest rate and foreign exchange 
derivatives, especially ones referring to exotic currencies.46 Still, the majority of derivatives 
traders today either lack the capabilities to do so or they find the implied complexity to be 
unjustified. The financial institutions that do model right-way/wrong-way risk seem to be 
doing it in form of an additional analysis at best.47 
In order to examine the widespread methodology for pricing CVA we will therefore 
introduce the assumption of no right-way/wrong-way risk as for instance done by Pykhtin 
and Zhu (2007) or Gregory (2012). Doing so allows us to define UCVA as follows: 
 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) =  LGD2 �𝔼𝔼𝑢𝑢ℚ{𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑢𝑢)𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢)}𝑑𝑑ℚ(𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑢𝑢)𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡
.  (3.13) 
Still, solving Equation (3.13) analytically is limited to a rather small number of simple 
examples such as stand-alone European options. Computing exposure on the counterparty 
                                                 
44 See the example given in Chapter 4. See also Cesari et al. (2009), p. 224. 
45 See also Gregory (2012), pp. 242-263. 
46 Assume for example an American bank dealing a cross currency swap with the German state agency 
(Finanzagentur) in which the former borrows an amount in USD in exchange for an amount in EUR. The 
bank will then pay 3M Libor and receive three-month Euribor. At maturity the counterparties will exchange 
the borrowed notionals. The bank might assume that deterioration of Germany’s credit quality will go along 
with a depreciation of the Euro. In our example this would mean that the riskier Germany is, the less it will 
have to pay, i.e. the exposure exhibits a right way risk as it decreases with increasing credit risk. 
47 See for example the survey done by Deloitte and Solum (2013). 
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level, taking netting and collateral into consideration, will always require simulation 
approaches. Assuming the simulation is done in the time steps {𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏}𝑏𝑏=1𝑁𝑁  UCVA can be 
defined using the following time-descrete manner 
 
𝑈𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) =  LGD2�𝔼𝔼𝑢𝑢ℚ{𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)}𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
ℚ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏).  (3.14) 
Analogously DVA could be computed in the following manner 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) =  LGD0�𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)}𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
ℚ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏).  (3.15) 
In the same manner we are also able to define the (contingent) bilateral CVA, i.e. 
 
𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡)       =   LGD2�𝔼𝔼𝑢𝑢ℚ{𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)}𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
ℚ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏0, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)
− LGD0�𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)}𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
ℚ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏2, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏).  (3.16) 
Notice that the CVA term of Equation (3.16) takes the survival probability of the investor 
into consideration while the DVA term depends on the survival probability of the 
counterparty. After all, the investor will suffer a loss from the default of the counterparty if 
she will not default until then, and vice versa.  
The discrete manner of computing CVA with no right-way/wrong-way risk as given in 
Equation (3.14) offers a variety of very convenient aspects, especially the ability of modeling 
the necessary factors, i.e. expected exposure and credit, in two separate blocks. In the 
following we will elaborate on the steps needed to model the expected exposure 
(Subchapter  3.3.3) and estimating the credit risk (Subchapter  3.3.4), i.e. the probability of 
default and the respective recovery. 
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3.3.3. ESTIMATING EXPECTED EXPOSURE 
We are interested in estimating the exposure that the investor is expected to have towards a 
given counterparty. For this purpose we need an approach for modeling the evolution of the 
value of the portfolio, taking possible netting and collateral agreements into account. 
Again, we assume no correlation between the credit risks of the counterparty and the 
investor on the one hand, and the risk factors driving the exposure on the other. A possible 
interdependency between the credit risk of the investor and the counterparty is also 
excluded. This practical approach enables us to examine the modeling of expected exposure 
in a separate manner. 
The proposed framework can be split in the following main steps:48 
• Step 1: Generation of scenarios for price factors 
• Step 2: Revaluation of instruments 
• Step 3: Netting set aggregation and collateral adjustment 
• Step 4: Definition of expected exposure profiles 
Notice that a set of future dates {𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏}𝑏𝑏=1𝑁𝑁  in which the portfolio needs to be revaluated is pre-
required. In practice this decision is a payoff between computational power on the one hand 
and precision on the other. While daily valuation will capture margin calls and possible 
jumps in the value of the portfolio it might exhibit computational and technical challenges. 
A possible solution is given by choosing a set of future dates with decreasing granularity, e.g. 
starting with one month of daily revaluation, then moving to 11 months of monthly 
revaluation, followed by quarterly revaluations etc. More sophisticated approaches define the 
future dates based on the portfolio at hand, e.g. revaluation dates depend on the cash flows 
                                                 
48 Comparable computation steps were given for example by Canabarro and Duffie (2003) or Pykhtin and 
Zhu (2007). 
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of the derivatives and the margin calls of the respective collateral agreement. This way 
exposure changes are captured while managing possible computational and technical 
challenges. In Figure 11 for example 16 generic simulation steps illustrate the revaluation 
dates. 
 
Figure 11: Framework for Exposure Simulation 
The figure illustrates the general framework for estimating expected exposure. The lines stand 
for the estimated values of the portfolio as a function of a simulated price factor path (e.g. the 
value of an interest rate swap in dependence of the simulated interest rate curve). At every 
future date the distribution of possible portfolio values is simulated. For UCVA purposes we 
are only interested in the positive values. On the other hand, the expected exposure for a given 
time period is defined as the average of the positive values. DVA is a function of the expected 
negative value. The expected negative exposure is defined as the average of the negative values 
for a given date. 
Step 1: Generation of Scenarios for Price Factors 
The first block is the generation of possible scenarios for the factors driving the value of the 
portfolio at the given set of future dates {𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏}𝑏𝑏=1𝑁𝑁 . Interest rate derivatives will for example be 
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driven by reference rates such as Eonia, three-month Euribor or 12-month Libor. Other 
examples of price factors are foreign exchange rates, stock prices, commodity prices or 
inflation indexes.  
Pykhtin and Zhu (2007) distinguish between two general methods for generating price factor 
scenarios. They refer to the first method as Price-Dependent Simulation (PDS) and to the 
second as Direct Jump to Simulation Date (DJS). Within the PDS method the price factors 
simulated for a future date 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 would depend on the simulated results in the previous future 
date 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1. In the DJS method they are only dependent on the results given for the simulation 
date, i.e. 𝑡𝑡0. Although both methods should bring identical price factor distributions for a 
given future date the valuation of path-dependent products such as American or Bermudian 
options might however imply path-dependent simulation of price factors, implying that for 
CVA purposes PDS approaches are more adequate. 
In line with derivative pricing CVA computation is based on risk-neutral valuation. This 
means for example that for the generation of exposure of interest rate derivatives (e.g. 
interest rate swap) arbitrage-free interest rate models are needed.49 A prominent example 
used for this purposes is the Hull White interest rate model. We will apply the one factor 
version of this model in an example below. This model describes the dynamics of the short 
term interest rate using the following stochastic differential equation (SDE): 
 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡  = (𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 +  𝜎𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡  (3.17) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 stands for the short rate at time period t. 𝜅𝜅, 𝜃𝜃, 𝑎𝑎,  𝜎𝜎,𝑢𝑢 are the model parameters, 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is 
a standard Brownian motion. This means that for each future date a set of short-term 
interest rates (e.g. 10.000) needs to be simulated in order to generate the same number of 
                                                 
49 For an overview on risk-neutral models for interest rate risk see Subchapter  2.3.1. 
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respective interest rate curves. In Figure 11 for example six different sets of path-dependent 
risk factors are given at each future date. 
A further complication is the simulation of correlated market risk factors, e.g. generation of 
interdependent interest rates and foreign exchange rates. While interdependency can be 
modelled through simplified approaches, the market lacks sufficient instruments to allow for 
its risk-neutral calibration. Interdependence can for example be modelled through 
introducing respective correlation coefficients driving the diffusion process. Due to the lack 
of instruments to calibrate the needed correlation matrix some practitioners refer to 
historical values for approximations.50  
Step 2: Revaluation of Instruments 
Given the sets of generated risk factors for each future date the instruments are subsequently 
revaluated, producing respective distribution of derivative values. For interest rate swaps for 
example a pricing model is needed that re-estimates the remaining cash flows and the 
respective value of the instrument at each time step and scenario. In the example illustrated 
in Figure 11 the instrument needs to be revaluated in each one of the 16 time steps and for 
each one of the 6 scenarios, i.e. 6 ×  16 = 96. In a more realistic example of a portfolio 
consisting of 50 positions then need to be revaluated 50 times, given 10.000 scenarios it 
would imply 25.000.000 revaluations. This makes it clear that in large portfolios of financial 
institutions with numerous counterparties and instruments this number can easily explode, 
and needs to be managed carefully. 
Having adequate pricing models for each instrument in the portfolio can be a very 
challenging task, especially if the portfolio contains exotic derivatives that require Monte 
Carlo pricing techniques (e.g. Bermudian swaptions etc.). After all, this requires a draw of 
realizations for the relevant risk factors (outer step) and further (inner steps) to re-valuate the 
                                                 
50 See for example the survey on counterparty credit risk conducted by Deloitte & Solum (2013), esp. p. 25.  
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instrument, conditional on the drawn risk factor distribution. Gordy and Juneja (2008) or 
more recent work of Broadie et al. (2011) demonstrate possible solutions for nested Monte 
Carlo simulations. American Monte Carlo methods as described in Longstaff and 
Schwartz (2001) or Glasserman and Yu (2002) provide a further possible solution if closed-
form pricing solutions are not available. These methods exploit future simulations in 
approximating the (expected) exposure at a given revaluation time period, avoiding the inner 
step simulation.  
In practice exotic derivatives tend to be part of a bigger portfolio that is mainly driven by 
plain vanilla instruments (e.g. interest rate swaps). In such cases approximations tend to 
suffice, e.g. Bermudian swaptions can be proxied through European swaptions as proposed 
by Gregory (2012, p. 164) or even through more crude add-on-based estimates.  
In addition, the value of an instrument might depend on past events (i.e. on the simulation 
path prior to the revaluation date) as for barrier options or callable swaps for example. This 
underlines the importance of using path-dependent simulation approaches as proposed by 
Pykhtin and Zhu (2007).51 
Step 3: Netting Set Aggregation and Collateral Adjustment 
If the instruments are part of a netting set their values at each time step and scenario need to 
be summed up, producing an aggregated distribution of the value of the portfolio at each 
time step. Let 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡) stand for the net present value of instrument 𝑖𝑖, in scenrio 𝑠𝑠 at time 
period 𝑡𝑡. Assuming that the instruments 𝑖𝑖 =  1, … , 𝐼𝐼 are all part of the same netting set the 
aggregated value for a given combination of a scenario and a time period is defined as 
follows 
                                                 
51 Pykhtin and Zhu (2007), p. 19 also refer to Lomibau and Zhu (2005) for possible solutions also relevant for 
Direct Jump to Simulation Date (DJS) approaches. 
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𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡) =  �𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡)𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖=1
. (3.18) 
In addition, a possible collateral agreement needs to be considered. Let 𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡) stand for the 
value of the collateral posted or received at a given scenario and time period, the exposure of 
the netting set if defined as follows 
 𝐸𝐸(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡) =  𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡), 0}. (3.19) 
This means that if the NPV is negative and the investor posts a collateral amount to the 
counterparty that exceeds the absolute value of the NPV, the investor will have a positive 
exposure (due to overcollateralization). 
This pre-requires the modelling of the collateral for each time step, or at least the most 
significant properties of the collateral agreement at hand. Such agreements are usually 
specified in an annex to the master service agreement used. A Credit Support Annex (CSA) 
is for example part of the most commonly used ISDA master agreement as published by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association. Main properties of a CSA that are usually 
modelled are the following: 52 
a. Type of eligible collateral, e.g. cash, sovereign bonds, equity etc. 
b. Threshold amount, i.e. the amount which the portfolio value needs to exceed 
before an exchange of collateral takes place 
c. Minimum transfer amount (MTA), i.e. the amount which the collateral to be 
exchanged needs to exceed before an exchange takes place 
d. Margin periods, i.e. the frequency of collateral exchanges (e.g. daily, weekly 
etc.) 
                                                 
52 Further properties are the rounding method of the exchanged amount or the interest rate paid on the 
collateral posted (e.g. Eonia). 
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Netting effects are crucial in exposure simulation, especially if an institution trades contrary 
positions (e.g. payer swaps and receiver swaps) with the same counterparty and within one 
netting set as becomes visible when looking at Table 9. 
Table 9 illustrates the effects of netting and collateral using the data published by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) and ISDA. According to these estimates netting 
agreements reduce the worldwide OTC derivative exposure by more than 80%. Considering 
netting and collateral agreements reduces the exposure by even more than 90-95%. In 
Subchapter  3.5.2 below we will discuss the effectiveness of collateralization as a technique to 
mitigate CVA. 
In USD trillions 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gross market value (GMV) 15.8 35.3 21.5 21.3 27.3 24.7 
Gross credit exposure (after netting) 3.3 5.0 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.6 
% of gross market value 20.6% 14.2% 16.3% 16.3% 14.3% 14.6% 
Gross credit exposure (after netting and collateral) 1.1 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
% of gross market value 7.2% 4.8% 5.1% 4.9% 4.1% 4.4% 
Table 9: Gross Credit Exposure after Netting 
The table illustrates the effect of netting through survey data as published by ISDA and BIS.53 
Gross market value stands for the market value of all outstanding contracts before netting. 
Gross credit exposure considers netting benefits. 
Recall that the exposure amount we are estimating is the amount the non-defaulted 
counterparty will demand from the defaulted counterparty at the time of default, also 
referred to as the closeout amount. Looking at common literature around CVA pricing it is 
interesting to see that the close-out amount is assumed to be counterparty credit risk-free.54 
Brigo and Morini (2011) argue that the legal (ISDA) documentation suggests that the non-
                                                 
53 Refer to the OTC market analysis, ISDA (2013). 
54 See for example Gregory (2009) or Brigo and Capponi (2009, 2010). 
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defaulted counterparty should actually price its own-counterparty credit risk, i.e. DVA.55 
This introduces a recursive problem. The expected exposure amount is dependent on future 
DVA amounts, which in return depend on the expected exposure amount. Iterative 
approaches to solve the problem are discussed also in Gregory and German (2012). 
Acknowledging the need for such approaches (to ensure a more realistic illustration) we will 
in the following retain the assumption of risk-free closeout amount for simplicity reasons, in 
line with common literature and practice. 
Step 4: Definition of Expected Exposure Profiles 
For CVA purposes we are interested in the (risk-neutral) expectation of what the investor 
can lose given a default of the counterparty. In mathematical terms we need to define the 
following expected exposure (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) for each re-valuation time period 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡)  =  𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ[𝐸𝐸(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡)] (3.20) 
where 𝐸𝐸(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡) is the net exposure at time 𝑡𝑡 for a given scenario s, given in Equation (3.19). 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ 
stands for risk neutral expectation at time 𝑡𝑡. Looking at Figure 11 this means that we need to 
define the average of the positive values of the distribution at each one of the 16 time steps. 
Notice that for DVA purposes the mirroring exposure profile needs to be estimated. The 
negative expected exposure (NEE) stands for the risk-neutral expectation of what the 
counterparty can lose if the investor defaults, i.e. the average of the negative values of the 
distribution. 
Figure 12 exhibits a typical expected exposure profile for an interest rate swap and is given 
for illustration purposes only. The typical profile increase is a function of the drift captured 
                                                 
55 Brigo and Morini (2010) and Brigo and Morini (2011) do not limit the aspect to be a modeling question, and 
discuss the unwanted implications on creditors if the closeout amount is credit risk-free.  
  
81 
in current forward rates whereas the decrease is a function of the amortizing value of the 
swap as less and less cash flows remain to be exchanged.  
 
Figure 12: Expected Exposure Profile of an Interest Rate Swap 
The straight line in the figure illustrates the expected exposure (EE) profile an exemplary 
interest rate swap with semiannual payments with the following properties: Reference rate 6-
month Euribor; effective date is March 1, 2013, maturing in five years. Notional is 100.000.000 
€ and swap rate is 0.9%. The exposure profile was estimated using a Hull-White 1 factor 
interest rate model (own calculation for illustration purposes only). 
3.3.4. ESTIMATING DEFAULT PROBABILITIES AND RECOVERY RATES 
In this subchapter we move to discuss practical approaches for estimating the marginal 
default probabilities ℚ(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏0, 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏−1 < 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) and recovery rates (1 – LGD2) needed for 
CVA valuation as given in Equation (3.16) above. 
Recall that CVA has been defined as a financial instrument which is priced under the risk-
neutral measure ℚ. This means that – in contradiction to credit risk models – CVA pricing 
cannot be based on historical probabilities of default. In order to align with arbitrage-free 
valuation we need to use probabilities of default as implied by credit-sensitive instruments. 
There is a variety of such instruments with respective quotes in the market, e.g. single-name 
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credit default swaps (CDS), index CDS, asset swaps (ASW) or bonds. Whereas credit default 
swaps (CDS) can be considered as the most straightforward ones.56 Also from a theoretical 
perspective CDS spreads have the cleanest isolation of credit risk, enabling the estimation of 
default risk and the respective implied risk premium. 
It is worth mentioning that also yields of default-able bonds are a standard source for 
measuring implied default probability. Notice, however, that besides credit risk, bond 
spreads may incorporate a significant portion of further aspects such as liquidity. For 
empirical analysis on bonds spreads and credit risk see for example Longstaff et al. (2005). 
For the relationship between bond spreads and CDS spreads see for example Hull et 
al. (2004). Credit linked notes and Asset swaps are further quite popular instruments that are 
worth being mentioned.57 
Notice that historical and market implied probabilities differ systematically. The former 
represent an actual assessment under the real world-measure of an entity defaulting while 
market implied probabilities reflect current market quotes and associated hedge costs.58 
Following the notations given by Brigo et al. (2013a, esp. pp. 66-70) we will in the following 
discuss how CDS can be used to estimate risk-neutral probabilities of survival (and of 
default) in a model-independent manner.59 A more elaborate discussion on key CDS 
characteristics is given in Subchapter  4.2.1 of this thesis. 
For this purpose we assume a standard CDS contract with inception time 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, and maturity 
time 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 . The protection buyer pays a premium 𝑅𝑅, e.g. regular payments of a (credit) spread 
                                                 
56 As for example also noted by Schönbucher (2005), p. 15. 
57 For an overview and description of a variety of credit dependent derivatives see for example 
Schönbucher (2005), especially pp. 8-50. 
58 For studies on the differences between risk-neutral and real-world probabilities of default see for example 
Altman (1989), Hull et al. (2005) and Giesecke et al. (2010). 
59 For a proof of the discussed we refer the reader to Brigo at al. (2013a), pp. 66-70. 
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times a given protection amount. If the reference entity defaults within the lifetime of the 
contract the protection seller will compensate the buyer with a respective settlement 
payment (i.e. loss given default (𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷) times the protected amount). Notice that the valuation 
of such a contract might seem mathematically rather straightforward. After all, we only need 
to estimate the expected cash flows for each leg. The complication comes through the fact 
that the cash flows are credit-sensitive per se. The premiums need to be paid only if the 
entity has survived until that time period while the protection amount needs to be paid only 
if the entity defaults within the time period. The cash flows need thus to be weighted with 
probabilities of survival and default, respectively. 
The mid-market premium seen at inception time 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠.𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷(0) ensures a fair valuation of the 
contract, i.e. that the premium leg value equals the protection leg value. This means that the 
CDS contract has a value of zero, i.e. 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏(0,𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠.𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷(0), 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷) = 0. 
Given the market premiums 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠.𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷(0) for a set of different maturities, e.g. 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 = 1𝑦𝑦, 2y, …  5y 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠  =  0, an assumption for the LGD underlying the quotes as well as the current (risk-
free) discount function 𝑃𝑃(0,∙) and the given survival probabilities ℚ(𝜏𝜏 >∙) – with ∙ standing for 
the maturities of the used instruments – can be stripped by solving the following equation: 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙0,𝑏𝑏(𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷,𝑃𝑃(0,∙),ℚ(𝜏𝜏 >∙)) = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙0,𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅;𝑃𝑃(0,∙),ℚ(𝜏𝜏 >∙)�   (3.21) 
whereas the protection leg and the premium leg are valued as follows:60 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏�𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷;𝑃𝑃(0,∙),ℚ(𝜏𝜏 >∙)� ≔ −𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷� 𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 ℚ(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
,   (3.22) 
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙0,𝑏𝑏�𝑅𝑅;𝑃𝑃(0,∙),ℚ(𝜏𝜏 >∙)� ≔  (3.23) 
                                                 
60 As also noted by Brigo et al. (2013a), p. 68, given a discretization time step that is small enough the given 
integrals can be approximated numerically through by summations of Riemann-Stieltjes sums. 
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𝑅𝑅 �−� 𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑡𝑡)�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽(𝑡𝑡)−1�𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 ℚ(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
+ � 𝑃𝑃(0,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ℚ(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=𝑠𝑠+1
�. 
Recall that we have not dropped the assumption of independency between exposure and 
credit, and in this case explicitly between interest rates and default. 
To strip the probabilities from the above equations a step-wise approach is needed. We start 
with 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 = 1𝑦𝑦 in order to find the market implied survival probabilities {ℚ(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 1𝑦𝑦}. The 
results are then used as input for 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 = 2𝑦𝑦, then moving to 𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏 = 3𝑦𝑦 and so on and so forth, 
finally estimating the implied survival probabilities {ℚ(𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑡𝑡), 𝑡𝑡 ∈ (1𝑦𝑦, 2𝑦𝑦, 3𝑦𝑦, 4𝑦𝑦, 5𝑦𝑦)}. 
 Example A Example B 
Maturity  
(in 
years) 
CDS spreads 
(in basis 
points) 
Survival 
probability 
Marginal 
default  
probability 
CDS spreads 
(in basis 
points) 
Survival 
probability 
Marginal 
default  
probability 
1 5 0.9992% 0.08% 126 0.9793% 2.07% 
2 7 0.9975% 0.25% 139 0.9549% 4.51% 
3 10 0.9949% 0.51% 151 0.9273% 7.27% 
4 12 0.9917% 0.83% 162 0.8969% 10.31% 
5 13 0.9887% 1.11% 173 0.8640% 13.60% 
Table 10: Stripping Default Probabilities from Quoted CDS Spreads 
The table above illustrates the implied survival probabilities and the marginal default 
probabilities using the CDS spreads quoted in the market. The CDS spreads used represent the 
average spreads quoted for the following financial institutions: Deutsche Bank, Santander Bank, 
Barclays, UniCredit, and Citi (with a recovery rate of 40%). Example A and Example B stand for 
the averages based on the 7th of July 2006, and the 5th of October 2010, respectively. 
Table 10 summarizes the stripped survival probabilities of exemplary quoted CDS spreads 
following the above given method. The marginal default probabilities needed for CVA 
valuation are subsequently defined through the difference between the respective survival 
probabilities. The examples given in Table 10 are based on real market data, illustrating the 
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increase in market implied default probabilities in particular, and in the significance and level 
of CVA in general following the financial crisis. 
After having discussed practical approaches to estimate expected exposure and default 
probabilities we turn to recovery rates (or loss given default, LGD) which are needed 
twofold to price CVA: (1) indirectly in order to strip probabilities of default; and (b) directly 
as seen in Equation (3.16). The recovery rate stands for the percentage of par value that 
investors will receive after a default event of the reference entity. 
Evidence suggests that collateral and thus recovery rates are stochastic, and jointly 
distributed with probabilities of default, especially in times of distress. This means that 
adequate credit risk modelling should rely on stochastic models for recovery rates as for 
example discussed in Altman (2006), Bilal and Singh (2012) as well as Li (2009) for the 
specific case of CVA pricing. Market convention, however, seems to rely on a more practical 
approach, assuming a constant recovery rate. The CDS data quotes given for example by the 
data provider Markit assume a constant recovery rate of 40%, i.e. LGD of 60%.61 The use of 
a constant recovery rate is not limited to practice and is also wide-spread in academic and 
research work as seen in Brigo and Chourdakis (2009) or Lipton and Sepp (2009). 
In any case, it indeed seems consistent to use the same assumption for recovery rate twice, 
i.e. for stripping default probabilities and directly for CVA valuation. This would in fact also 
limit the effect of LGD on CVA due to a cancellation effect, as referred to by 
Gregory (2012, p. 252). On the one hand, the higher (lower) the LGD assumed the lower 
(higher) the default probabilities stripped and the CVA computed. On the other hand, CVA 
is a direct function of LGD, i.e. a higher LGD increases CVA and vice versa.  
                                                 
61 See for example Brigo et al. (2013a), pp. 185-186 or Bilal and Singh (2012). 
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3.4. ACCOUNTING AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND OF 
COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK 
3.4.1. REMARKS 
Counterparty credit risk in general and CVA in particular seem to be highly driven by 
regulatory and accounting standards.62 From a regulatory perspective financial institutions 
are faced with requirements with respect to measuring and capitalizing counterparty credit 
and (unilateral) CVA volatility. In addition, international accounting standards require the 
consideration of (bilateral) CVA in fair value measurement, affecting not only financial 
institutions but all OTC derivative traders such as corporates that use such derivatives for 
example to hedge their interest rate and foreign exchange positions. In fact such non-
financial institutions seem to be concerned with possibly being impaired twice. On the one 
hand accounting standards require them to compute CVA and DVA, facing them with 
methodological and technical challenges. In addition, banks will try and rollout their higher 
requirements through higher margins. Watt (2011) cites the Head of Finance at Lufthansa, 
one of the major German non-financials, saying the following: 
“We think the new [CVA capital] charge will have a big impact on our business. Long-
term derivatives will be a problem. For some of these trades, we understand the cost will be so 
high that we will have to accept the risk of sharp movements in whatever we are hedging 
against, like floating interest rates or oil prices. That means our profit and loss figures will be 
more volatile” 
As will be displayed, the accounting and regulatory requirements can be seen as quite 
straightforward from a theoretical perspective. Still, as seen from the above given quote 
there seems to be a controversial discussion around their diverse practical implications. An 
                                                 
62 This view is shared for example by Albanese et al. (2013). 
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overview on counterparty credit risk cannot leave out an elaboration on these requirements 
because they seem to influence the discourse on risk management and CVA pricing. 
In the following two subchapters we will give an overview of the main accounting and 
regulatory requirements, focusing on international accounting standards (IFRS and US-
GAAP) and the Basel III framework.63 In Subchapter  3.4.4 we summarize our analysis of 
the regulatory efforts, commenting on whether the fear of the cited Lufthansa manager is 
justified. 
3.4.2. ACCOUNTING BACKGROUND 
CVA as Part of an Exit Price 
Derivatives have to be measured and disclosed according to the fair value measurement both 
under the international financial accounting standards (IFRS) and under US-GAAP as 
specified in IFRS 13 and ASC 815. Both standards refer to fair value as an “exit price” and 
require the use of a “fair value hierarchy”. In the following we will give a recap for both 
terms. 
According to IFRS 13.9 or ASC 820-10-20 exit price is defined as the price that would be 
received for an asset or the price that would be paid to transfer a liability. As specified in 
IFRS 13.72 and ASC 820-10-35 exit prices have to be estimated according to a fair value 
hierarchy which categorizes pricing parameters along three levels. If possible one must use 
quoted prices for identical assets and liabilities in active markets, these categorized as level 1 
parameters. For example the liquid stock price should be used to evaluate a respective stock 
position. If such quotes are not available one must refer to level 2 parameters, i.e. direct or 
indirect input parameters and standard pricing methods. The value of interest rate swaps is 
                                                 
63 For a further reading on the regulatory framework around CVA and counterparty credit risk see for example 
Schwake et al. (2011) who also give an overview of the specific requirements under the German GAAP 
(Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB). 
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for instance not directly quoted. Bootstrapping of interest rate curves (such as three-month 
Euribor or Eonia) from market information is needed and the valuation is subsequently 
done using a discounting cashflow method. Lastly level 3 parameters consist of unobservable 
parameters that need to be estimated, e.g. for the valuation of an asset backed security (ABS) 
one needs to estimate a default probability and severity of the respective pool of loans. Such 
parameters are usually not quoted and have to be estimated using historical statistics, peer 
group comparisons or expert estimations. 
Taking counterparty credit risk into consideration in the fair value of an OTC derivative can 
in general be motivated twofold. For one, being a significant risk factor counterparty credit 
risk will be priced in by third parties, making CVA part of an exit price. In addition, both 
US-GAAP and IFRS have specific requirements to take non-performance risk into 
consideration as specified for example in ASC 80-10 and IFRS 13.42. Notice that this 
implies the consideration of own credit risk in derivative pricing as specifically required by 
IFRS 13.42: 
“The fair value of a liability reflects the effect of non-performance risk. Non-performance risk 
includes, but may not be limited to an entity’s own credit risk (as defined in IFRS 7: 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures).” 
It goes without saying that there are circumstances in which CVA or DVA for a given entity 
or for parts of its OTC derivatives portfolio are concluded as not material. The 
consideration of CVA or DVA would then not be obligatory.64 This might for example be 
the case if collateral agreements with daily posting are in place and the counterparties 
involved exhibit high credit quality. This could also be the case for corporates with relatively 
                                                 
64 See also Schwake et al. (2011), pp. 293-294. 
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small derivatives portfolio.65 In any case materiality is entity-specific and has usually to be 
validated and agreed upon with the auditor. 
Estimation of Credit Risk 
As mentioned in previous subchapters – especially Subchapter  3.3.3 – one of the drivers of 
CVA is the credit risk of the counterparty, i.e. the risk of default and changes in the credit 
quality.66 According to the “fair value hierarchy” this has to be estimated using as much 
market data as possible. If such data is not available, approximations and indirect data can be 
used. Historical and statistical estimation or expert opinions can only be used if all other 
alternatives are not available. 
Following the “fair value hierarchy” one should thus use credit spreads that are directly 
traceable to the respective counterparty. This means that – if available – single name CDS 
spreads should be used. This aligns with what we have discussed in Subchapter 3.3.3 
above.67 If such spreads are not available entities should map these to other tradable CDS 
spreads (e.g. categorized by rating, geography or industry). According to this logic internally 
estimated spreads should hence only be used if mapping procedures are either impossible or 
economically meaningless. In order to deliver market implied valuation (i.e. staying in line 
with duplicating strategy or hedge strategy valuation) but also in order to stay aligned with 
the “fair value hierarchy” this spread has to contain – besides default risk – an estimate for a 
market risk premium. 
Despite the fact that these requirements are quite straightforward from an academic and 
theoretical point of view they seem to imply significant challenges for many entities. After 
                                                 
65 It is worth mentioning that both IFRS 13 and ASC 820 explicitly allow the computation of CVA on 
counterparty level (in order to take netting and collateral aspects into consideration). 
66 An overview on credit risk modeling is given in Subchapter  4.2.2. 
67 In its comment on fair value measurement, the Institute of Public Auditors in Germany, names CDS spreads 
as sole example for market source of credit risk estimation (see IDW RS HFA 47, paragraph 102). 
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all, for a large part of entities there are no liquid CDS spreads, and the use of mapping 
procedures seems arbitrary, lacking economic reason.68 Credit risk of small and medium 
sized corporations (e.g. a local German corporation with 30 employees in the construction 
business) can hardly be mapped to index CDS, containing large and international 
corporations. A further reason why corporations might not want to use market implied 
information is their apparent higher volatility, a reason that cannot, however, be cleansed 
from balance sheet manipulation. It can furthermore be argued that if hedging of 
counterparty credit risk is impossible then market implied valuation is not needed (also 
referred to as warehouse book valuation). In that case CVA is interpreted as a metric for 
expected credit loss. Still, risk-neutral valuation is based on duplication strategies, irrespective 
of whether hedging strategies are truly in place. In addition, from an accounting point of 
view, market implied valuation can be motivated not only by being market standard but 
because of its limited manipulability if compared with entity specific information. Moreover, 
it facilitates a better comparability of financial statements of differing entities. 
In a recent comprehensive assessment the European Central Bank (ECB) challenged 
valuation and provisioning methodologies of European banks. The assessment revealed a 
gab of € 3.1 billion to CVA calculation., resulting in a 27% increase in the respective metric 
for the banks that were part of the assessment. Most of this adjustment was driven by an 
incorrect use of historical – instead of market implied – probabilities of default.69 
It is worth mentioning that the standardization of risk-neutral CVA valuation, especially in 
the market of counterparties with no liquid CDS spreads which largely intersects with the 
non-financial market in which no collateral is daily posted is very difficult, because arbitrage 
                                                 
68 For empirical findings on the use of internal spreads see for example Schwake et al. (2011) or Deloitte and 
Solum (2013), p. 26. For an attempt to use internal data with market implied information see for example 
Knoth and Schulz (2010). 
69 See ECB (2014), pp. 98-100. 
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opportunities are rather excluded and the counterparties do not have to agree on the value 
of the portfolio on daily basis. 
It can be concluded that marked implied default probabilities seem to have become more 
popular.70 This trend cannot however be regarded independently from the specifications of 
IFRS 13 and subsequent higher focus of audit firms and supervisors on the subject matter. 
Accounting for Debt Valuation Adjustment (DVA) 
A further topic that has quite controversially been discussed is DVA. The accounting 
standard requirements are actually rather clear with regard to this topic. Entities have to 
consider their own credit risk, i.e. CVA has to be computed on a bilateral basis. Still, studies 
show that the consideration of DVA for accounting purposes but also in front-office pricing 
is not as straightforward as the standard setters might have had in mind.71 DVA seems to be 
presumed as unintuitive, implying a variety of unwanted challenges. In the following we will 
go through the main issues around DVA, extending and commenting the discussion given 
by Gregory (2009). 
First, by taking DVA into account, the evaluating entity assumes a gain from its own default. 
This is indeed questionable from the entity’s perspective because such gains are irrelevant 
and unrealizable. From a valuation perspective, a bilateral CVA might allocate a higher value 
to a derivatives portfolio than its “default-free” value (also referred to as marked-to-market 
value, MtM). On the other hand, for the shareholders not having to redeem obligations (in 
that case derivative obligations) does exhibit a profit when one’s company is at default. Taking 
DVA into account would thus make sense if the shareholders are viewed as the main 
stakeholders of financial reporting. Even if some counterparties claim not to price a DVA 
                                                 
70 See for example Schwake et al. (2011), pp. 295-298 or the more recent analysis done by EBA (2015). 
71 For the consideration of DVA in pricing and accounting purposes see the study done by Deloitte and 
Solum (2013), especially p. 29. Schwake et al. (2011) have collected information from publicly available 
information on DVA, focusing on its consideration for accounting purposes. For DVA in pricing see  3.5.1. 
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component the fact that they are pricing a CVA component plainly means that someone else 
is symmetrically (willingly or not, knowingly or not) pricing DVA. Arora et al. (2012) find 
evidence that the higher the credit risk of a dealer, the lower is the price he can charge for 
selling a CDS. This implies that these dealers are (willingly or not, knowingly or not) taking 
their own credit into consideration. 
Gregory (2009) does argue that from an entity’s perspective realizing DVA is possible if the 
entity is near default, and brings in some examples from the insurance business. In such 
cases the counterparties would readily unwound the portfolios and pay-out the entity a 
respective compensation. We argue that the realization of DVA is not limited to such 
extreme cases. Counterparties can for example also agree on raising the collateralization, e.g. 
through a two way collateral agreement with minimal thresholds or through central clearing. 
These amendments would trigger a change in the value of the bilateral CVA. The 
counterparty that benefits more from the amendment (through a relief in its CVA position) 
would thereby compensate the other party, allowing it to (at least partially) realize DVA. 
Second, accounting for DVA implies that the financial results are subject for changes in 
one’s own credit risk, hence making a profit from own credit deterioration. The following 
newspaper quotes on the financial reports of leading investment banks expose how 
unintuitive this effect is: 
“Citigroup benefited from a paper gain of nearly $ 2 billion, reflecting a sharp increase in the 
perceived riskiness of its debt […]. That contributed about one-third of its pre-tax operating 
profit […]”72 
“Debit valuation adjustments […] helped Citigroup Inc. post a $ 3.77 billion profit Monday 
even as its revenue fell. And J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. included a $1.9 billion pre-tax 
benefit from debt valuation adjustments in its investment bank when it posted third-quarter 
                                                 
72 See Dash (2011). 
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earnings last Thursday. And this morning, Bank of America Corp. reported booking a $ 1.7 
billion gain due to the accounting rule.”73 
On the other hand one can argue that these effects are transparent, and can thus be correctly 
interpreted by analysts and investors. Furthermore, one could also argue that if the 
derivatives portfolios are unwound or better collateralized at the time period of the financial 
reports the entity will indeed receive higher compensations.  
We conclude that the unintended effect of “making money” with one’s own default is rather 
a critical issue for management accounting, less so for financial accounting. This is especially 
relevant for derivatives traders with relatively large OTC portfolios. In these cases trading 
departments should not be able to make profits (and hence pay higher bonuses to their 
employees) due to a higher DVA. This can be reached for example either by not considering 
DVA in management accounting or by designating DVA to a special unit (e.g. CVA desk) or 
by taking DVA into account only on a bank-wide level. 
Third, from a risk management perspective accounting for DVA contradicts the principle of 
prudency, especially if the bilateral CVA metric is either zero or negative, implying no or 
negative counterparty credit risk.74 The regulator is however aware of these effects. Financial 
institutions are required therefore to use unilateral CVA for determining regulatory capital. 
Also the capital charge for CVA risk, i.e. CVA volatility accounts only for the volatility 
driven by the unilateral CVA. 
Fourth, as noted by Albanese et al. (2013) or Gregory (2009), a main problem of bilateral 
CVA is it being unhedgeable. For one, the unilateral CVA part has to be hedged only as long 
                                                 
73 See Burne (2011). 
74 This might be the case if the DVA component is larger than the UCVA component, delivering a negative 
BCVA. Notice that this is not only a function of credit risk. If both counterparties have similar credit risk but 
the expected negative exposure is significantly larger than the expected positive exposure the DVA 
component would be larger, delivering a total negative adjustment. 
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as the entity doing the computation is solvent. More complex is the fact that DVA hedging 
implies selling a protection on one’s own default, quite an impossible task. Gregory (2009) 
mentions beta hedging as a possible approach. The company might sell protection on 
comparable counterparties (e.g. from one’s peer-group). However, this strategy will deliver a 
proxy-hedge for credit spread volatility at best. In a worst case scenario it might also imply 
dramatic losses if the credit risk of such comparable counterparties deteriorates or if they 
even default on their obligations while the own entity is still solvent. 
There is actually a further – and less discussed alternative – for hedging one’s own credit 
risk. This possibility is however limited to a handful of entities, whose single name CDS is 
part of a liquid CDS index.75 If for example a single name CDS referenced to an entity (e.g. 
Deutsche Bank) is part of a CDS index (e.g. iTraxx Europe Senior Financials) that company 
would theoretically be able to sell its own credit risk. The company could sell the index and 
buy protection on all the remaining counterparties in the index. It has however to be stressed 
that this hedge strategy would still be very (and probably prohibitively) expensive, especially 
if re-hedge costs are considered. 
Fifth, and probably the most controversial and sophisticated aspect both from a theoretical 
as well as from a practical perspective is the overlap between DVA and expected funding 
benefits. In the following we will synthesize the key takeaways that are relevant for our 
analysis of the overall discourse on DVA, but will refrain from giving a comprehensive 
overview, especially with regards to a possible misalignment between pricing funding and 
financial theory. For this purpose we refer the interested reader to Morini and Prampolini 
(2011), Pallavacini et al. (2011), Hull and White (2012a) or Burgard and Kjaer (2013).76 
                                                 
75 The author thanks R. O. for this intuitive idea, raised in a discussion on CVA and DVA. 
76 On the controversy around funding of derivatives while also touching the overlap between DVA and 
funding see for example Cameron (2014). For a high level overview on FVA see also Fries et al. (2013). 
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Funding costs (benefits) are associated with uncollateralized positive (negative) exposure. 
While positive exposure needs to be funded, negative exposure is interpreted as a liability, i.e. 
a funding source. This can be illustrated through the following example. Assume a bank is 
trading an uncollateralized interest rate swap with a client. The bank hedges the interest rate 
risk arising from this swap through a mirroring position, traded with a bank. The only 
difference between the two swaps is that while the client derivative is not collateralized the 
hedge position is. Now if the client position is positive (negative) the hedge position will be 
negative (positive). In the first case the bank will need to post collateral to the hedging 
counterparty while not receiving any from the client. The bank will thus need to fund an 
amount equal to the positive exposure. In the second case the bank will receive collateral 
from the hedge counterparty and will not need to post any to the client. The bank will thus 
receive a funding amount equal to the negative exposure.77 
A funding cost adjustment (FCA) considers expected funding costs arising from expected 
positive exposure, i.e. depending on the same exposure profile like UCVA and the assumed 
funding spread. On the other hand, funding benefit adjustment (FBA) considers expected 
funding benefits arising from expected negative exposure, i.e. depending on the same 
exposure profile as DVA and an assumed funding spread. It becomes clear that an 
institution that prices FBA and DVA might be double counting, especially if the funding 
spread and the credit spread (used for DVA valuation) contain similar information. Morini 
and Prampolini (2011) point out that funding benefit should be based only on the CDS-
bond-basis, excluding possible double counting per definition. In practice one also sees 
traders that price FBA while being reluctant in pricing DVA. In a survey done by Deloitte 
and Solum (2013, p. 39) we find the following conclusion: “[…] banks are increasingly seeing 
                                                 
77 One can argue that the above given motivation is flowed because the value of a derivative cannot be driven 
by the funding structure of the trading institution. Recall, however, that arbitrage-free valuation is based on 
the possibility to structure a duplication portfolio. In practice the hedge of an uncollateralized trade is 
collateralized. This implies additional funding considerations to achieve a duplication. See also Burgard and 
Kjaer (2013). 
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DVA as a funding benefit and not as a benefit in the event they default. We note that whilst a bank may 
consider CVA + symmetric funding [FCA + FBA] to be relevant, they may refer to the funding benefit as 
DVA.” 
We conclude that although DVA has a variety of pitfalls and challenges that have to be taken 
into account its consideration is not a mere theoretical and accounting aspect. If some 
market participants are pricing CVA then other market participants must (willingly or not, 
knowingly or not) be taking their own credit risk into consideration, i.e. pricing (at least to a 
certain extent) DVA.  
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3.4.3. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
Remarks 
In December 2010 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published a 
document containing its revised standards under the title “Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for more Resilient Banks and Banking Systems”. Through the new basis for 
international lawmaking, the BCBS intended to deliver a (quick) response to the financial 
crisis, taking lessons-learned from recent events into consideration. Basel III offers major 
amendments to the previous Basel II78 accord in general and with respect to counterparty 
credit risk and CVA in particular. 
The regulatory requirements for capitalizing counterparty credit risk, in terms of default risk, 
have been amended on the one hand to be more prudent (e.g. stressed exposure etc.). On 
the other hand Basel III offers financial institutions an incentive to clear their OTC 
derivatives through a central counterparty (CCP), assigning significantly lower risk weights 
for such exposures. This is aligned with further regulatory efforts to shift the OTC market 
towards central clearing as codified in the US-American Dodd-Frank Act and in the 
European Regulation EMIR.79 
Basel III has in particular introduced a new capital charge for CVA risk, i.e. CVA volatility. It 
has been correctly anticipated that this new charge will increase the capital requirement for 
counterparty credit risk considerably. Since the publication of the first draft of Basel III in 
December 2009, CVA capital charge seems to have been dominating the discourse on 
counterparty credit risk and CVA pricing, raising the attention of the top management not 
only of financial institutions but also of non-financial corporations, followed by vehement 
                                                 
78 Basel II is the common reference to the document of the BCBS “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards”, published in 2006. 
79 Dodd-Frank Act stands for the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into 
federal law on July 21, 2010. EMIR stands for European Market Infrastructure Regulatory interred into force 
on August 16, 2012. 
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critique and organized lobbyism.80 At least in Europe, this opposition seems to have been 
effective. The latest package of the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV) which 
transposed Basel III into EU law, introduces exemptions from the CVA capital charge for 
non-financial counterparties, a clear advantage to European institutions, when compared to 
north American banks for instance.81 
In the following we will display the very main regulatory requirements around counterparty 
credit risk and CVA risk (the emphasis is on very main). The following elaboration is in no 
means an exhaustive description of all the respective requirements.82 We will especially not 
elaborate on country specific amendments (e.g. through an endorsement process of the 
framework). The aim of the following elaboration is rather to pinpoint the relevant issues in 
order to demonstrate the interplay between the regulatory requirements, accounting issues 
and the discourse around counterparty credit risk and CVA, trying in particular to 
understand whether the fear of the cited Lufthansa manager is justified. 
Measuring and Capitalizing (Counterparty) Credit Risk 
As noted, banks have already under Basel II been required to capitalize and measure the 
default risk inherent in their derivatives portfolios, i.e. (counterparty) credit risk. For this 
purpose, the supervisor prescribes a loan-equivalent technique, requiring the capitalization of 
the risk-weighted exposure at default, computed on a netting-set level. Banks must thus hold 
sufficient capital against their risk weighted assets (RWA), defined as follows: 
 RWA = RW ∙ EAD. (3.24) 
                                                 
80 The first draft for the Basel III accord was published by the BCBS in December 2009 in a document titled 
"Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector". For the discussion on the CVA capital charge within 
the first Basel III draft see for example Pengelly (2010). For the CVA capital charge in its last version see for 
example Rebonato et al. (2010). 
81 CRD IV entered into force on July 17, 2013. 
82 For a more extensive description see for example Gregory (2012), pp. 371-402. 
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RW stands for the risk-weight of the position, depending in general on the credit risk of the 
counterparty and the maturity of the portfolio at hand. EAD is the exposure at default to a 
specific counterparty with a one year horizon, depending in general on the market risk 
inherent in the derivatives portfolio, taking possible collateralization effects into 
consideration. 
The Basel framework offers three main approaches for assessing the risk-weight of a 
position; (1) the standardized approach, (2) the internal rating-based approach (IRBA) and 
(3) the advanced IRBA. Under the first approach banks are offered rating-based grids of 
risk-weights for each class of counterparties (e.g. sovereigns, financial institutions etc.). 
IRBA, on the other hand, prescribes the use of a model-based formula to define the risk 
weight. Following BCBS (2005) the risk weight RW can be defined as 
 RW = LGD ∙  �𝑁𝑁 �𝑁𝑁−1(𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷) − �𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁−1(0.999)
�1 − 𝜌𝜌 � − 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷� ∙ 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹(𝑀𝑀,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷) ∙ 12.5 (3.25) 
with 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 standing for the loss given default, i.e. the proportion of the exposure that will not 
be recovered. 𝑁𝑁(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 is the 
probability of default (in one year) and 𝜌𝜌 is the correlation factor between the obligor and 
the market factor. 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹 is a so-called maturity factor, a function of the maturity 𝑀𝑀 for several 
values of 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷. 
Under IRBA banks will be allowed to estimate the default probability, subject to meeting 
predefined conditions and explicit supervisory approval. Banks operating under advanced 
IRBA will be allowed to estimate LGD and exposure at default (EAD) as will be explained 
below in more detail. 
Assuming a minimum capital ratio of 8% – as required under Basel II – the minimum 
regulatory capital requirement RC is given as follows 
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 RC = LGD ∙  �𝑁𝑁 �𝑁𝑁−1(𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷) − �𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁−1(0.999)
�1 − 𝜌𝜌 � − 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷� ∙ 𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹(𝑀𝑀,𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷) ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷. (3.26) 
Equations (3.25) and (3.26) find their theoretical foundation in the Asymptotic Single Risk 
Factor (ASRF) model of portfolio credit risk, developed amongst others by Gordy (2003).83 
In the following, we will not elaborate extensively on this model and will refer the interested 
reader to the cited works and to the explanatory note given in BCBS (2005). Relevant for our 
analysis on counterparty credit risk and CVA is the main objective of the formula: Assuming 
a large homogenous and granular pool of obligors with a normal distributed default rate, the 
formula aims on approximating the (expected and unexpected) credit loss that will be 
exceeded with a small probability of 0.1%. The maturity adjustment is expected to capture 
the higher risk given by longer maturities for example due to a higher probability of credit 
deterioration, i.e. migration. 
Hence, the above given formula delivers a value at risk (VaR) measure for credit risk with a 
confidence level of 99.9% and a time horizon of one year. This stands in line with the 
proclaimed objective behind the Basel framework to capitalize a peek loss, a balance 
between prudency and solvency on the one hand and economic efficiency on the other. 
The Basel Committee argues that by fixing the confidence level to 99.9% “an institution is 
expected to suffer losses that exceed its level of tier 1 and tier 2 capital on average once in a thousand years”, 
adding that “[t]his confidence level might seem rather high.” The Committee advocates this high level 
as “[protecting] against estimation errors, that might inevitably occur from banks’ internal […] estimations, 
as well as other model uncertainties.”84 The financial crisis offers a hindsight in which these 
elaborations appear rather inadequate, if not even naive. Basel III has addressed this issue by 
                                                 
83 See also Merton (1974), Schönbucher (2005) and Vasicek (2002). For an overview on credit risk modeling see 
Subchapter  4.2.2. 
84 See BCBS (2005), especially p. 11. 
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prescribing an evolution for the minimum capital requirement, raising it up to 14.5% by 
2018.85 Future will tell whether this increase suffices. 
Estimating Regulatory Exposure (EAD) 
A challenging task within the exercise of capitalizing counterparty credit risk is estimating the 
amount at stake, i.e. the exposure at default (EAD) from Equation (3.24). We have described 
the challenges involved in estimating expected exposure in Subchapter  3.3.3. In the 
following we will focus on unique aspects relevant for regulatory purposes while revisiting 
some notations in order to allow for a more fluent elaboration.  
The supervisor prescribes three possible alternatives for this purpose: (1) the current 
exposure method (CEM), (2) the standardized method (SM) and (3) the internal model 
method (IMM).86 The use of SM seems however to be rather rare so that we will in the 
following solely focus on the significantly more popular approaches, CEM and IMM.87 
The Internal Model Method (IMM) 
The IMM approach is based on the use of Monte Carlo schemes to estimate the (future) 
value of the derivatives portfolio, i.e. through the simulation of possible evolutions of the 
relevant risk factors in a forward looking manner.88 The exposure 𝐸𝐸 inherent in a portfolio 
of OTC derivatives at a given time period 𝑡𝑡 is defined as follows 
                                                 
85 We refer the reader to critical analysis of the VaR measure found for example in Beder (1995) or 
Taleb (1997), pp. 445-453. 
86 Notice that at the time of writing these lines BCBS has introduced a new standardized approach for 
measuring counterparty credit risk exposures (SA-CCR). The SA-CCR is supposed to be more risk sensitive, 
taking collateral and netting effects better into consideration. Because banks are still not required to adopt 
the approach we will keep it uncommented and refer the interested reader to BCBS (2014). 
87 According to an international survey on counterparty credit risk only one participating institution stated to 
use SM whilst no participant planned to use SM in the future, see Deloitte and Solum (2013), p. 8. 
88 For a more detailed description of exposure simulation we refer the reader to Subchapter  3.3.3. 
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 𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡)  =  𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡),0} (3.27) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 stands for the net present value of a given netting set, i.e. the (default-free) value 
or the marked-to-market (MtM) metric of the respective derivatives. 𝐶𝐶 is the value of the 
collateral posted or received. This means that if the NPV is negative and the bank posts a 
collateral amount to the counterparty that exceeds the absolute value of the NPV, the bank 
will have a positive exposure (due to overcollateralization). Notice that the IMM approach 
enables the full consideration of netting and collateral effects.  
After producing possible exposure profiles for a given time period set {𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏} the expected 
exposure 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 at time period 𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 is given as follows 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)  =  𝔼𝔼ℙ[𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏)] (3.28) 
Where 𝐸𝐸 is the net exposure at time t given in Equation (3.27) and 𝔼𝔼ℙ denoting the 
expectation under the probability (real-world) measure ℙ. It is worth mentioning that the 
exposure models used for regulatory purposes are supposed under Basel III to be calibrated 
to historical stress periods, allowing for more prudent exposure estimation (also deviating 
from the risk-neutral measure ℚ used in CVA valuation). In order to assign yet more 
prudency to the computation the regulator introduces a further exposure metric, the 
effective expected exposure 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, defined as the maximum expected exposure until the 
date of calculation, given as follows 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏) = max𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖∈[0,𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘]{𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)}, (3.29) 
Focusing on a time horizon of one year (𝐻𝐻), the effective expected positive exposure 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 
is defined as the average of the 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 given in the following equation 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 = 1
𝐻𝐻
�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)𝛥𝛥𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡<𝐻𝐻
 (3.30) 
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where ∆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ≡  𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 − 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1. The regulatory exposure at default EAD is finally computed as a 
product of the effective expected positive exposure and a multiplier alpha 𝛼𝛼, i.e. 
 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 = 𝛼𝛼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸. (3.31) 
The aim of the 𝛼𝛼 factor is to consider the fact that the portfolios are not granular and that 
the interdependencies between the exposure profiles and credit risk of the counterparties can 
be disadvantageous. The 𝛼𝛼 factor can thus be seen as a surcharge for concentration risk and 
general wrong way risk. The regulator sets the default value of the 𝛼𝛼 factor at 1.4 while 
allowing institutions to calibrate their own values.89 
The Current Exposure Method (CEM) 
The CEM offers an alternative proxy approach for institutions that do not have (or do not 
want) the ability to use Monte Carlo schemes to estimate their exposures. The regulatory 
exposure at default EAD is defined as the sum of the current exposure (CE) of a given 
netting set, taking collateral into consideration, i.e. the exposure 𝐸𝐸 at time period 0 from 
Equation (3.27), and a prescribed addon factor. EAD is given by: 
 EAD =  CE + Addon (3.32) 
where Addon is an adjustment, given as a percentage of the notional amount, depending on 
the underlying asset class and the maturity of the derivatives portfolio as given in Table 11 
below. In contrast to the internal model approach CEM allows only for a limited 
consideration of netting effects, using 60% of the current netting benefit. Notice in addition 
that while IMM might assign a zero exposure to a netting set, CEM, being significantly more 
prudent, will usually deliver higher exposure metrics. If for example the current value of the 
                                                 
89 The regulator sets a floor of 1.2 if own calibration methods are used. The own calibration of alpha seems to 
be quite rare, see Deloitte and Solum (2013). For measuring and analyzing the alpha factor see for example 
Cespedes et al. (2010). 
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derivative portfolio is significantly negative, i.e. the portfolio is deep out-of-the-money 
(OTM), the simulation models might produce no positive exposure for the next one year 
horizon, possibly delivering an effective exposure of zero. Under the CEM this is rather 
excluded as the pre-described addon factors will always be positive. 
Residual 
Maturity 
Interest Rate FX and Gold Equity Precious 
Metal 
Other 
Commodities 
𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓 ≤ 1 0% 1% 6% 7% 10% 
1 < 𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓 < 5 0.5% 5% 8% 7% 12% 
𝒓𝒓𝒓𝒓 ≥ 5 1.5% 7.5% 10% 8% 15% 
Table 11: Addon Factors Used within the CEM Approach 
The table above summarizes the regulatory predetermined addon factors for computing the 
potential future exposure according to the current exposure method (CEM). The addon factors 
are given a percentage of the notional amount of the derivative position. 𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀 stands for residual 
maturity in years. 
Concluding Remarks on Capitalizing Default Risk 
It can be concluded that both IMM as well as CEM aim on assigning derivatives a loan-like 
risk metric with a horizon of one year, (theoretically) allowing a similar treatment of 
counterparty credit risk inherent in OTC derivatives and credit risk, arising from loan (debt) 
instruments. 
Notice, however, that the overall minimum regulatory capital requirement for default risk 
captures – or at least aims on capturing – further relevant risks. Migration risk (incremental 
credit risk) is captured through a maturity factor. Market risk is addressed by allowing for 
asset class dependent addon factors (under the CEM) or an explicit risk-factor dependent 
simulation (under IMM). Concentration risk and wrong way risk are supposed to be 
captured by the alpha 𝛼𝛼 factor. 
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The capital requirement measure is on no account a pricing metric as it is not based on 
arbitrage-free or risk-neutral aspects, solely quantifying the risk inherent in the next year. It 
can rather be qualified as a risk metric, based on historically estimated parameters that are 
supposed to be prudent, not necessarily economically plausible. 
CVA Capital Charge – Remarks 
Adding a price adjustment to incorporate counterparty credit risk, e.g. in form of a CVA 
metric, introduces additional price sensitivities. CVA depends on the credit quality of the 
counterparty, usually quantified in terms of credit spread sensitivity (e.g. CS01). If for 
instance the credit quality deteriorates and spreads widen, CVA will increase, leading to value 
losses. Being exposure dependent, CVA exhibits also market risk sensitivity (e.g. DV01). 
Decreasing interest rates will for instance boost the value of receiver swaps as well as their 
expected exposure, subsequently enhancing CVA. In addition, CVA would also exhibit a 
sensitivity to the correlation between credit spreads and the relevant risk factors. 
The Basel Committee reports that during the financial crises two-third of the credit losses 
incurred by financial institutions were driven by the overall deteriorating credit quality and 
the increase of credit spreads (see BCBS, 2011). Losses incurred through counterparties 
actually defaulting and filing bankruptcy accounted only for one-third of the credit losses 
reported. This drove the Basel Committee to require for an additional capital charge. The 
CVA capital charge aims on capitalizing CVA volatility arising from credit spread sensitivity. 
Notice that the regulator (uncommented-wise) left further sensitivities of CVA, i.e. DV01 
and gamma, not accounted for. 
Basel III offers two alternatives for measuring CVA risk, a standard and an advanced 
method. In the following we will give a brief account of both approaches. 
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CVA Capital Charge – Standard Method 
The standard method aims on capturing the losses due to credit spread sensitivity using a 
closed-form solution approach.90 The approach addresses banks using less sophisticated 
approaches to estimate their exposure (e.g. CEM). The CVA capital charge 𝐾𝐾 for the bank-
wide portfolio is measured using the following predefined formula: 
 
 
𝐾𝐾 = 2.33 √𝐻𝐻��0.5 ∙ ��𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖ℎ�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
� − 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖
ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
ℎ�
2 + 0.75�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖2�𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 − 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖ℎ�2𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (3.33) 
with 𝐻𝐻 being the one-year time horizon in units of a year (i.e. 1 year). 𝑛𝑛 stands for the 
number of netting sets. 𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is the exposure at default for netting set 𝑖𝑖 as computed for 
example using CEM. 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 stands the effective maturity of the netting set in units of a year. 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 
is the weight assigned to the credit risk of the counterparty as predefined according to the 
following table: 
 
Credit quality steps 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Weight  𝒘𝒘𝒊𝒊 0.7% 0.8% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 10.0% 
Table 12: Weights Used in the Standard Approach for Calculating CVA Capital Charge 
The table above summarizes the weight used in the standard formula for calculating CVA capital 
charge as given by CRR IV, Article 384. 
                                                 
90 See also CRR IV, Article 382. 
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Notice that the regulator explicitly allows the recognition of credit hedges. 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 in the formula 
above stands for the notional of a credit derivative, e.g. single name or index CDS, 
protecting from the default of counterparty 𝑖𝑖.91 
Pykhtin (2012) shows that the Basel III equation for CVA capital charge is the closed-form 
solution of the value at risk based on a one-factor credit spread model with conservative 
assumptions. Instead of using market implied volatilities for credit spreads the equation 
relies on (conservative) constant risk weights. 
CVA Capital Charge – Advanced Method 
Under the advanced method the CVA capital charge is measured using a Monte Carlo 
scheme in which the credit spreads for each counterparty are simulated and the CVA VaR is 
subsequently computed, based on the following prescribed formula:92 
 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇�𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 �0; 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �− 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇� − 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �− 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇��𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1 ∙ �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 � (3.34) 
with 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 standing for the loss given default ratio, based on market implied information. 
𝑇𝑇 is the maturity of the netting set and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 stands for the respective future time period. 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is 
the discount factor at time period 𝑖𝑖. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is the expected exposure, considering possible 
collateral and netting agreements, and based on the stressed calibration method as elaborated 
above for EPE purposes. 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the simulated credit spread at future time period 𝑖𝑖. Basel III 
explicitly requires the use of market implied data to estimate the credit spreads, prescribing a 
hierarchy of sources and a respective mapping approach. If possible banks should rely on 
CDS spreads referencing to the counterparty. If such spreads are not available they are 
                                                 
91 Eligible hedges according to CRD IV, Article 386 are (a) single-name CDS or other equivalent hedging 
instruments referencing the counterparty directly; (b) index CDS. 
92 See CRD IV, Article 383. 
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expected to develop a mapping procedure based on rating, industry and region of 
counterparties.93 
CVA is thus being modeled as a function of the same components as given in the practical 
Equation (3.16) for CVA pricing: (1) LGD is clearly visible and is based on market implied 
information, (2) the first part of the summation is the derived default probability, and (3) 
stands for the discounted expected exposure as average between each two future time steps. 
The VaR measure is computed using a 99% confidence level and 10-day horizon (in addition 
to a predefined multiplier of three). 
Banks are allowed to incorporate possible hedge positions that reduce credit sensitivity (e.g. 
CS01). This means that credit hedges such as single name CDS can be modeled to reduce 
the expected exposure profile, and thus the CVA VaR computed. Hedges aiming to reduce 
other sensitivities, e.g. interest rate sensitivities, are on the other hand not considered as 
eligible. 
3.4.4. EVALUATION SUMMARY 
As with other regulatory capital requirements the approaches described above exhibit certain 
shortcomings and inconsistencies. After all, regulatory capital requirements can be seen as 
following contradicting objectives. On the one hand they are supposed to display theoretical 
soundness that is presumably aligned with the way “banks do business”. On the other hand 
they are supposedly prudent, ensuring banks are sufficiently capitalized for extreme cases. In 
the following we give a very short summary of the criticism against CVA capital charge, and 
                                                 
93 “Whenever the credit default swap spread of the counterparty is available, this must be used. Whenever such 
a credit default swap spread is not available, the bank must use a proxy spread that is appropriate based on 
the rating, industry and region of the counterparty.” CRD IV, Article 383, Paragraph 1. 
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will subsequently conclude with an own assessment of the requirements and their 
consequences.94 
Banks have criticized the misalignment of the approaches with how they calculate CVA, i.e. 
with how “they do business” 
 Aiming to be theoretically sound the advanced approach (in line with accounting 
requirements for fair value measurement) prescribes the use of market implied 
parameters to estimate LGD and default probabilities (CDS spreads). Recall that 
many banks have relied their valuation on historical and rating-based parameters. 
Agnostic of the reasons – which have already been discussed in Subchapter  3.4.2 – 
banks seem to advocate the use of theoretically inconsistent approaches, especially 
contradicting the risk-neutral valuation scheme. 
CVA capital charge has also been criticized for its prudency:  
 The advanced approach prescribes the use of stressed expected exposure measures, 
i.e. the use of data from historical periods of distress to calibrate the exposure 
models. This clearly deviates from risk-neutral valuation, which is behind the use of 
market implied data. In the meanwhile the standard method prescribes the use of 
EAD which is per se a conservative measure, standing for a different metric than the 
exposure measures used for CVA calculation.95 
 In contrary to accounting standards the regulatory capital approaches focus only on 
the unilateral CVA. Excluding DVA means that a “natural hedge” for the bilateral 
CVA is not considered. After all, the credit spreads of the bank and its counterparty 
might display a similar dependency to a common market factor. If CVA increases 
                                                 
94 For a more comprehensive overview of the industry’s criticism against the CVA capital charge methods we 
refer the reader to Gregory (2012), pp. 393-396. 
95 The conservative assumptions used in the standardized approach have also been discussed, especially 
regarding the use of risk weights instead of market implied CDS volatilities. 
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due to a general market deterioration DVA will also increase, absorbing – at least to 
some extent – some of the CVA volatility. 
 Both the standard and advanced approaches consider credit-sensitive hedges as 
eligible. Holding a single name CDS referencing to the counterparty will for example 
reduce the exposure and thus the CVA capital charge. Other hedges, e.g. interest rate 
or FX hedges aiming to reduce the volatility of the CVA due to exposure changes 
are, however, excluded. 
Given CVA is a volatile number with significant impact on the P&L of a bank it is 
straightforward that regulators are now requiring its capitalization. The more interesting 
aspect about CVA capital charge and the associated discourse is that it gives an almost 
school-book-like example of how regulatory-driven financial institutions actually are. It also 
shows the tautology behind many of the discussions around regulatory requirements.  
Yes, it can be argued that CVA is a volatile number that needs to be capitalized. Yet, it seems 
that most banks started accounting for CVA in their financial statements after the 
introduction of the regulatory requirements described above. Recent studies do show that 
banks “have progressively converged in reflecting the cost of the credit risk of their counterparties in the fair 
value of derivatives using market implied data based on CDS spreads and proxy spreads in the vast majority 
of cases.”96 But as also acknowledged by the regulators “[t]his convergence is the result of industry 
practice, as well as a consequence of the implementation […]of IFRS 13 and the Basel CVA framework.” 
One could argue that the supply with regulatory capital requirements has produced its own 
demand through insisting on using (volatile) marked implied data that increased the volatility 
of banks' P&L statements. After all, it is only fair to note that risk-neutral and arbitrage-free 
valuation presume traded hedging instruments that allow for a “duplication strategy”. As 
discussed above this is hardly the case for CVA, especially when it is material at most. 
Clinging to use market implied parameters without reflecting on their economic sense and 
                                                 
96 EBA (2015), p. 8. 
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most importantly on their consequences risks financial statements to aspire for something 
they cannot deliver per se.97 
If we, however, agree that financial statements should give a “true and fair view” then – as it 
applies for all other plain-vanilla and exotic derivatives – considering CVA and measuring it 
according to the fair value hierarchy is straightforward. Bearing in mind that the disclosed 
CVA measures are a proxy at best, their bare existence increases the value of the financial 
statements as it points to a significant risk, reducing at least some of the opaqueness 
surrounding counterparty credit risk. After all, stakeholders that haven’t been aware of CVA 
might make decisions without considering all relevant risks.98 
Evidence indeed shows that banks have started to charge significantly more for 
uncollateralized derivatives as a reaction to the new regulatory paradigm. A comparative 
study coordinated by the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) and cited by 
EBA (2015) claims for example that the costs associated with regulatory capital for 
counterparties with a rating of BB have doubled. This indeed reveals that the lobby-like 
pressure coming from the industry was not justified, and that the concerns articulated by the 
Lufthansa manager quoted above hit the spot. A CVA capital charge would increase hedging 
costs, possibly making them too punitive for counterparties with no access to liquid 
collateral. 
This also explains why the EU lawmakers have reacted to the pressure by allowing to exempt 
transactions with non-financial counterparties such as Lufthansa.99 Interestingly, however – 
                                                 
97 The increased use of CDS spreads for CVA valuation has indeed increased the demand for CDS in the 
market which in return increased the level of CVA as shown for example by Bilal and Singh (2012). 
98 Psychologists refer to the fact that humans tend to jump to conclusions based on limited evidence as 
WYSIATI, which stands for what you see is all there is, see Kahneman (2011), especially pp. 85-88. 
99 The CRR exempts the following: (I) Transaction with non-financial counterparties below the EMIR clearing 
threshold, as codified in CRR Article 382(4)(a); (II) Transactions between clearing members and clients in 
the context of indirect clearing when the clearing member is acting as an intermediary between the client and 
a qualifying central counterparty - CRR Article 382(3); (III) Intragroup transactions - CRR Article 382(4)(b); 
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as EBA (2015) seemingly acknowledges – “accounting CVA is usually [already] reflected in the price 
of derivative contracts”. The increased charges are thus only a function of the bank’s decision “to 
also pass on the capital costs associated with the regulatory CVA risk charge to their counterparties”. In the 
following we will take a second glance at this rather daring hypothesis that seems to pass 
through without sufficient scrutiny. 
Indeed, the CVA capital charge formulas are not equal to the formula used to price CVA 
and supposedly also used to measure it for accounting purposes, as illustrated by Equation 
(3.16). Still, both formulas are definitely not miles away from each other (especially under the 
advanced approach). A bank that incorporates the (accounting) CVA will be double-
counting for a series of factors if it then fully incorporates the CVA capital charge on top. 
Think of the (accounting) CVA as the hedge cost for counterparty credit risk. If we charge 
these costs to the client then we should theoretically be able to hedge the exposure-
sensitivity as well as the credit-sensitivity of CVA. Hedging the latter is crucial as it will 
minimize the regulatory capital requirement both under the standard and the advanced 
methods. The remaining requirements will result from the prudency of the regulatory 
requirements, especially the use of stressed exposure measures etc. 
CVA capital charge will thus indeed lead to an increase in hedge costs. It is, however, 
questionable whether that increase will be as significant as the evidence shows. It can rather 
be concluded that the evidence discovers that banks have not been pricing for CVA 
adequately in the past. This might be driven by the competitive market, cross-selling aspects 
or the fact that people selling these product plainly did not think systematically about 
counterparty credit risk, because no metric pointed to it. 
The exemption rule will thus only help the industry if banks systematically misprice their 
products, i.e. charging less for them than the hedge costs they imply. Interestingly banks also 
                                                                                                                                                 
(IV) Transactions with pension funds - CRR Article 382(4)(c) and CRR Article 482; and (V) Transactions 
with sovereign counterparties - CRR Article 382(4)(d) 
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pledged for these exemptions which might speak for a strong belief in cross-selling aspects 
and the increased opaqueness they bring along. It might also speak for the fact that the risk-
neutral and arbitrage-free perspective – for right or for wrong – did not yet penetrate the 
executive management levels of financial institutions. 
If the above analysis can be synthesized into one key takeaway it is that financial institutions 
are heavily driven by regulatory requirements. They do not only measure and manage their 
risks according to detailed requirements they also trade and price according to such 
requirements that originally aimed to actually mirror how banks “do business”. Bearing in 
mind that regulatory requirements should set minimum standards for all financial institutions 
it remains questionable if the detailed level of such requirements is beneficial. Especially 
when it comes to topics like CVA where there is a lack of theoretical soundness and practical 
experience it would be more beneficial to let a larger number of entities experiment than 
having one entity prescribing everything in detail to the rest. 
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3.5. MANAGING AND MITIGATING CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENT 
3.5.1. MANAGING AND PRICING CVA 
The previous subsections revealed the technical challenges around modeling CVA. They also 
shed light on the evolving regulatory and accounting landscape. Agnostic of whether the 
regulatory requirements increased the awareness of CVA or whether they are only a reaction 
of its increased importance, derivative traders - especially banks - are faced with the 
challenges of systematically incorporating counterparty credit risk into pricing. This implies 
techniques for charging CVA to the client but also to allocate it across the organization in 
order to allow for adequate incentives. In this subchapter we will give an overview of such 
techniques, evaluating their effectiveness from the perspective of the management of a 
financial institution as well as their counterparties. 
The technical challenges around CVA, especially the discussions around estimating default 
probabilities, revealed how shaky (if not even unscientific) CVA modeling can be. Lacking 
theoretically sound valuation schemes at all times, traders - as they probably always do - 
cannot base their pricing solely on mathematical considerations. Not incorporating CVA 
into pricing can indeed lead to adverse selection in Akerlof’s (1970) sense as the bank will 
not only face a problem of not covering costs through default, it will also draw a higher 
proportion of counterparties with relatively high credit risk. Still, it may remain a well-taken 
management decision to invest in order for example to increase market shares in a specific 
segment or in order to reap cross-selling benefits from other products. In the following we 
will discuss key issues around incorporating CVA into pricing. We will show that even when 
it seems highly technical, the need for strategic and tactical considerations will prevail as all 
decisions will be taken under a significant proportion of uncertainty. 
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Incremental CVA 
As already discussed in previous subchapters exposure and thus CVA are calculated on 
netting set level. If the instruments within a netting set do not exhibit offsetting effects, e.g. 
if the derivatives are identical, then CVA on a netting set level will equal the sum of the 
individual CVA metrics. If, however, the instruments do exhibit offsetting effects, e.g. a 
netting set with payer and receiver swaps, the overall unilateral CVA will be smaller than the 
sum of the individual instruments.100 
In case of the unilateral CVA the relation can be formalized as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 ≤�𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (3.35) 
with 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 standing for CVA on a netting-set (portfolio) level. 𝑛𝑛 is the number of instruments 
within the netting set, and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 is the CVA of the instrument 𝑖𝑖. This means that pricing 
unilateral CVA on a standalone basis could be punitive if a netting set is in place. Pricing a 
so-called incremental CVA allows the consideration of such offsetting effects. Estimating 
the incremental CVA of a new trade includes the quantification of CVA on a netting-set 
level before and after the trade has been introduced. The following equation formalizes this 
relation 
 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 =  𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃+𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 (3.36) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 stands for the incremental CVA of instrument 𝑖𝑖. 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃+𝑖𝑖 stands for CVA 
of the netting set if instrument 𝑖𝑖 included, and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 stands for the CVA on netting set if 
instrument 𝑖𝑖 is not included. 
                                                 
100 Notice that the effect on the bilateral CVA is not that intuitive, because the final metric is not only a function 
of the expected positive exposure but also of the expected negative exposure, and thus DVA. See also 
Gregory (2012), pp. 177-178. 
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From a pricing perspective charging for the incremental CVA seems the theoretically right 
thing to do. A transaction gets charged with the CVA amount it contributes. This does, 
however, imply certain challenges that will be discussed in the following. 
First, incremental CVA is not additive, i.e. it is not possibly to allocate the portfolio CVA 
metric to the different trades.101 This implies possible inconsistencies when simultaneously 
trading a number of derivatives with the same counterparty while being interested in having 
an incremental CVA metric for each trade. This pitfall seems more relevant for CVA 
allocation, i.e. post pricing. 
In addition, pricing incremental CVA implies that the unilateral CVA of a new trade does 
not have to be positive. If a trade exhibits extreme offsetting effects, reducing the expected 
exposure of a netting set, its incremental CVA would be negative.102 Assuming both 
counterparties are equally informed and sophisticated a negative CVA would be an obvious 
contractual prerequisite. OTC derivatives are, however, not always traded between equally 
informed and sophisticated counterparties. One can question the willingness of a trader to 
share a negative CVA with an uninformed counterparty, e.g. a buy-side (client) without the 
technical capabilities. Also from a management perspective one can argue that flooring CVA, 
e.g. by zero, would avoid too progressive a pricing, especially relevant for non-collateralized 
client portfolios. 
A further aspect of incremental CVA is its dependency on the order in which transactions 
are traded. Think for example of a netting set with numerous derivatives, e.g. receiver and 
payer swaps. The counterparties now plan to trade two mirroring instruments. The first 
instrument (trade A) is a receiver swap (e.g. semi-annual payments of three-month Euribor, 
                                                 
101 See also Pykhtin and Rosen (2010). 
102 As discussed above bilateral CVA does not have to be positive per definition, e.g. if the counterparty doing 
the calculation has the worse credit quality or if the expected negative exposure is larger than the expected 
positive exposure. 
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receiving a fixed spread of 100 basis points etc.). The second instrument (trade B) mirrors 
the first, i.e. payer swap (semi-annual payments of a fixed spread of 100 basis points, 
receiving three-month Euribor etc.). The incremental CVA of the individual trades A and B 
will differ significantly, depending on the sequence in which they are traded (e.g. A-B or B-
A). This simplified example illustrates that using incremental CVA can in fact be 
counterintuitive, especially if one is able to “anticipate” future transactions with the 
counterparty. This makes it also clear why traders might not charge for CVA as they expect 
further transactions (with offsetting netting effects) to be traded with the respective 
counterparties. The fact that incremental CVA is sequence-dependent raises a further issue 
which is relevant for banks in which the different trading desks are internally charged for 
CVA (see below). A trader might “optimize” the order in which he deals to minimize 
internal charges. 
In addition, incremental CVA implies further significant technical challenges. CVA 
calculation as such requires sophisticated technical capabilities (e.g. estimation of expected 
exposure, taking netting and collateral agreements into consideration). Calculating an 
incremental CVA raises the bar significantly as the calculation needs to happen twice (with 
and without the deal) and fast to allow for usual OTC derivative trading time slots. This 
makes it worthwhile to consider the “use case” of CVA pricing. Yes, CVA might remain 
significant even if collateral agreements are in place, especially if derivatives with significant 
jump risk are being traded.103 Still, CVA is most significant if no collateral agreements are in 
place and if the credit risk of the counterparties is asymmetric. This is usually the case when 
banks trade with (buy-side) clients (e.g. non-financial counterparties) in contrary to trading 
with other financial institutions. Interestingly, one might argue that in such cases the netting 
sets will tend be rather one-sided as such counterparties trade derivatives with banks in order 
to hedge similar positions (e.g. hedging interest rate risks of floating loans). The “use case” 
                                                 
103 See Subchapter  3.5.2 for further elaborations on this. 
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of CVA pricing does not argue against incremental CVA. It does, however, put it into 
proportion, facilitating a more adequate discussion around the importance and urgency of 
implementing the respective technical capabilities. This explains why derivative traders rely 
also on approximations for CVA pricing such as lookup tables with grids of predefined CVA 
values, e.g. depending on the maturity and credit quality.104 
Pricing DVA 
As noted in Subchapter  3.4.2 above, if CVA is priced then some counterparties are (willingly 
or not, knowingly or not) pricing DVA. This indeed sheds a different light on the discussion 
around how counterintuitive it presumably is to price DVA. After all, the unilateral CVA, 
calculated by one counterparty is the DVA of the other counterparty, independently of 
whether one can monetize DVA or not. Still, it seems hard to detach the discussion around 
pricing CVA and DVA from the pricer at hand, especially if the counterparties can be 
classified as price setters or price takers, e.g. as is the case when financial institutions trade 
with clients from industries other than financial services. While two banks trading would 
accept and expect CVA and DVA to be priced in order to allow for fair contractual terms 
and symmetrical pricing, a bank trading with a client (e.g. non-financial services corporation) 
might be reluctant to price in its own counterparty credit risk, because of a variety of 
reasons. (a) The trader might argue that his bank’s credit risk is negligible if compared with 
the credit risk of the client. This can indeed be the case in many situations, making DVA 
seem like theoretical (over-) complication with no real practical use; (b) The trader might see 
himself as a service provider (and not as a counterparty on equal terms); (c) A reputational 
issue might arise by “admitting” that the bank is default-prone in front of a client; (d) Lastly 
DVA simply reduces the profit margin, leaving no incentive for the trader to price it in the 
first place. The latter argument (d) might seem banal, but it is an important indication that 
                                                 
104 See also Gregory (2012), p. 411. 
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the discourse around DVA is not a pure scientific search for truth. Profit considerations 
cannot be excluded, especially if the debate is led by people from the industry. 
Interestingly – and as also noted in Subchapter  3.4.2 – evidence does show that an increasing 
number of banks are pricing DVA while some interpret it as a funding benefit adjustment.105 
Independently of whether this interpretation is based on sound theoretical considerations, 
the evidence does point to the fact that CVA on a unilateral basis has become more scares 
and harder to advocate for. 
Central Management and Pricing – CVA Desk 
Acknowledging the complexity and uniqueness of the topic banks usually dedicate 
specialized organizational units to price and manage CVA, usually referred to as CVA 
desks.106 The main objective of these units is to offer a counterparty credit risk (CCR) hedge 
to the individual desks. For this reason the trading desks pass on the CVA amount (they 
charged the counterparty for) to the CVA desk as illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Illustration of the Role of a CVA Desk in Hedging and Pricing 
The figure illustrates the CVA charging process. The trading desk (e.g. interest rate swap desk) 
passes on a CVA charge for a trade. In return all counterparty credit risk inherent by that trade, 
i.e. default risk and CVA volatility is borne by the CVA desk which usually has the mandate to 
(partially) hedge default risk and CVA volatility. 
                                                 
105 For evidence on pricing DVA, and its increased interpretation as funding benefit adjustment see for 
example Deloitte & Solum (2013), pp. 38-39. 
106 See for example EBA (2015), pp. 22-23 or Deloitte & Solum (2013), p. 23. 
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The CCR hedge between the different desks and the CVA desk can take the form of an 
internal contingent CDS (C-CDS) contract (discussed in Section  3.1 above). A perfect CCR 
hedge means that the individual desks suffer no losses if the counterparty defaults nor do 
they need to deal with additional volatility as a function of CVA changes. If the hedge is 
based on a bilateral CVA it would also imply that individual trading desks do not profit (nor 
do they lose) from deterioration (improvement) in the credit quality of their banks, avoiding 
non-plausible P&L effects on trading desk level. 
In addition, these units are supposed to ensure the following: (a) Complex decisions around 
pricing and mitigating CVA (as well as DVA) are taken by employees with adequate training 
and professional knowhow; (b) Possible diversification (netting) effects are considered. This 
becomes especially relevant when considering effects within a multi-asset netting set; and 
(c) Expertise to develop and run adequate modeling capabilities for the different CVA 
components, e.g. expected exposure, collateral agreements, probabilities of default, wrong-
way-risk etc. 
An essential question that needs to be discussed is whether CVA desks should operate as 
profit generating units or as a cost center. After all, it seems intuitive for a trading 
department to want to “make money” from CVA, and to incentivize the CVA desk to 
operate accordingly. Doing that, the banks might, however, run the risk of incentivizing the 
CVA desk to generate profits at the expense of the other trading desks or to increase the risk 
positions, in misalignment with the overall trading strategy, e.g. through hedging CVA risk of 
other banks or other proprietary (prop) trading positions. It might therefore seem more 
promising to define the CVA desk as a so-called utility function. Gregory (2012, pp. 409-
410) uses the term to indicate that “the mandate of the CVA desk is to have a flat PnL”, while 
commenting that “a zero PnL mandate on annual basis is still not ideal” as it might give rise to 
wrong incentives. In addition he points to several measures that can reduce CVA without 
automatically increasing the risk. 
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In order to ensure that the CVA desk is acting according to the overall strategy of the bank, 
a set of adequate quantitative key performance indicators (KPIs) needs to be defined, in 
alignment with its overall mandate. This indeed depends highly on the size and structure of 
the OTC derivative portfolio at hand and the overall strategy of the bank, and can thus 
hardly be discussed in general terms.107 In the following we give several examples of such 
KPIs for illustration purposes only: 
 Quantitative KPIs: CVA volatility vs. target, hedge effectiveness, changes in CVA 
regulatory capital requirements (RWA volatility), workout recovery etc. 
 Qualitative KPIs: Quality of CSAs, evaluation of hedging strategies, feedback from 
other trading desks regarding pricing, consulting etc. 
3.5.2. MITIGATING CVA – COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS 
Besides netting agreements an obvious way of reducing counterparty credit risk is through 
collateralization. For this purpose the counterparties agree on posting collateral whenever 
their position is out-of-the-money, i.e. when the derivative portfolio displays a liability from 
their perspective. This reduces the net exposure of the counterparty with in-the-money 
positions as it receives a respective collateral amount as formalized in Equation (3.7) and 
Equation (3.8) above.108 
Due to the stochastic nature of derivative values – incl. the fact that they can be either 
positive or negative – the counterparties need to agree on respective terms for posting and 
receiving collateral. Such terms are usually specified in an annex to the master service 
agreement used. The ISDA Credit Support Annex (CSA) is the most popular format for 
                                                 
107 In Subchapter  3.5.2 and Subchapter  3.5.3 we discuss possible mitigation strategies, possibly run by a CVA 
desk. 
108 As also shown in Equation (3.7) and Equation (3.8), p. 40, overcollateralization will lead to increased 
counterparty credit risk for the party posting the collateral. 
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such agreements.109 We will therefore in the following refer to CSAs and collateral 
agreements synonymously. 
As illustrated in Table 9 above, ISDA estimates that collateral agreements in combination 
with netting agreements reduce the overall OTC exposure by not less than 95%, leaving less 
than 5% of the gross market exposure uncollateralized – which is anyhow 1.1 trillion 
USD.110 This can be seen as a testimony of the high popularity of netting and collateral 
agreements and their effectiveness in reducing exposure. The popularity of collateral 
agreements is most evident within the financial services sector as seen in Table 13. Almost 
every derivative traded between banks seems to be collateralized. On the other hand, 
counterparties outside of the financial services sector seem still to struggle with 
collateralizing their derivatives, maybe due to limited access to liquid assets that are 
considered eligible. 
Counterparty type CSA No CSA 
Banks and security firms 95.5% 4.5% 
Hedge funds 94.1% 5.9% 
Pension funds 75.3% 24.7% 
Non-financial institutions 28.6% 71.4% 
Government-sponsored entities / government agencies 42.4% 57.6% 
Table 13: Percentage of Active Bilateral Derivative Collateral Agreements by Counterparty Type 
The table illustrates the percentage of collateral agreements (CSAs) by counterparty type as of 
December 31, 2014. Source of the table is the market survey of ISDA (2015). 
                                                 
109 For statistics on the topic see for example the 2015 margin survey of ISDA (2015), e.g. p. 10. 
110 See Table 9. p. 48 above. 
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Product type CSA No CSA 
Commodity derivatives 59.1% 40.9% 
Credit derivatives 97.0% 3.0% 
Equity derivatives 91.3% 8.7% 
Fixed-income derivatives 88.9% 11.1% 
Foreign exchange derivatives 73.0% 27.0% 
Table 14: Bilateral Derivative Collateral Transactions by Product Type 
The table illustrates the percentage of collateral agreements (CSAs) by product type as of 
December 31, 2014. Source of the table is the market survey of ISDA (2015). 
As for example shown by Brigo et al. (2013b) or Lipton and Shelton (2012) collateral 
agreements can reduce the expected exposure, and can thus have a mitigating effect on 
counterparty credit risk and CVA. Still, a differentiated analysis is needed in order to 
understand which risks remain despite having a CSA in place, and which new challenges 
collateral agreements introduce. For this purpose we revisit and analyze the key 
characteristics of CSAs (introduced shortly in Subchapter  3.3.3):111 
i. Collateral type: The CSA defines the eligible type of collateral each counterparty needs 
to post, e.g. cash, government bonds, corporate bonds etc. Cash can be seen as the 
least risky collateral type.112 Still, an FX risk may arise if the currency of the collateral 
differs from the currency of the derivatives. If, in addition, the CSA allows for cash 
to be posted in more than one currency, e.g. EUR and USD a cheapest to deliver 
option is introduced. Such an option might exhibit a considerable value which needs 
to be taken into account as for example shown by Fujii and Takahashi (2011).  
                                                 
111 See also Cesari et al. (2009), pp. 190-191. 
112 According to ISDA (2015) cash (especially USD and EUR) makes out around 75% of the collateral received 
and delivered worldwide. The second most popular type are government securities (especially of the United 
States and member states of the European Union) who make ~18% of the collateral delivered. 
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Collateral becomes riskier if we turn to securities such as bonds (especially with 
rather risky issuers) or even equities. To account for such risks counterparties might 
agree on so-called haircuts.113 Posting securities such as bonds might imply 
additional wrong-way risk that needs to be analyzed and considered. This is 
especially relevant if the credit risk of the counterparty (e.g. state-owned bank), 
posting the collateral, is highly correlated with the credit risk of the issuer (e.g. 
government bond). 
ii. Threshold: A threshold stands for the level underneath which collateral will not be 
called. If the portfolio value exceeds the threshold collateral will be exchanged to 
cover the surplus exposure. The threshold amount will remain uncollateralized. 
Counterparties might agree on thresholds to reduce operational costs, but from a 
CVA perspective they can be significant and need to be considered.114 Thresholds 
can also be defined asymmetrically, i.e. the counterparties will have differing 
amounts. This is especially relevant if one counterparty has an “unlimited” threshold 
as this implies that it will never post collateral. In that case one can also refer to the 
CSA as being one-sided. 
From a modelling perspective thresholds can be relatively challenging if they can 
change, e.g. if a rating downgrade triggers a lower threshold.115 
iii. Minimum transfer amount (MTA): MTA is the amount which the collateral to be 
exchanged needs to exceed before an exchange takes place. Because collateral can 
only be exchanged in blocks that exceed the MTA it also resembles an 
uncollateralized amount. 
                                                 
113 See also Gregory (2012), pp. 68-69. 
114 See for example Cesari et al. (2009), especially pp. 190-194 or Gregory (2012), pp. 261-262. 
115 According to ISDA (2015), especially p. 22, the most popular threshold methodology is based on credit 
ratings. 
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iv. Margining frequency: The CSA also defines the frequency in which collateral is 
exchanged (e.g. daily, weekly etc.). The bigger the time difference between each 
collateral call the bigger the risk of the exposure changing, i.e. the bigger the risk of 
having undercollateralized exposure. 
This risk is of course also a function of the type of derivatives traded. Derivatives 
with jump-like changes will have a higher probability of causing significant under 
collateralization as shown by Brigo et al. (2011a) for CDS, especially with high 
wrong-way risk. This can be seen as one factor driving the relatively high collateral 
coverage of credit derivatives (97% CSA) as seen in Table 14.116 
Daily margining – which can be considered as the least risky frequency – is especially 
common among institutions with large OTC portfolios. This seems to remain a 
challenge for institutions with smaller OTC portfolios that lack the operational 
capabilities.117 
Besides the contractual margining frequency one has to assess the risk that arises 
when the counterparty defaults due to the time it takes to liquidate the portfolio, i.e. 
close-out risk which as noted for example by Cesari et al. (2009, p. 195) need to be 
taken into account when estimating CVA. For this purpose one assumes that default 
can happen at any time, and adjusts the frequency in which collateral is called by a 
so-called margin period of risk, i.e. the expected time it takes to complete the close-
out procedures after the counterparty has defaulted.118 
Estimating the margin period of risk is not trivial and involves a number of 
operational and legal aspects. Among others one has to estimate the time it takes to 
re-valuate the positions, to receive the collateral (incl. disputes and settlement risk), 
                                                 
116 One might argue in addition that a further factor is the type of counterparty trading the different derivative 
types, i.e. credit derivatives are mostly traded by financial institutions etc. 
117 ISDA (2015), p. 26, reports that especially among large portfolios (greater than 5,000 trades) daily 
reconciliation is the norm (87.1%) and expects this to be further driven by Dodd-Frank and EMIR 
regulations. 
118 See for example Brigo et al. (2013a), p. 313. 
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and to liquidate the positions and structure new hedges.119 Institutions can also rely 
on historical figures or regulatory requirements.120 
v. Re-hypothecation: A further aspect that needs to be considered is whether the collateral 
taker has an unrestricted right to lend and sell the collateral under a “repo” or re-
hypothecate it. Re-hypothecation is especially relevant for non-cash collateral 
agreements, introducing a new credit risk for the counterparty that is posting the 
collateral. After all, the collateral giver is now exposed to the risk of an additional 
party (e.g. buyer of collateral) defaulting. Brigo et al. (2013a, p. 335) show that re-
hypothecation can have ludicrous consequences, making collateral agreements riskier 
than having no collateral at all. 
It can be concluded that collateral agreements can be an efficient tool to mitigate 
counterparty credit risk. Having a collateral agreement in place does not, however, 
automatically imply full-collateralization. CVA pricing and counterparty credit risk 
management need to consider the above mentioned CSA characteristics in order to 
adequately estimate future exposure. Even if the CSA is structured to enable full-
collateralization (i.e. cash collateral, zero MTA, zero (bilateral) thresholds with daily 
frequency) the remaining close-out risk implies that the counterparty credit risk is not 
eliminated. While on a trade level such risk might indeed be negligible this conclusion might 
differ on a portfolio level, especially given a large OTC portfolio with risky counterparties. 
3.5.3. MITIGATING CVA – HEDGING STRATEGIES 
An institution can also decide to hedge its positions to mitigate counterpart credit risk and 
reduce the CVA volatilities inherent in its books. In the following we will touch upon the 
                                                 
119 See for example Gregory (2012), pp. 146-148. 
120 According to Gregory (2012), p. 147 (footnote 23), it took market participants around 5-10 business days to 
complete close-out after Lehman Brothers defaulted. Basel III defines margin period of risk up to 20 days. 
See for example CRV IV, Article 285. 
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key issues around CVA hedging, analyzing the challenges in light of the regulatory 
framework as well as the consequences it can have on the market as a whole. 
A perfect hedge for CVA can be achieved through a single-name contingent credit default 
swap (C-CDS), i.e. a CDS in which the protected amount equals the (stochastic) exposure at 
default of a predefined counterparty. After all, CVA can be defined as the funds required to 
duplicate a C-CDS, i.e. CVA is the value of such a contract.121 For this reason – as shortly 
discussed in Subchapter  3.5.1 – internal deals between a possible CVA desk and the different 
trading desks usually take the form of a C-CDS. Accordingly, a single-name C-CDS is 
considered an eligible credit hedge that would reduce the regulatory CVA capital charge.122 
Still, the use of C-CDS to hedge CVA externally is rather limited.123 Gregory (2012, pp. 347-
387) points out two obvious risks that C-CDS contracts might exhibit, possibly explaining 
their relative low popularity: 
a. Legal risk. C-CDS contracts need to reference to all the relevant trade economics of 
all deals within the protected netting set (e.g. day-count-conventions, reference rates, 
maturity dates etc.). Otherwise the protection seller and buyer will possibly run into 
disputes with regards to the exposure amount at default. Notice that the legal 
challenges increase if the netting set is adjusted regularly, e.g. through new trades and 
novation of older ones. Such legal disputes might be indeed more manageable within 
an institution which explains the feasibility to use C-CDS internally. 
b. Joint default risk. The protection buyer runs a possible wrong way risk if the credit risk 
of the protection seller and the reference entity are correlated. The quality of the 
credit of the protection seller needs not only to be better than the reference entity, 
                                                 
121 As shown in Subchapters  3.1 and  3.3.1. 
122 See also Subchapter  3.4.3 for CVA capital charge and eligible hedges. 
123 In the survey conducted by EBA (2015) only one bank stated that it is uses C-CDS hedging. See also 
Deloitte and Solum (2013), p. 33. 
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but also to display a rather low interdependency with it. Otherwise the protection 
seller might default exactly when the protection buyer needs him most. This type of 
wrong way risk is, however, not limited to C-CDS contracts and might be also 
inherent in standard CDS contracts as well. We will dedicate a separate Chapter 4 to 
discuss wrong way risk within CDS. 
In addition to the above, C-CDS contracts display an enormous practical challenge for 
protection sellers, because – as already noted by Cesari et al. (2009, p. 220) – a duplicating 
strategy might be prohibitively expensive, and the hedging instruments could be illiquid, if 
not inexistent. The statement might seem tautological, but it does mirror the challenges of 
every institution seeking to hedge its CVA risk. After all, CVA exhibits sensitivities to a very 
large number of factors that might also exhibit interdependencies between themselves. Using 
a standard taxonomy of CVA sensitivities we will discuss key aspects around respective 
hedging strategies:124 
a. Credit sensitivities. CVA is sensitive to changes in the credit quality of a counterparty. 
This includes CVA sensitivity to CDS spreads (delta), delta sensitivity to CDS spreads 
(gamma), and CVA sensitivity to changes in the volatility of CDS spreads (vega). 
A standard instrument to hedge these risks is a single name CDS. A perfect static 
hedge using single name CDS would replicate the expected exposure profile, offering 
a protection at each time point equaling the expected amount to be lost given a 
default of the counterparty. As the exposure profile might change over time such a 
static hedge would need rebalancing, implying respective additional costs. 
Alternatively one might chose to keep the approximation of the exposure profile 
rather gross or even decide to hedge only the average expected exposure (also 
referred to as expected positive exposure, EPE), leaving parts of the exposure 
(willingly) unhedged. Such a hedge would still reduce the P&L volatility, also offering 
                                                 
124 For more comprehensive elaborations on CVA hedging we refer the reader to Gregory (2012), pp. 339-369. 
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a partial hedge if the counterparty defaults. As illustrated in the example given in 
Figure 14 below there is a payoff between an adequate credit protection and hedging 
costs.125 
If a single name CDS is not available or illiquid an institution might chose to hedge 
the credit component using index CDS (e.g. iTraxx Europe Senior Financials). Such 
a proxy will however not offer protection against the idiosyncratic credit risk of the 
counterparty. It will offer a sensitivity hedge if the credit risk of the counterparty and 
the index at hand display a high correlation. It does not, however, offer any 
protection if the counterparty does default (if the index does not include a CDS 
referencing to the specific counterparty). 
From a regulatory perspective both single name CDS and index CDS are considered 
eligible hedges. Having an eligible hedge in place reduces the exposure, subsequently 
decreasing the CVA capital charge both under the standard and advanced methods 
as seen in Equations (3.33) and (3.34), respectively. Notice, however, that both the 
advanced and the standard method use rather prudent exposure methods as has been 
discussed in Subchapter  3.4.4 above. This leads to a structural misalignment between 
the regulatory CVA capital charge on one hand and with how CVA is computed for 
financial accounting on the other. From a hedging perspective this implies a further 
payoff that needs to be considered as both metrics demand differing hedging 
strategies. For example – as has been described above – the standard approach is 
based on a prudent exposure measure, exposure at default (EAD) which demands an 
economic over-hedge in order to eliminate the CVA capital charge completely. 
Evidence indicates that hedging CVA risk with CDS might lead to unintended 
negative consequences.126 An increased use of CDS – especially in times of crises – 
might cause a widening of CDS spreads. From the perspective of the institutions 
                                                 
125 For other possibilities to determine an optimal static hedge refer also to Cesari et al. (2009), pp. 220-221. 
126 See also Carver (2011), Carver (2013) or Gregory (2012), pp. 360-361. 
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seeking to hedge their risk a widening of CDS spreads actually increases the level of 
CVA, possibly triggering a loop of higher demands to hedge CVA and higher 
hedging costs. From the perspective of debtors, widening credit spreads imply higher 
debt issuance costs that in time of crisis might even be prohibitively high.127 
Avoiding the negative consequences of such pro-cyclicality might have been one of 
the reasons the European implementation of Basel III (CRD IV) exempts 
transactions with sovereign counterparties from the CVA capital charge. 
In addition, buying CDS to hedge counterparty credit will lead to an increase of 
“naked” CDS positions in the market, i.e. situations in which the protection buyer 
does not hold the original risk in form of debt securities (e.g. bonds) in his portfolio. 
“Naked” positions are associated with pure speculation, and claims to ban them 
found resonance in respective legislations, e.g. in Germany and in the EU.128 This 
means that an investor interested in hedging the counterparty credit risk inherent in a 
contract with an Italian sovereign will need to have an Italian government bond in 
his portfolio. While the ban does seem to follow intended market regulation it does 
contradict the Basel III accord which incentives the use of CDS for hedging 
derivative (not only bond) exposure. 
b. Exposure sensitivities. CVA is sensitive to the same factors that underlie the 
counterparty credit risk-free value of the derivative. Given changes in the underlying 
market factors the exposure profile will change, triggering a change in the CVA 
metric as well. For example for the CVA metric of a standard interest rate swap the 
respective sensitivities would include one to interest rate changes (delta) and a delta 
sensitivity to interest rate changes (gamma) as well as sensitivity to changes in the 
                                                 
127 Bilal and Singh (2012) look at the link between CVA hedging and sovereign debt issuance in the European 
“periphery” (e.g. Greece, Italy etc.). 
128 See for example Augustin (2014).  
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volatility of interest rates (vega).129 In that case the expected exposure profile can be 
duplicated by a series of swaptions as shown by Sorensen and Bollier (1994). 
A netting set would, however, usually include differing swaps (with differing 
reference rates) as well as other derivative products (e.g. FX options, FX swaps etc.). 
This sheds light on the complexity of deriving all relevant CVA sensitivities, 
including the cross-gamma sensitivities between the different market factors (e.g. 
correlation between three-month Euribor and USD/EUR exchange rate). Let alone 
finding liquid hedging instruments. Theoretically such hedges can also increase the 
overall CVA risk, depending on the quality of the counterparty with which they are 
traded, especially if no collateral agreements are in place. 
Whilst hedging against exposure sensitivity might reduce the CVA volatility, banks 
are disincentivized to do so from a regulatory perspective. Hedges aiming to reduce 
the exposure sensitivity are not considered as eligible, neither under the standard nor 
under the advanced CVA capital charge approach. As seen in Equations (3.33) and 
(3.34) none of the approaches is able to capture such hedges as mitigants. 
Interestingly larger banks report that they do hedge for exposure sensitivity130, 
aiming on reducing the P&L volatility, accepting the regulatory disadvantages. 
c. Cross gammas. CVA displays a sensitivity to the interdependency between the 
exposure and the credit quality of the counterparty, also referred to as cross gamma. 
This brings us back to the concept of wrong way risk (and right way risk). As will be 
discussed in the next Chapter 4 quantifying wrong way risk is rather complicated. Let 
alone finding appropriate instruments to hedge it. As noted by Gregory (2012, p. 
                                                 
129 For delta hedging of interest rate risk see also Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
130 See for example EBA (2015), pp. 88-91. 
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360) in most cases hedging wrong way risk will only be partial at best. In specific 
cases strategies can be constructed.131 
Cesari et al. (2009, p. 223) argue that the difficulties around hedging wrong way risk 
are mitigated somewhat by the fact that the cross gamma is rarely the key risk driver. 
On the other hand Brigo and Capponi (2010) or Hull and White (2011) discuss cases 
in which wrong way risk is a key driver behind CVA risk.132 
d. Own credit. Bilateral CVA exhibits a sensitivity to changes in the credit quality of the 
institution, i.e. DVA. We have discussed the risks and challenges around hedging 
DVA in Subchapter  3.4.2 above. 
It can be concluded that while hedging can significantly help in mitigating CVA risk, an 
institution cannot rely on it solely due to a variety of significant challenges. CVA of a given 
netting set might exhibit sensitivities to a very large number of factors, incl. cross-gammas. 
This implies technical challenges in measuring sensitivities that are accompanied with 
significant model risks (e.g. measuring right way risk). Even if the sensitivities are measured 
adequate hedging instruments with sufficient liquidity need to be available (e.g. single name 
CDS). Hedging CVA has thus also to rely on proxies and alternative approaches. An 
adequately manned CVA desk becomes crucial in finding such solutions. Consider for 
example a bank that is interested in reducing its (net) exposure to a peer and is not able to 
find adequate hedging instruments. CVA managers will need to “think out-of-the-box” in 
order to find alternative solutions, e.g. borrowing money (e.g. through a loan) from the other 
bank as it functions similarly to collateral etc. 
                                                 
131 Gregory (2012), p. 360 gives the example of an institution trading a cross currency swap with a sovereign. 
While the institution pays USD the sovereign pays in the local currency of the institution. By buying a local 
currency CDS and selling a USD CDS the institution ensures that the FX rate at default will be hedged. 
132 See also Gregory (2012), pp. 358-359. 
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In addition, banks need to consider the structural misalignment between regulatory CVA 
capital charge on the one hand and accounting standards on the other. The challenges will 
differ from one institution to the other, highly depending on the OTC portfolio at hand as 
well as the overall trading strategy of the bank. 
For some institutions CVA hedging might indeed be unfeasible. Consider for example a 
locally active tier 2 bank, offering OTC derivatives to its clients (mostly mid-sized local 
companies with no liquid single name CDS). Most of the client OTC book is left 
uncollateralized so that the counterparty credit risk is not insignificant. The bank hedges its 
market risk positions (e.g. interest rate risk) through respective transactions with other banks 
(usually a handful of tier 1 banks with bigger portfolios). These transactions are adequately 
collateralized (with daily margining, no threshold etc.) so that the counterparty credit risk is 
rather limited, and no hedging is needed. Still, the bank can be interested in hedging the 
CVA risk inherent in its client book. With respect to credit sensitivity the bank can only 
hedge some generic or sector risk, based on index CDS (as no single name CDSs are 
available). There is, however, a good possibility that none of its counterparties can be 
economically mapped to a respective index. This leaves the bank only with the possibility of 
hedging the market risk component of CVA. Such a strategy might seem expensive if it only 
reduces the CVA volatility, having no mitigating effect on the regulatory capital 
requirements. 
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Figure 14: Practical Hedging Strategies for CVA Credit Sensitivity 
Subfigure (a) illustrates an exemplary uncollateralized expected exposure profile (e.g. of an 
interest rate swap book) following Bree et al. (2011). Subfigure (b) illustrates the case of 
hedging the average expected exposure profile, also referred to as expected positive exposure 
(EPE). The shaded square “A” stands for the CDS contract with a notional amount equaling 
the EPE, and a maturity equaling the maturity of the netting set. It becomes clear that at the 
begging and at the end of the life time of the netting set the CDS contract exhibits an over-
hedge while in between a substantial exposure is left not hedged for. A better proxy for the 
exposure profile is possible through buying one further CDS contract “B” and selling another 
“C”, as seen in Sub-Figure (c) and (d), respectively. It becomes clear that the better the 
approximation of the exposure profile is, the more expensive the hedge strategy is. This is 
crucial because the expected exposure profile might change, demanding rebalancing of the 
CDS positions as well. 
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3.5.4. EVALUATION SUMMARY 
The level of sophistication but also the mere feasibility of managing counterparty credit risk 
and CVA depends highly on the institution at hand, especially the OTC derivatives strategy it 
follows and the respective financial and technical capabilities it aspires. The bigger and more 
complicated the OTC portfolio, the higher the inherent counterparty credit risk possibly is. 
This means also that it becomes more worthwhile to invest in technical and management 
infrastructures (e.g. CVA computation engine, CVA desk etc.) on the one hand. On the 
other hand it also implies a widening of the spectrum of possible mitigation strategies, e.g. 
introducing the possibility of hedging credit risk sensitivity due to a higher probability of 
having counterparties with liquid CDS. 
Still, counterparty credit risk and CVA aspects, incl. pricing and management issues are 
relevant for every institution trading OTC derivatives, independent of its portfolio size and 
complexity. This becomes apparent if regulatory requirements and accounting standards are 
considered, especially the ones affecting financial institutions. As the below  given example 
of Bayer indicates, having elaborated capabilities to measure and manage counterpart credit 
risk and CVA is not limited to banks. Head of corporate financial controlling at Bayer is 
cited by a press release of a company offering IT solutions for counterparty credit risk and 
CVA, saying: 
“To help mitigate risks, Bayer decided to utilize the same risk management methodologies used 
by some of the largest and most advanced global banks. [The IT solutions] enable Bayer to 
determine, monitor and steer our counterparty risk accurately and consistently across our 
counterparties. With the automated […] solution in particular, we are now able to calculate 
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Monte Carlo-based CVA and DVA and attribute the results accurately to the trade level, 
even within netting sets, helping us to comply with regulations such as IFRS 13.133 
Beyond complying with rules and regulations every institution trading OTC derivatives 
should be aware of counterparty credit risk and CVA simply because if it does not, it might 
get “punished” by the market. After all, many of the topics we have discussed in the 
previous subchapters indicate much opaqueness around pricing CVA. This usually benefits 
the more sophisticated and capable counterparties. By having minimal capabilities to price 
and manage – or just to comprehend – CVA issues the less sophisticated and capable 
counterparties limit their vulnerability. If for example a larger institution (e.g. tier 1 
investment bank) approaches a (buy-side) client (e.g. health care company), and offers to 
amend existing collateral agreements, e.g. lowering the thresholds. The client is well advised 
to investigate the effects such an amendment would have on the expected exposure profile, 
and thus CVA (and DVA), before agreeing. 
A key takeaway from our discussion around CVA is that it reveals the limits of risk-neutral 
valuation, especially when it comes to practical implementation of pricing models or 
constructing adequate hedges. Clinging to use market implied parameters or elaborate 
models that need overcomplicated calibration (e.g. first-to-default CVA models) without 
reflecting on their economic sense might not only imply mere model and valuation risks, but 
also significant financial risks at the latest when it comes to hedging CVA. While elaborate 
and theory-based modeling is crucial to allow for intersubjective discussions around factors 
driving CVA and subsequent consequences, every CVA manager will need to tailor his 
management tools to his portfolio, focusing mainly on not being “arbitraged”. 
  
                                                 
133 See Sungard (2013). In the press release Bayer is defined as “[…] a global enterprise with core competencies 
in the fields of health care, agriculture and high-tech materials.” 
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CHAPTER 4:  
PRICING CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS WITH WRONG WAY RISK – MODEL 
IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPUTATIONAL TUNE UP 
4.1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE OVERVIEW 
One possibility for investors to mitigate counterparty credit risk is to buy protection in form 
of a credit default swap (CDS) as discussed in the previous Chapter 3, esp. Subchapter  3.5.3. 
In return for a premium, investors buying CDS contracts, receive protection for a certain 
notional amount of debt of a predefined reference entity. CDS contracts can thus be used to 
hedge the risk of the counterparty defaulting or its credit quality deteriorating. 
We have, however, also extensively discussed the fact that all over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives exhibit counterparty credit risk, and there is no reason why CDS contracts should 
be an exception.134 After all, protection buyers now have an exposure to a new counterparty 
with non-zero probability of default. Protection buyers can still benefit if the credit quality of 
the protection seller is superior to that of the reference entity, especially if both 
counterparties agree on posting collateral. If, however, the credit quality of both protection 
seller and reference entity are positively interdependent, such a “protection” becomes 
questionable if not worthless, since the protection seller might default exactly when needed 
most. 
This inherent wrong-way risk and the systemic risk accompanied by it are key reasons why 
CDS contracts have been identified by some as contributors to the financial crisis, analyzed 
for example by Mirochnik (2010) or Stulz (2010).135 In his article “Buffet’s ‘time bomb’ goes 
                                                 
134 For the definition of counterparty credit risk see for example Section  3.2 above. 
135 Note that both cited papers do not use the term wrong way risk, which originates from counterparty credit 
risk literature, e.g. Cesari et al. (2009). 
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off on Wall Street” Kelleher (2008) cites an interviewee, explaining the reasons behind the 
crisis as follows: 
"This was supposedly a way to hedge risk," […] "I'm sure their predictive models 
[financial institutions] were right as far as the risk of the things they were insuring 
against. But what they didn't factor in was the risk that the sellers of this protection wouldn't 
pay... That's what we're seeing now." 
Although the opinion of the interviewee around the predictive power of financial modeling 
seems inappropriately flattering, the comment around the lack of consideration of possible 
wrong way risk does hit the spot, especially when it comes to the fad of buying credit 
protection against structured securities as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) from 
monoline insurers, i.e. insurance companies that traditionally provide coverage for one 
insurance line.136 
Monoline insurers were common underwriters of such CDSs in the years leading to the 
subprime and financial crisis.137 According to ISDA (2011) by 2008 monoline insurers wrote 
protections “on tens of billions of dollars” on CDOs on residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), primarily referencing to subprime loans. This made them extremely sensitive to a 
deterioration in the mortgage market. Still, monoline insurers had top ratings (mostly AAA), 
granting guaranteed structured notes an almost credit-risk-free status even though monoline 
insurers successfully resisted collateralization.138 
                                                 
136 Much of the information given in this Subchapter is backed by evidence from ISDA (2011). See also 
Brunnermeier (2009) for a qualitative analysis of the situation that led to the financial crisis also elaborating 
on the role of monoline insurance companies. Notice that as discussed in Jaffee (2006) monoline insurers 
focus on one product line due to legal restrictions. This means, paradoxically, that the significant 
concentration risk borne by monoliners can be attributed to regulation. 
137 For more on the subprime crises and asset-backed securities see for example Longstaff (2010). 
138 See ISDA (2011) according to which some monoliners did agree on posting collateral if downgraded.  
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Amid the plummeting of market prices for CDOs on RMBS in 2007 the investment 
community seemed to have finally found the catch. Rating agencies started downgrading 
monoline insurers while others had to file for bankruptcy. Market prices started accounting 
for significant credit valuation adjustments (CVA) due to the deteriorating of the credit 
quality of both reference entity and the protection seller. The significant CVA figures that 
went through the profit and loss statements of the banks increased the demand for modeling 
approaches that incorporate wrong way risk.139 Banks, hedge funds, monoline insurers, asset 
managers, auditors, regulators – to name a few – were in the need for such models to 
compute CVA consistently with the new prevailing view. In the following we will go through 
some of the most prominent examples that tried to deliver appropriate solutions, motivating 
our focus on Brigo and Capponi (2010). 
In the spirits of Merton’s structural approach Blanchet-Scalliet and Patras (2008) derive 
closed-form solutions for counterparty credit on a CDS. Yet, due to the focus on analytically 
solvable dynamics their model cannot be fit to CDS spread quotes. Lipton and Sepp (2009) 
present a multi-dimensional jump-diffusion structural model that can be calibrated to current 
market information. The model demonstrates the significance of default correlation and 
credit spread volatility while pricing CVA on CDS. 
Leung and Kwok (2005) examine bilateral counterparty credit risk using a reduced form 
framework with deterministic functions and contagious defaults. Based on the shifted 
squared root (jump) diffusion (SSRJD) – previously introduced in Brigo and Alfonsi (2005) 
– Brigo and Chourdakis (2009) introduce a unilateral CVA model with stochastic credit 
spreads. They adopt stochastic intensity models for the default events, connected via a 
Gaussian copula function. Brigo and Capponi (2010) generalize this approach. Assuming all 
three entities are subject to interdependent default risk, they explicitly model what we have 
                                                 
139 In its survey of 12 international investment banks ISDA (2011) attributed CVA charges of more than $ 50 
billion to monoline exposure. 
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referred to as first-to-default CVA (FTDCVA).140 This means that the model can be used to 
analyze wrong-way risk as well as the presumable inconsistencies around pricing own credit 
risk, i.e. DVA. We have therefore chosen to revisit this model and analyze it in detail. 
Further model extensions were offered for example by Assefa et al. (2009) who introduce 
netting and collateral agreements. Using a Markov chain copula Crepey et al. (2010) model 
wrong way risk with possible simultaneous defaults. Li (2009) examine the effect of 
stochastic recovery on CVA of CDS. 
As mentioned, the following Chapter 4 is dedicated to analyze the approach offered by Brigo 
and Capponi (2010). When appropriate we will also refer to the more comprehensive 
elaborations and calculations given in Brigo and Capponi (2009) or Capponi (2009). We 
introduce a step-by-step implementation guide and offer a computation tune up for the most 
elaborate part of the computation, i.e. generation of the default probability structure of the 
reference entity, conditional on the default of either the investor or the counterparty. For 
this purpose Brigo and Capponi (2010) suggest the use of the Fractional Fourier 
Transformation (FRFT) technique. The heuristic approach we suggest is based on an easy-to-
implement lognormal approximation. Throughout a variety of examples we show that this 
approximation delivers rather robust and satisfying results, while requiring less 
computational power and less excessive implementation. A case study based on real market 
data demonstrates the use of the model and the insights it delivers. In addition, the codes 
(written in R) used for the main functions of the algorithm are given in Appendix D. 
The descriptive part is followed by a comprehensive critical evaluation of the Brigo and 
Capponi (2010) approach in particular, and CVA modeling in general. We analyze both the 
capability of the model in delivering an arbitrage-free framework as well as in its use for 
inter- and intra-organizational communication. A specific feature of interest in this respect is 
                                                 
140 See also Subchapter  3.2 above. 
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the use of a copula function to model interdependency, a formula accused of “killing Wall 
Street”.141 Besides revealing key challenges, risks and limitations of the model, the analysis 
will also point to possible benefits and insights offered by such approaches. 
The remaining of Chapter 4 is structured as follows. In Subchapter  4.2 we start with a short 
introduction to CDS contracts, followed by an overview on structural and reduced form 
credit modeling, explicitly elaborating on their use also for CVA modeling, given in 
Subchapter  4.2.2. Subchapter  4.2.3 is dedicated to the use of (Gaussian) copula functions to 
model default dependency. A detailed description of the model is given in Section  4.3. While 
Subchapter 4.3.1 revisits the first-to-default CVA for CDS, Subchapter  4.3.2 gives an 
overview of the algorithm. Subchapter  4.3.3. discusses the approach used to model 
interdependent defaults, e.g. stochastic intensity approach in conjunction with a Gaussian 
copula. In Subchapter 4.3.4 we revisit the computation of the conditional value of the CDS 
given a default. We give a detailed guide for estimating the needed partial derivatives of the 
Gaussian copula as well as the cumulative distribution function (CDF) using the method 
suggested by Brigo and Capponi (2010), i.e. fractional Fourier transformation (FRFT) 
technique. In the subsequent Subchapter 4.3.5 we offer a heuristic approach based on a log-
normal approximation of the CDF, reducing the complicity of the implementation and 
speeding up the computation. Numerical examples are delivered both for understanding the 
mechanism of the model in general and to back our heuristic approach in particular. The 
case study given in Section  4.4 returns to our introductory example of monoline insurers 
selling protection on structured notes. An evaluation of the approach is discussed in 
Section  4.5. We conclude the chapter in Section  4.6. 
Notice that the Chapter is an adaptation of previous work of the author published in 
Grominski et al. (2012), and that some elaborations, especially in the computational part, are 
                                                 
141 See for example MacKenzie and Spears (2014). 
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identical. In order to avoid redundancy we will, however, refrain from continuously referring 
to Grominski et al. (2012). 
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4.2. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS 
4.2.1. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
A credit default swap (CDS) transfers credit risk from a protection buyer to a protection 
seller.142 One can differentiate between a single name CDS and an index CDS. While single 
name CDSs offer a protection of a certain notional amount of debt of one specified reference 
entity, index CDSs are linked (obviously) to an index with numerous entities. We will in the 
following focus on single name CDS, and will henceforth omit “single name” for simplicity 
reasons. 
In a CDS contract the protection buyer pays an upfront or periodic premium. In return the 
protection seller grants the buyer a settlement payment based on predefined procedures if 
the reference entity defaults during the life time of the contract. The documentation of a 
CDS will thus include a reference debt (e.g. a specific bond) and a reference entity (e.g. a 
legal entity such as a corporate, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or a sovereign). In addition, 
the documentation will need to define relevant credit events that trigger a default, e.g. 
bankruptcy of obligor, distressed restructuring, delinquent payments (90 days past due). 
                                                 
142 The following summary on CDS is largely inspired by the more comprehensive elaboration given 
Augustin (2014) and Gregory (2012), especially pp. 211-224, to which we refer the interested reader. 
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Figure 15: Visual Illustration of a Single Name CDS Contract  
The protection buyer pays the protection seller a premium (upfront and/or periodically) in 
exchange for a settlement payment due when the reference entity suffers a credit event (e.g. 
default). 
Given a credit event a CDS may have a “physically” or a “cash” settlement. In the following 
we will describe the difference between both possibilities, exploring the advantages and 
limitations: 
 Physical settlement. One speaks of a physical settlement when the protection buyer 
transforms debt securities issued by the reference entity (with notional amount equal 
to the protection amount) to the protection seller. The protection seller compensated 
the buyer with the full notional amount in cash. The method seems rather 
straightforward at first sight, limiting the need to involve third parties and to use 
elaborate evaluation schemes. It does however introduce a “cheapest-to-deliver” risk 
for the protection seller. Given a physical settlement the protection buyer will chose 
to transform the cheapest bond available, e.g. the most illiquid. As a consequence 
CDS contracts might restrict the use of securities that can be transformed given a 
restructuring event, e.g. “Modiﬁed Restructuring” omits the possibility of delivering 
securities with a remaining maturity exceeding 30 months.  
In addition it also increases the risk of “delivery squeeze”, leading to an increase in 
the prices of the reference bonds. Physical settlement meets it limitations especially 
when the protection amount sold in the market is larger than the notional amount of 
traded debt (due to “naked” CDS positions, see also Subchapter  3.5.3). Gupta and 
Sundaram (2012) refer to Summe and Mengle (2006) who for example report that 
when Delphi Corporation filed bankruptcy in 2005 the amount protected was 
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estimated to be around $28 billion while the notional amount in deliverable bonds 
was merely $2 billion. 
 Cash settlement. As no securities are delivered under a cash settlement the protection 
seller will only need to compensate the protection buyer for the incurred loss, i.e. the 
difference between the par value and the recovery value. While introducing a 
possible solution for the delivery squeeze, cash settlement imply a process for 
determining the recovery value such as auctions.143  
The use of credit default swap (CDS) is controversial at best, as analyzed for example by 
Stulz (2010). While praised as innovative solutions that transform risk to those best suitable 
to bear it, they have also been associated with the financial crisis, e.g. due to “naked” CDS 
positions taken for pure speculation. Prominent figures such as the investor Warren Buffer 
have referred to them as “time bombs” and others such as hedge fund manager George 
Soros pleaded to ban them completely.144 In order to limit the effect of speculation on CDS 
and the associated cost of issuing debt, the EU banned the use of “naked” CDS for 
respective sovereign reference entities (see also Subsection 3.5.3). In the meanwhile the 
regulatory framework Basel III recognizes CDS as eligible collateral. Basel III as well as 
international accounting standards demand the use CDS spreads for counterparty credit risk 
and CVA measurement (see also Section 3.4). 
One might be aware of the possible limitations and market distortions, CDS contracts cause, 
and still be interested in using the information they imply. Especially from a no-arbitrage 
theory perspective CDS (spreads) are crucial as they determine respective prices and 
conditions under which one excludes being arbitraged, agnostic of whether the market turns 
out to be “mispriced”. In the subsequent Subchapter we will revisit two approaches for 
                                                 
143 Gupta and Sundaram (2012) analyze the CDS auctions and possible informative biases. They also describe 
in detail the auction process designed by ISDA and auction administrators CreditEx and Markit. 
144 See Berkshire Hathaway (2002) and Soros (2009). 
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modelling credit, elaborating on the use CDS spreads to generate risk-neutral probabilities of 
default. 
4.2.2. MODELING CREDIT RISK – STRUCTURAL VS. REDUCED FORM MODELS 
Two broad approaches have emerged in literature to model credit risk: structural (or firm-
value) models, based on the work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), and 
reduced form – also referred to as intensity or hazard rate models given a suitable context – 
models that go back to Jarrow and Turnbull (1992) and Duffie and Singleton (1999). In the 
following we will give a short overview of the “two competing methodologies” (Bielecki and 
Rutkowski 2001, p. 26), linking both to CVA literature and the explored model approach 
introduced by Brigo and Capponi (2010). The description given below is inspired by Bielecki 
and Rutkowski (2001), Brigo et al. (2013a, esp. pp. 48-86) and Jarrow et al. (2003) to which 
we refer the interested reader for more comprehensive elaborations. 
Structural models 
Structural models relate default to an economic variable (e.g. firm value). A default is 
triggered when the economic variable crosses a pre-defined threshold (or barrier). This 
methodology goes back to the model introduced by Merton (1974) in which firm assets 
follow a lognormal distribution and the firm is assumed to be financed both by equity and 
debt (in form of a finite zero coupon bond). The model postulates that the ﬁrm defaults if 
the notional amount of its debt exceeds the value of its assets (only) at the time of maturity. 
The equity value can thus be viewed as a European call option on all assets of the firm. The 
option matures with the zero bond and the strike price equals its face value. The Merton 
approach shows two kern elements of this category of models: a) Key issue within this 
methodology are modelling assumptions around the evolution of the ﬁrm’s value and the 
ﬁrm’s capital structure. For this reason they are referred to as “structural” or “firm value” 
models, and b) Structural models usually base these assertions on option pricing models, 
using these also to calibrate probabilities of default. 
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Black and Cox (1976) offered a notable extension to the Merton approach by introducing 
continuous default barrier, i.e. relaxing the assumption that default can happen only at debt 
maturity. Many extensions and generalizations have been offered. Prominent examples that 
introduced stochastic interest rates were Shimko et al. (1993), Nielsen et al. (1993) and 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). More complex debt structures were modelled for example by 
Leland (1998) and Tauren (1999). 
The implied default probability of these models for a company with a high credit quality in 
the short-term is close to zero, especially contrasting high near term CDS spreads. For this 
purpose further extensions were introduced for example by Hull and White (2001), 
incorporating curvilinear barrier. Jumps in a ﬁrm’s value were introduced for example by 
Lipton (2002) and Sepp (2004, 2006). 
Structural models are seen as elegant, because they are motivated with economic reason, 
allowing investors’ expectations of firm’s future performance to be considered. Moreover, 
structural models can be seen as forward looking with evidence of explanatory power as for 
example discussed in Arora et al. (2005). In addition, they imply an arbitrage relationship 
between equity and debt which can be informative when it comes to analyze relative pricing 
of respective financial instruments. Indeed structural models have found their way into the 
center of “mainstream” risk management. As discussed in Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) they lay 
the foundations for prominent risk management services such as Moody’s KMV and 
CreditMetrics. More importantly – through the asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) 
approach discussed in Subchapter  3.4.3 – they display the backbone of the Basel regulation 
framework, clearly influencing measurement and capitalization of credit risk. 
As noted above a variety of CVA structural models, considering wrong-way risk have been 
introduced, e.g. Blanchet-Scalliet and Patras (2008), Lipton and Sepp (2009) and Lipton and 
Savenscu (2013). 
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As shown by Jarrow and Protter (2004) structural approaches have a restrictive assumption, 
implying that modelers have “continuous and detailed information about all of the ﬁrm’s assets and 
liabilities.” More importantly they show that the modelers and firm’s managers (and 
regulators in the case of commercial banks) would all have to hold the complete information 
about default time and expected recovery, meaning also that the default time is always 
predictable. Moreover, from a pricing perspective structural models are still regarded as 
limited, because they generally provide a poor fit of market information, particularly 
underpricing short term securities as for example discussed in Jarrow et al. (2003) or 
Capponi (2009). Moreover, as shown for example by Brigo et al. (2013a, p. 65 or p. 80) 
structural models can be challenging when it comes to practical calibration, especially when 
the credit risk of more than three entities is involved. 
Reduced form models 
In contrary to structural models reduced form models do not proclaim any economic 
rationale behind default which is not triggered by observable variables but is given through 
an exogenously driven jump process, i.e. a Poisson process with stochastic or deterministic 
intensity. Modelling default through an exogenous process frees reduced form approaches 
also from assumptions around firm’s assets and its capital structure. It also implies that 
default becomes unpredictable. 
Main motivation behind intensity models is their suitability to model credit spreads and the 
easiness in which they can be calibrated to CDS quotes. Prominent examples of reduced 
form models were given by Jarrow and Turnbull (1992), Madan and Unal (1998), Duffie and 
Singleton (1999), Hull and White (2001) as well as Brigo and Alfonsi (2005). This list is not 
exhaustive and can be easily extended. 
Following the notations given by Brigo et al. (2013a, esp. pp. 66-77) we will reintroduce the 
main assumptions and features behind reduced form models. For this purpose we assume 
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that default time 𝜏𝜏 is the first jump of Poisson process. Given no default has occurred yet, 
the (risk-neutral) probability ℚ of defaulting in the next 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 is 
ℚ(𝜏𝜏 ∈ [𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡]|𝜏𝜏 > 𝑡𝑡, market info up to 𝑡𝑡) =  𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡. (4.1) 
with 𝜆𝜆(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 standing for intensity or hazard rate which – for simplicity reasons - is assumed 
to be strictly positive. It can be seen as an ad-hoc combination of market and financial 
variables. The intensity function can be fit to market data (e.g. CDS spreads), and is the 
exogenous force related to the dynamics of the firm at hand. The cumulative intensity 
function Λ is given as 
Λ(𝑡𝑡): = ∫ 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡0 (𝑢𝑢)𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢. (4.2) 
Recall that the transformation of the jump time 𝜏𝜏 of a Poisson process according to its own 
cumulated intensity Λ gives an exponential random variable, i.e. 
Λ(𝜏𝜏) = : 𝜉𝜉 ∽ standard exponential random variable with mean 1 (4.3) 
with 𝜉𝜉 being independent of all other variables, e.g. interest rates, equities, and other 
(stochastic) intensities etc. Notice that exactly this independence and stochasticity of 𝜉𝜉 are 
what allow reduced form models to assume incomplete markets, produce unpredictable 
defaults and allow for instantaneous credit spreads to be different from zero. 
Inverting the Equation (4.3) leads to 
𝜏𝜏 = : Λ−1(𝜉𝜉) (4.4) 
which illustrates why 𝜉𝜉 are also referred to as default triggers. The survival probability at time 
period 𝑡𝑡 is given as follows 
ℚ{𝜏𝜏 > 𝑡𝑡} = ℚ{Λ(𝜏𝜏) > Λ(𝑡𝑡)} = ℚ{𝜉𝜉 > Λ(𝑡𝑡)} = 𝔼𝔼ℚ �𝑒𝑒−∫ 𝜆𝜆(𝑢𝑢)𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡0 � (4.5) 
because the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard exponential random 
variable is given by ℚ{𝜉𝜉 ≥ x} = 𝑒𝑒−𝑓𝑓. 
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Looking at Equation (4.5) it becomes clear that the survival probability is just the price of a 
zero coupon bond while the stochastic intensity process replaces the stochastic interest rate 
process, usually noted with 𝑟𝑟. This allows us to interpret intensities as instantaneous credit 
spreads. Now assuming that the intensity 𝜆𝜆 is constant then pricing formula for a bond is 
simplified to 
𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)  = 𝑒𝑒−(𝑟𝑟+𝜆𝜆)(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡), (4.6) 
displaying the similarity between the intensity (or hazard rate) and the credit spread more 
clearly. Analogously practitioners make an intensive use of the following formula 
𝜆𝜆 =  𝑅𝑅0.𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷(0) 
𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷
 (4.7) 
with 𝑅𝑅0.𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷(0) standing for the mid-market spread of a CDS, running from time period 0 to b. 
Despite the fact that this formula is an approximation at best it is popular among 
practitioners, especially for quick plausibility checks. After all, it is very simple as it does not 
require any extensive calculation or assumptions, e.g. regarding interest rates dynamics. 
Moreover, it intuitively relates CDS spreads to probabilities of default.145 
It is of course more realistic to assume credit spreads – and thus intensities – to be volatile. 
As noted survival probabilities can be interpreted as zero coupon bond prices. This implies 
that stochastic interest rate models can be used to model intensity. Recall that the intensity 
process is strictly positive, excluding some interest rate models (e.g. Gaussian models). 
Flexibility and analytical tractability makes Cox Ingersoll Ross (CIR) processes especially 
appealing in this case. Their suitability is studied for example by Brigo and Alfonsi (2005), 
Brigo and Cousot (2006) or Brigo and El-Bachir (2008). Also Brigo and Capponi (2009, 
2010) model intensity using a shifted CIR process (i.e. with a drift term to ensure an exact fit 
of the term structure) as will be elaborated in more detail below. In principle, the CIR 
                                                 
145 For the proof of this equation we refer the interest reader to Brigo et al. (2013a), pp. 70-71. 
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process they use incorporates an additional jump term that Brigo and Capponi (2010), 
however, omit in the implementation part of their paper. 
The fact that intensity models lack an economic rationale can be seen as a weakness. 
Moreover, Arora et al. (2005) argue that the ﬂexibility of intensity models to fit observable 
data makes them more prone to focus on in-sample ﬁtting properties while displaying poor 
out-of-sample predictive ability. While this argument might be worth analyzing from a credit 
risk management or rating perspective, it is rather irrelevant for arbitrage-free pricing. In 
contrary, the intuitiveness and tractability in which reduced form approaches presumably 
depict market implied information makes it worthwhile to analyze their application to 
pricing, incl. arbitrage free CVA modeling. 
4.2.3. COPULA FUNCTIONS – MODELING MULTINAME DEFAULTS 
Modeling default dependency is central when it comes to bilateral CVA, especially in the 
case of CDS with wrong way risk. For this purpose reduced form approaches are usually 
enriched with copula functions.146 A prominent examples is given by Schönbucher and 
Schubert (2000).147 Copulas introduce a very general manner to model dependence of 
random variables. Theoretically there is an infinite number of possible copula functions. Due 
to the scarcity of data on default interdependence Schönbucher (2005), however, advices to 
use more convenient low-parametric families of copula functions. One such function is the 
Gaussian copula used in the approach of Brigo and Capponi (2010). Other examples include 
the t-copula and the Archimedean copulae.148  
                                                 
146 See also Brigo et al. (2013a), especially pp. 78-86, that have inspired the elaboration on Copula functions. 
For alternative approaches to model correlated defaults (e.g. correlated intensity functions) see also Duffie 
and Singleton (2003), especially pp. 229-249. 
147 The use of copulas to model dependency in general is attributed to Li (2000) as well as Frey and 
McNeil (2003). 
148 See also McNeil et al. (2005), especially pp. 184-237. 
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In the following, we provide a definition for copula functions in general and the Gaussian 
copula in particular. In addition, we provide the procedure for generating triggers of default 
on the basis of a Gaussian copula. 
Following Schönbucher (2005), a copula function can be defined as follows 
Definition 1 A function 𝐶𝐶 ∶  [0, 1]𝐼𝐼  →  [0, 1] is a copula if there are uniform random variables 
𝑈𝑈1, … ,𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼 with values in [0,1] while 𝐶𝐶 is their joint distribution function. 𝐶𝐶 has uniform marginal 
distributions, meaning for all 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐼𝐼; 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] there is 
𝐶𝐶(1, … ,1,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , 1, … ,1) = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. (4.8) 
According to Sklar's Theorem as given below, any multivariate distribution function 𝐹𝐹 can 
defined as a copula. 
Theorem 1 (Sklar) 𝑋𝑋1, …𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼 are random variables with the following marginal distribution functions 
𝐹𝐹1,𝐹𝐹2, … ,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼. If their joint distribution function is 𝐹𝐹, then there exists a copula (𝐼𝐼-dimensional) 𝐶𝐶 such that 
for all (𝑥𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼) ∈ ℝ: 
𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼) = 𝐶𝐶�𝐹𝐹1(𝑥𝑥1),𝐹𝐹2(𝑥𝑥2), … ,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼)�. (4.9) 
This implies that 𝐶𝐶 is the distribution function of �𝐹𝐹1(𝑥𝑥1),𝐹𝐹2(𝑥𝑥2), … ,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼)�. Whenever 𝐹𝐹1,𝐹𝐹2, … ,𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 are 
continuous 𝐶𝐶 will be unique. If not, 𝐶𝐶 will be uniquely determined on 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹1 × ⋯× 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼. Whereas 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 
stands for the range of 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼(𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼𝐼).149 
Definition 2 (Gaussian copula) Let 𝑋𝑋1, …𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼 be random normal distributed variables with the means 
𝜇𝜇1, … 𝜇𝜇𝐼𝐼, the standard deviations 𝜎𝜎1, …𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 and the correlation matrix R. By definition the distribution 
function 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅(𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2) of the standard normal distributed variables 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 is a so-called Gaussian copula. 
Whereas 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 are 
                                                 
149 See Schönbucher (2005), pp. 326-333. 
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𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = Φ�𝑋𝑋1 − 𝜇𝜇1𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼 � , 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝐼𝐼 (4.10) 
and 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅(𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2) = Q(𝑈𝑈0 ≤ 𝑢𝑢0,𝑈𝑈1 ≤ 𝑢𝑢1,𝑈𝑈2 ≤ 𝑢𝑢2) (4.11) 
where 𝛷𝛷(∙) stands for the cumulative univariate standard normal distribution function. 
In the following we give a procedure for generating triggers of default for three parties on 
the basis of a Gaussian copula: 
1. Generate a matrix 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚 , containing of three vectors each with 𝑛𝑛 independent standard 
normal distributed variables 𝑍𝑍1𝑣𝑣 = (𝑧𝑧11, … , 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛1),𝑍𝑍2𝑣𝑣 = (𝑧𝑧12, … , 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛2) and 𝑍𝑍3𝑣𝑣 = (𝑧𝑧13, … , 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛3) 
2. Define a matrix 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚 = 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅)−1 ∙ 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚, with 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑅𝑅)−1 standing for the Cholesky 
decomposition of the correlation matrix between the independent uniforms 𝑅𝑅 
3. Define 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚 = 𝛷𝛷(𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚) (item-wise) 
4. Use 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚 to define the default triggers 𝜉𝜉𝑚𝑚 = −log(1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑚𝑚)  (item-wise) 
Despite their popularity copula models are seen as controversial, even being blamed for 
causing the financial crisis150 Their main disadvantage is the lack of a robust methodology to 
estimate the copula function, especially being short of feasible and logical (market implied or 
historical) data to calibrate the correlation matrix. Indeed one can argue that “the rationale for 
their applications is murky” (Mikosch, 2005). 
They are considered to be superior to linear correlation that is not fit to model dependence 
between variables that are not jointly instantaneous Gaussian shocks. More importantly, 
both advocates and opponents underline the mathematical convenience copula functions 
offer. They allow separate modeling of the individual (marginal) credit risk on the one hand, 
                                                 
150 See MacKenzie and Spears (2014). 
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and the modeling of the interdependence (joint) structure on the other. Moreover, especially 
the Gaussian copula function is popular because of its easiness in simulating correlated 
normal distributed variables through the Cholesky decomposition. 
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4.3. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MODEL 
4.3.1. FIRST-TO-DEFAULT CREDIT VALUATION ADJUSTMENT FOR CREDIT DEFAULT 
SWAPS 
Based on the general pricing framework for CVA introduced in Subchapter  3.3.1 we will in 
the following specify the relevant pricing framework for the case of CDS contracts. For the 
sake of completion we will recall key elements of the general framework. For a more 
comprehensive description we refer the reader to the respective Subchapter  3.3.1 above. 
Analogous to the general framework we define an investor (name “0”) and a counterparty 
(name “2”), dealing a CDS. Note that these definitions are agnostic of which party is selling 
and which party is the buying protection. In addition, we introduce a reference entity 
(name “1”) to whose default the CDS contract is linked. Notice that if the reference entity is 
assumed to be default-free name “1” can be removed. 
Let 𝜏𝜏0, 𝜏𝜏1 and 𝜏𝜏2 stand for the default time periods of the investor, the reference entity and 
the counterparty, respectively. Analogous to the general framework the computations are 
assumed to be conducted in the probability space (Ω,𝒢𝒢,𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 ,ℚ).151 In line with the elaborations 
given in Subchapter  3.3.1 we define the counterparty credit risk-free CDS value at inception 
time period as follows 
 CDS𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏(0, S1, LGD1) =  𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ{𝜋𝜋(0,𝑇𝑇)} (4.12) 
with 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷1 standing for the assumed (constant) loss given default. We assume a periodic 
premium 𝐶𝐶1 is paid in the time interval [𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠;𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏]. We also assume deterministic interest rates 
                                                 
151As stated in Subchapter  3.3.1 ℚ stands for the risk-neutral measure, and 𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 is a filtration driving the whole 
market. ℱ𝑡𝑡 is a further subfilteration standing for all observable market quantities except for default events, 
hence ℱ𝑡𝑡 ⊆ 𝒢𝒢𝑡𝑡 ≔ ℱ𝑡𝑡 ∨ ℋ𝑡𝑡 . ℋ𝑡𝑡  stands for the subfilteration standing only for all default events. 
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which lead to independence between default events and interest rates. Ignoring the default 
probability of the seller and the buyer for the time being, the model-independent value of 
the CDS from the perspective of the receiver (protection seller) at inception is given as 
follows 
CDS𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏(0, S1, LGD1) = 𝐶𝐶1 �−� 𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑡𝑡)�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝛾𝛾(𝑡𝑡)−1�𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
𝑑𝑑 ℚ(𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡)
+ � 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃(0,𝑇𝑇) ℚ(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=𝑠𝑠+1
� + 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷1 �� 𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑 ℚ(𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎
� 
(4.13) 
whereas 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents the time elapsing between payment period 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖−1 and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖, measured in 
years.  𝛾𝛾(𝑡𝑡) is the next payment time period after 𝑡𝑡. 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡;  𝑥𝑥) is the (deterministic) discount 
factor. ℚ(𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡) stands for the survival probability of the reference entity, i.e. the probability 
that the reference entity defaults only after time period 𝑡𝑡. The term in the first pair of 
brackets represents the expected amount (of premiums) the receiver will collect in case the 
reference entity defaults during the life time of the CDS and in case it does not. The term in 
the second pair of brackets is the expected value (LGD weighted), the receiver will have to 
pay, if the reference entity defaults. Notice that the first and last highlighted terms stand for 
the partial derivatives of the default (not the survival) probability. In order to make this more 
intuitive let 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = ℚ(𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡) ⟺ 1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = ℚ(𝜏𝜏1 ≤ 𝑡𝑡), the partial derivative of both functions 
is thus 𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡) ⟺ 𝜕𝜕�1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)�/𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 = −𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡), respectively. 
Now let 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡) be the net present value (NPV) of the CDS at time period T𝑖𝑖 , with  T𝑠𝑠 < T𝑖𝑖 <  𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏, denoted as follows 
 𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�T𝑖𝑖 , T𝑏𝑏� ) = CDS𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏(T𝑖𝑖 , S1, LGD1). (4.14) 
We combine Equation (4.13) with Equation (4.14), leading to 
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CDS𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏�T𝑖𝑖 , S1, LGD1�  =  1𝜏𝜏1>𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶������𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏�T𝑖𝑖 , S1, LGD1� (4.15) 
≔ 1𝜏𝜏1>𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗  �𝐶𝐶1 �−� 𝑃𝑃�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡��𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝛾𝛾(𝑡𝑡)−1�𝑑𝑑ℚ �𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢T𝑗𝑗  �𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏
max�𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗�
+ � 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖�ℚ �𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖|𝒢𝒢𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗  �𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=max(𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖)+1 �
+ 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷1 �� 𝑃𝑃�𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡�𝑑𝑑ℚ �𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢T𝑗𝑗  �𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏
max (𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎,𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗) �� 
 
which stands for the residual value of the CDS contract at time T𝑖𝑖, conditional on the 
available information at T𝑖𝑖 , especially with regards to credit information, incl. default events 
of the three entities. Note that 1𝜏𝜏1>𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 ensures the reference entity has not defaulted yet. 
Plugging Equation (4.15) with Equation (3.10) we receive the first-to-default CVA for 
specific case of CDS contracts152 
𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 − CDS𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏(t, 𝐶𝐶1, LGD1) =  𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷2 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡 �1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏2)�1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏2𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶������𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏(𝜏𝜏2, 𝐶𝐶1, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷1)�+� 
 − 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷0𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡 �1𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏0)�−1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏0𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶������𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏(𝜏𝜏0, 𝐶𝐶1, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷1)�+� (4.16) 
with A =  {𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ T}, B =  {𝜏𝜏0 ≤ T ≤ 𝜏𝜏2}, C =  {𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏𝜏0 ≤ T}, and D =  {𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝑇𝑇 ≤ 𝜏𝜏0}. 
In the first right term an adjustment for the default probability of the counterparty is 
undertaken. The events (C and D) – in which the counterparty defaults before the other two 
parties – are considered. The condition term 𝜏𝜏1 > 𝜏𝜏2 makes sure that only such default events 
are considered, in which the reference entity outlives the counterparty. The sign (+) implies 
that the CDS value at 𝜏𝜏2 is positive from the perspective of the investor, meaning that the 
CDS contract is a liability of the counterparty. In the second term on the right hand a second 
adjustment is taken to consider the counterparty credit risk of the investor, i.e. the events (A 
                                                 
152 For a proof see Capponi (2009), p. 67. 
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and B) in which the investor defaults before the other two parties. The condition 𝜏𝜏1 > 𝜏𝜏0 
makes sure that only such default events are considered, in which the reference entity 
outlives the investor. The sign (+) in combination with (-) before the indicator implies that 
the CDS value at 𝜏𝜏0 is negative from the perspective of the investor, i.e. positive from the 
perspective of the counterparty that then suffers a respective loss. 
 
Figure 16: Illustration of the Algorithm for Computing FTDCVA for CDS 
The figure gives an overview of the algorithm proposed by Brigo and Capponi (2010): a) 
Three independent default intensity processes are simulated. b) Based on a Gaussian copula 
and a given correlations default triggers are simulated. c) Defaults are generated by comparing 
the cumulated intensity for each entity with the respective simulated trigger. d-g) The 
algorithm considers relevant scenarios and executes all subsequent computations from the 
perspective of the investor that can either be a receiver (R) or a payer (P). Consider the case in 
which the investor is the payer, buying protection from the counterparty. The investor will 
suffer a loss if the counterparty defaults (e) and the CDS value is positive (g). If, however, the 
investor defaults first (d) he will “gain” from his own default is the residual value is negative. 
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4.3.2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ALGORITHM 
The task of the algorithm proposed by Brigo and Capponi (2010) is to compute 
Equation (4.16). It assumes the investor can be either the payer or the receiver of the CDS 
contract, delivering two FTDCVA metrics, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃 and 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅, respectively. In the following we 
will give a high level description of the numerical approach, while more detail on the various 
items will follow in subsequent sections. An illustrative overview is also given in Figure 16. 
The risk-neutral probabilities of default as seen in Equation (4.16) are considered numerically 
through a Monte Carlo scheme, simulating default time periods of the three entities. For this 
purpose Brigo and Capponi (2010) rely on an intensity approach, simulating three 
independent shifted CIR processes. In the meanwhile a Gaussian copula function models 
the interdependencies between the defaults, simulating default triggers for each entity. A 
default occurs when the integrated CIR process of one the parties exceeds the value of the 
respective trigger. 
The algorithm then considers only relevant defaults, i.e. defaults either of the investor or of 
the counterparty, given that the reference entity survived. For these cases the value the 
surviving entity loses given a default is computed, i.e. the 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷1-weighted conditional residual 
value of CDS seen in Equation (4.15). Averaging these terms according to the logic given in 
Figure 16 delivers the FTDCVA metrics. 
For this purpose the conditional survival probabilities of the reference entity are needed, i.e. 
conditional on the set of information given a default of the counterparty (𝜏𝜏0) or the investor 
(𝜏𝜏2), defined as  
1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏2ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2  � (4.17) 
and 1𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏0ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏0  �, (4.18) 
respectively. 
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As shown by Brigo and Capponi (2009) the probabilities given in Equations (4.17) and (4.18) 
can be computed in a closed-form manner using a Fourier transformation as will be shown 
in a subsequent subchapter. Technically speaking this is actually the most elaborate part of 
the model, and we contribute a greater part of this paper to explain the needed steps in 
detail. We will also introduce a heuristic tune up, based on a log-normal approximation. 
4.3.3. MODELING INTERDEPENDENT DEFAULTS 
In the following we will first take the reader through the steps needed to model defaults via 
an intensity process. Subsequently we will elaborate on the use of Gaussian copulas in 
modeling interdependencies between the respective processes. 
Brigo and Capponi (2010) use a stochastic intensity model that mirrors the shifted interest 
rate CIR model – also referred to as CIR++ – examined for example by Brigo and 
Mercurio (2006). Instead of modelling the instantaneous short rate the reduced form 
approach models the instantaneous intensity that can also be interpreted as the instantaneous 
default probability. The model incorporates a shift term that allows for exact calibration of 
CDS quotes. Although Brigo and Capponi (2010) introduce jumps in the intensity process 
formally, they subsequently drop the term – possibly due to technical challenges – and refer 
the reader to future work. We therefore, will also focus on intensities without jumps, i.e. 
using the shifted squared root diffusion (SSRD), previously examined by Brigo and 
Alfonsi (2005). 
Within the SSRD approach the stochastic intensity for each party 𝑗𝑗 is given by 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽), 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑗𝑗 = 0,1,2 (4.19) 
with 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 standing for the shift term, i.e. a deterministic function guaranteeing that the 
modeled survival probabilities equal the market implied terms. The dynamics of the 
stochastic term 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖  are defined as follows  
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𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖 �𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 𝑗𝑗 = 0,1,2 (4.20) 
whereas Zj is a Brownian motion process under the risk-neutral measure ℚ. The CIR process 
of each entity is represented by the vector βj = �κj, µj, νj, y(0)�, consisting of positive 
constants. The integrated processes are then given by 
 Λ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = ∫ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡0 , 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = ∫ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡0 , Ψ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡) = ∫ 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖�𝑠𝑠,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡0 . (4.21) 
Model implied survival probabilities are defined as follows 
ℚ(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡) ≔ 𝔼𝔼ℚ�𝑒𝑒−𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)� 
:= 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅(0, 𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖). (4.22) 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅(0, 𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) resembles the zero coupon price within the CIR approach, solved analytically by 
the following equation 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅(0, 𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) exp{−𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)} (4.23) 
where 
ℎ = �𝜅𝜅 + 2𝜎𝜎2 
𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) = � 2ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝜅𝜅 + ℎ)(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)/22ℎ + (𝜅𝜅 + ℎ)(exp(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)ℎ − 1)�2𝜅𝜅Θ𝜎𝜎2  
𝐵𝐵(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) = 2(𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)ℎ − 1)2ℎ + (𝜅𝜅 + ℎ)(exp(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)ℎ − 1). 
(4.24) 
Calibration of the parameters can be obtained by comparing the model implied survival 
probabilities 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅(0, 𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) and market implied probabilities 𝑄𝑄(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡)𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡  as will be shown in 
the case study below. For stripping market implied survival probabilities from CDS spreads 
please see also Subchapter  3.3.4 above. 
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Finally we turn to the shift (deterministic) term of the intensity process given 
Equation (4.19). Its integrated process Ψ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡) already introduced in Equation (4.21) is 
defined as follows 
Ψ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡)  = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 � 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅(0, 𝑡𝑡,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)ℚ(𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡)𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡�, (4.25) 
taking the differences between model-implied and market implied survival probabilities into 
consideration, ensuring that the model values are consistent with observed market data. 
For the simulation of the intensity dynamics of each party, Brigo and Capponi (2009) offer 
the following formula 
y(𝑡𝑡) = 𝜈𝜈2�1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢)�4𝜅𝜅 𝜒𝜒𝑒𝑒′ � 4𝜅𝜅𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢)𝜈𝜈2(1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡−𝑢𝑢)) 𝑦𝑦(𝑢𝑢)� (4.26) 
with 
𝑑𝑑 = 4𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇
𝜈𝜈2
 (4.27) 
whereas 𝜒𝜒𝑒𝑒′ (o) stands for a non-central chi-square random variable with 𝑑𝑑 degrees of 
freedom. 𝑙𝑙 is the non-centrality parameter. Using the trapezoidal rule, the integrated process 
𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) can then be defined through the following approximation 
𝑌𝑌(𝑡𝑡) = � 𝑦𝑦(𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 12𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦(𝑧𝑧 − 1) + 𝑦𝑦(𝑧𝑧)𝑡𝑡
𝑧𝑧=1
𝑡𝑡
0
 (4.28) 
with 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 is a predefined discretization parameter. 
Let Λi(t) stand be the integrated stochastic process for the default intensity of party 𝑖𝑖. We 
define 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 as the default trigger of party 𝑖𝑖. The default time period of the same party can be 
given as such 
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τ𝑖𝑖(t) = Λ𝑖𝑖−1(𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖), i = 0,1,2. (4.29) 
Again, the three CIR processes are independent. The introduction of interdependencies 
between the default times of the three parties are generated on the basis of a Gaussian 
copula that determines the correlated default triggers. 
The default triggers are defined as exponential random variables with the following uniforms 
U𝑖𝑖 = 1 − exp{−𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖}. (4.30) 
The uniforms from Equation (4.30) are correlated through a trivariate Gaussian copula 
function 
C𝑅𝑅(𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2) = ℚ(𝑈𝑈0 < 𝑢𝑢0,𝑈𝑈1 < 𝑢𝑢1,𝑈𝑈2 < 𝑢𝑢2). (4.31) 
For the simulation of these default triggers we thus only need the following correlation 
matrix as an input 
R = � 1 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,ℎ 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,ℎ 1 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 1 � (4.32) 
whereas 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 stands for the correlation coefficient between the default triggers of the parties 𝑗𝑗 
and 𝑖𝑖. 
Remarks 
The short elaboration given above illustrates the theoretical and practical advantages the 
SSRD approach has. The dynamics of the process are well researched, with relatively 
straightforward approaches to implement fast simulation procedures. Moreover, the CIR 
framework offers analytical (closed-form) solutions for bonds that can be applied for 
survival probabilities, facilitating easy calibration schemes.  
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The convenience of the calibration is supported by the fact that interdependency is modelled 
separately through a copula function. However, the estimation of the correlation matrix 
given in Equation (4.32) is indeed a key weak spot of the copula approach and of the CVA 
model. After all, we lack natural methodologies and data for their calibration, implying 
unsolved challenges in hedging the CVA metric produced as will be discussed in Section  4.5 
below. 
4.3.4. MODELING THE CONDITIONAL EXPECTED EXPOSURE 
Conditional Copula Values 
As already stated, the missing information in order to compute the conditional value of the 
CDS contract - as seen in Equation (4.15) - are the conditional survival probabilities given in 
Equations (4.17) and (4.18). Following Brigo and Capponi (2009), we define 𝐹𝐹Λ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  as the 
cumulative distribution function of the cumulative (shifted) intensity of the CIR processses. 
Brigo and Capponi (2009) show that the (missing) survival probabilities can be computed as 
follows 
1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏2ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2  � = (4.33) 1𝜏𝜏2≤𝑇𝑇1𝜏𝜏2≤𝜏𝜏0 �1?̅?𝐴 + 1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2 � 𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�− log(1 − 𝑢𝑢1) − Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶1|0,2(𝑢𝑢1;𝑈𝑈2)1
𝑈𝑈�1,2 � 
and 
1𝐴𝐴∪𝐵𝐵1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏0ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏0  � = (4.34) 1𝜏𝜏0≤𝑇𝑇1𝜏𝜏0≤𝜏𝜏2 �1𝐵𝐵� + 1𝜏𝜏0<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏0 � 𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏0)�− log(1 − 𝑢𝑢1) − Λ1(𝜏𝜏0)�𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶1|2,0(𝑢𝑢1;𝑈𝑈0)1
𝑈𝑈�1,2 � 
where  
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𝑈𝑈�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 1 − exp�−𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖�𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖��  (4.35) 
and the scenarios ?̅?𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵�  are defined as A�  =  {𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝜏𝜏2 ≤ 𝜏𝜏1} and B�  =  {t ≤ 𝜏𝜏0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏1}, respectively. 
Following Brigo and Capponi (2009), the conditional copula values used in equations (4.34) 
and (4.35) are given as 
𝐶𝐶1|0,2(𝑢𝑢1;𝑈𝑈2) = (4.36) 
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶1,2(𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢1)
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2
|𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢1�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶1,2�𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢1�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 + 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈21 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶0,2�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶1,2�𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 + 𝐶𝐶�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2  
and 
𝐶𝐶1|2,0(𝑢𝑢1;𝑈𝑈0) = (4.37) 
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶0,1(𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1)
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢0
|𝑢𝑢0=𝑈𝑈0 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑈𝑈�2,0�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢0 |𝑢𝑢0=𝑈𝑈0 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶0,1�𝑢𝑢0,𝑈𝑈�1,0�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢0 |𝑢𝑢0=𝑈𝑈0 + 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑢𝑢1,𝑈𝑈�1,0,𝑈𝑈�2,0�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢0 |𝑢𝑢0=𝑈𝑈01 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶0,2�𝑢𝑢0,𝑈𝑈�2,0�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢0 |𝑢𝑢0=𝑈𝑈0 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶0,1�𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢0 |𝑢𝑢0=𝑈𝑈0 + 𝐶𝐶�𝑢𝑢0,𝑈𝑈�1,0,𝑈𝑈�2,0�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢0 |𝑢𝑢0=𝑈𝑈0 , 
respectively. 𝐶𝐶0,1 is the bivariate copula connecting the default time of 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, while 𝐶𝐶 
denotes the trivariate copula connecting the default time of all three parties. We revisit the 
proof of Equations (4.37) in Appendix E, p. 201. 
In order to make the computation of Equation (4.33) and Equation (4.34) more clear, we 
shall distinguish between the following three different terms needed: 
Term 1:         
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗
|𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗=𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗   
Term 2:          
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑢𝑢ℎ,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗�
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗
|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖=𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 
Term 3:           𝐹𝐹Λ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  
The derivation all three terms will be described in the following. 
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Partial Derivatives of the Gaussian Copula (Term 1 and Term 2) 
Due to the specifications of the Gaussian copula, Terms 1 and 2 can be calculated 
analytically. Term 1 is the partial derivative of the bivariate Gaussian copula. It is given by 
Schönbucher (2005) and recited by Capponi (2009), and can be computed as follows: 
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
|𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗=𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = 𝑃𝑃∗�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 < 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖� = Φ
⎝
⎛Φ
−1(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖) − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖Φ−1�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�
�1 − 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖2 ⎠⎞  (4.38) 
whereas 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  denotes the correlation coefficient between 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗, and Φ(⋅) stands for the 
cumulative univariate standard normal distribution function. 
Term 2 is the partial derivative of a trivariate Gaussian copula, and is the bivariate density of 
𝑖𝑖 and ℎ, given 𝑗𝑗 is thus given by 
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑢𝑢ℎ,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖=𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗 = 𝑃𝑃∗�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 < 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖� (4.39) = Φ0,𝑅𝑅∗(Σ)(𝑢𝑢�ℎ,𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖) 
 
where Φ0,𝑅𝑅 stands for the cumulative bivariate standard normal distribution function, and 
𝑅𝑅∗(Σ) is the correlation matrix given by the covariance matrix Σ of the variables 𝑢𝑢�ℎ and,𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖 
which are defined below. 
The aim is to write 𝑢𝑢�ℎ and 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖 in dependence of 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and 𝑢𝑢ℎ while 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  is given. For this purpose, 
we first compute the Cholesky decomposition of the correlation matrix between the 
independent uniforms 𝑅𝑅 as given in Equation (4.32) as follows 
𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚 = �1 𝐷𝐷1,2 𝐷𝐷1,30 𝐷𝐷2,2 𝐷𝐷2,30 0 𝐷𝐷3,3� = 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �
1 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,ℎ 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,ℎ 1 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 1 �.  (4.40) 
Notice that 𝐷𝐷1,2 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,ℎ and 𝐷𝐷1,3 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖. Given independent values for 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, 𝑢𝑢ℎ and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 the 
dependent values for 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖 , 𝑢𝑢�ℎ and 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖 can be computed as follows: 
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�
𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢�ℎ
𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖
� = �1 𝐷𝐷1,2 𝐷𝐷1,30 𝐷𝐷2,2 𝐷𝐷2,30 0 𝐷𝐷3,3� 𝑇𝑇 ∙  �
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢ℎ
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
� . (4.41) 
Obviously 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖  is given by 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. The dependent uniforms follow normal distributions given by 
𝑢𝑢�ℎ = 𝐷𝐷1,2  ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷1,2  ∙ 𝑢𝑢ℎ                              ~ 𝑁𝑁(𝐷𝐷1,2  ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, �𝐷𝐷2,2�2 (4.42) 
𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷1,3  ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝐷𝐷2,3  ∙ 𝑢𝑢ℎ + 𝐷𝐷3,3  ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖           ~ 𝑁𝑁(𝐷𝐷1,3  ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 , �𝐷𝐷1,3�2 + �𝐷𝐷3,3�2.  
The covariance of both variables is given by 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐�𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙ 𝑢𝑢ℎ,𝐷𝐷2,3 ∙ 𝑢𝑢ℎ + 𝐷𝐷3,3 ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖� = (4.43) 
𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐�𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙ 𝑢𝑢ℎ,𝐷𝐷2,3 ∙ 𝑢𝑢ℎ� + 𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐�𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙ 𝑢𝑢ℎ,𝐷𝐷3,3 ∙ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�  
= 𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙ 𝐷𝐷2,3.  
Considering the variance given in Equation (4.42) the conditional covariance matrix we are 
seeking can be written as follows 
Σ = � (𝐷𝐷2,2)2 𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙  𝐷𝐷2,3
𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙  𝐷𝐷2,3 (𝐷𝐷2,3)2 + (𝐷𝐷3,3)2� . (4.44) 
The bivariate distribution of the uniforms 𝑢𝑢ℎ, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  conditional on 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  is given by 
�
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
|𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖�~N��𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷1,2𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷1,3� ,� (𝐷𝐷2,2)2 𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙  𝐷𝐷2,3𝐷𝐷2,2  ∙  𝐷𝐷2,3 (𝐷𝐷2,3)2 + (𝐷𝐷3,3)2�� . (4.45) 
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CDF using Fourier Transformation (Term 3) 
The third term 𝐹𝐹Λ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is the cumulative distribution function of the integrated CIR process. 
Brigo and Capponi (2009) state that this can be done by using the Fourier transformation by 
inverting the characteristic function of the integrated CIR process. 
In the following we will describe how this can be done. As noted by Carr et al. (2003), the 
characteristic function for Λ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is well known and is given by 
𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸[exp{𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝛬𝛬(𝑡𝑡)}] =  ∅(𝑢𝑢, 𝑡𝑡, 𝑦𝑦(0), 𝜅𝜅, 𝜆𝜆)  (4.46) 
 = 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡,𝑢𝑢)𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝{𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡,𝑢𝑢), 𝑦𝑦(0)}   
where 
𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡,𝑢𝑢) = exp �𝜅𝜅2𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡𝜆𝜆2 �
�cosh �𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡2 � + 𝜅𝜅𝛾𝛾 sinh �𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡2 ��2𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘/𝜆𝜆2  (4.47) 
𝑏𝑏(𝑡𝑡,𝑢𝑢) = 2𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢
𝜅𝜅 + 𝛾𝛾coth (𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡2 )  
𝛾𝛾 = √𝜅𝜅 − 2𝜆𝜆2𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢.  
The imaginary unit is denoted by 𝑖𝑖. The aim is thus to compute the continuous Fourier 
transform (CFT), which is defined as follows 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇[𝐸𝐸](𝜔𝜔) = � 𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜔𝜔𝐸𝐸(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∞
−∞
  (4.48) 
where 𝜔𝜔 and 𝑡𝑡 are the spaces of the transformed and the original function, respectively. 
Following Bailey and Swarztrauber (1993) and Chourdakis (2005), we will transform the 
characteristic discretization of the CFT by the fractional fast Fourier transformation (FRFT). 
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This is a technical adjustment of the fast Fourier transformation (FFT), it again being a fast 
implementation of the discrete Fourier transformation (DFT). The DFT is defined as 
𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇�𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�(𝜔𝜔) = �𝑒𝑒−2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=0
,    𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝜔𝜔𝑏𝑏)  (4.49) 
and the inverse is given by 
𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇−1�𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖��𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖� = 1𝑛𝑛  ∑ 𝑒𝑒2𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−1𝑖𝑖=0  𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,       𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸(𝜔𝜔𝑏𝑏). (4.50) 
The fractional Fourier transform (FRFT) is defined as 
𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇�𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼�(𝜔𝜔𝑏𝑏) = �𝑒𝑒−2𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖�𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=0
  (4.51) 
�𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑏𝑏
2𝛼𝛼�𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇−1 �𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖�𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖�� (𝜔𝜔𝑏𝑏), 0 ≤ 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝑛𝑛    
where 
𝑥𝑥 = ��𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖2𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖=0𝑛𝑛−1, (0)𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛2𝑛𝑛 �  (4.52) 
            𝑦𝑦 = ��𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖2𝛼𝛼�
𝑖𝑖=0
𝑛𝑛−1, �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋(2𝑛𝑛−𝑖𝑖)2𝛼𝛼�
𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛
2𝑛𝑛
�.  
Our aim is thus to compute the cumulative distribution function (CDF) through the FRFT 
as seen in Equation (4.51). In order to deliver a good approximation one has to define 
appropriate ranges for the respective spaces (𝑡𝑡 and 𝜔𝜔, being the spaces for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  and 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, 
respectively).153 In order to compute the radius of the 𝜔𝜔-space, we offer a heuristic approach 
                                                 
153 We denote with 𝛿𝛿 the grid size of the input vector 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , and with Λ� the grid size of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 . Due to the parameter 
𝛼𝛼, the FRFT allows an independent choice for both the grid sizes, where 𝛼𝛼 = Λ� 𝛿𝛿. In the continuous fast 
Fourier transformation, the inverse relation between the grid sizes (Λ� 𝛿𝛿 = 2𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛) leads to inefficiencies in the 
calculations as denoted by Chourdakis (2005). 
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on the basis of the first and second moments of the CIR process derived by 
Dufresne (2001). Given a time period 𝑡𝑡, time to maturity 𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡, and the CIR parameters 
𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡), 𝜅𝜅, 𝜇𝜇, 𝜈𝜈 these moments are given by 
𝐸𝐸∗(𝑌𝑌) = 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)
−𝜅𝜅
−
𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇
𝜅𝜅2
− (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡) 𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇
−𝜅𝜅
+ 𝑒𝑒−(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜅𝜅 �𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)
−𝜅𝜅
+ 𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇
−𝜅𝜅2
�,  (4.53) 
𝐸𝐸∗(𝑌𝑌2) = −𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈2
−𝜅𝜅3
−
5𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈2
−2𝜅𝜅4 − (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡) 𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈2−𝜅𝜅3 + 𝑒𝑒−(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜅𝜅 �2𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈2−𝜅𝜅4 − (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)�2𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈2−𝜅𝜅2 + 2𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈2−𝜅𝜅3 ��+ 𝑒𝑒−2(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜅𝜅 �𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈2
−𝜅𝜅5
+ 𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈2
−2𝜅𝜅6�.  
The radius 𝜔𝜔 is subsequently given by 
𝜔𝜔 = 𝐸𝐸∗(𝑌𝑌) + 𝜖𝜖�𝐸𝐸∗(𝑌𝑌2) − 𝐸𝐸∗(𝑌𝑌)2  (4.54) 
for a predefined parameters 𝜖𝜖.154 
In the case of the 𝑡𝑡-space we offer an iterative estimation algorithm, screening the 
convergence of the characteristic function outside the predefined radius. An example for a 
respective code is given in Appendix D. 
Figure 17 displays the functions involved in the procedure of estimating the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) through the FRFT. While the monotone increasing straight 
greed line stands for the CDF computed by the FRFT, the lognormal like red line is the 
normalized density function of the integrated CIR-Process. The normed characteristic 
function of the CIR process is plotted as a blue wavy line. 
                                                 
154 In our calculations, we have found that this parameter can be assumed to be approximately 10. In general 
the parameter can be derived from Chebischev inequality. 
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Figure 17: Results of the Fractional Fast Fourier Transformation 
The figure gives a visual example for the results of the FRFT. The monotone increasing 
straight green line stands for the CDF computed by the FRFT. The lognormal-like red shape is 
the output of the transformation before summing up the results. The (normed) characteristic 
function of the CIR process and the input needed for the FRFT is plotted through a blue wavy 
line. 
 
Figure 18: Lognormal Distribution vs. FRFT Approach 
The figure gives a visual example for the fit offered by the lognormal approximation of the 
distribution function of the CIR process. The somewhat wavy red line stands for the 
distribution function computed through the Monte Carlo scheme. The green line is the 
distribution function if lognormal-approximation is used. The black line stands for the 
distribution function when the FRFT technique is used. 
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4.3.5. COMPUTATIONAL TUNE UP AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
The Fourier transformation approach, proposed to compute the cumulative distribution 
function of the integrated CIR process can be seen as theoretically sound. It can, however, 
turn to be costly in terms of implementation as well as in terms of computational power. 
Especially when it comes to pricing, faster approaches are welcome to ensure trading 
feasibility. In addition, due to the needed definitions of the ranges, i.e. Equation (4.52), the 
FRFT-approach might demand an extensive parametrization process. This becomes very 
relevant, when the CIR parameters of the involved parties vary significantly or if a high 
number of parties is involved (e.g. in a portfolio of CDS). 
Motivated by the visual results seen in Figure 17, we offer an approximation for the CDF by 
a shifted lognormal distribution, matching the first three moments of the distribution 
function. For this purpose, one has only to compute the central moments in order to 
compute the cumulative distribution function. Whilst the first two moments are given in 
Equation (4.53) we illustrate – for completion reasons – the estimation of the third moment. 
Given a time period 𝑡𝑡, time to maturity 𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡, and the CIR parameters 𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡), 𝜅𝜅, 𝜇𝜇, 𝜈𝜈, the third 
moment is given by 
𝐸𝐸∗(𝑌𝑌3) = − 3𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈3
−𝜅𝜅5
−
11𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4
−𝜅𝜅6
− (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡) 3𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4
−𝜅𝜅5
⋯
+ 𝑒𝑒−(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜅𝜅 �− 3𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈4
−2𝜅𝜅5 − 15𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4−2𝜅𝜅6 − (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)� 3𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈4−𝜅𝜅4 + 9𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4−𝜅𝜅5 �⋯
+ 𝑡𝑡2 �3𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈4
−𝜅𝜅5
+ 3𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4
−2𝜅𝜅6 ��⋯
+ 𝑒𝑒−2(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜅𝜅 �3𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈4
−2𝜅𝜅5 + 3𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4−𝜅𝜅6 − (𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)� 6𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈4−𝜅𝜅4 + 3𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4−𝜅𝜅5 ��⋯+ 𝑒𝑒−3(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡)𝜅𝜅 �3𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)𝜈𝜈4
−2𝜅𝜅5 + 𝜅𝜅𝜇𝜇𝜈𝜈4−2𝜅𝜅6�. 
(4.55) 
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In order to demonstrate the goodness of fit, offered by the heuristic approach we conducted 
a series of exemplary numerical exercises, comparing the results produces using the Fourier 
transformation with those produced using the log-normal approximation. In a second step 
we compare further examples with the results given by Capponi (2009). We based the 
parameterization of the CIR process on the ones given in Capponi (2009), pricing the first-
to-default CVA (FTDCVA) for a five-year CDS. The results are summarized in Table 15, 
Table 16 and Table 17. The delivered CVA metrics are in basis points, given from the 
perspective of the investor (either protection payer or protection seller). 
Table 15 summarizes the results of the first-to-default CVA if the investor is the receiver 
(protection seller) under a variety of correlation matrixes and volatility terms for the CIR 
process of the reference entity 𝜈𝜈1. Table 16 summarizes the first-to-default CVA results if the 
investor is the premium payer (protection buyer), following the structure of Table 15, i.e. 
summarizing the results of the first-to-default CVA under a variety of correlation matrixes 
and volatility terms for the CIR process of the reference entity 𝜈𝜈1. Table 17 tests further 
possible combinations of the correlation coefficients, and compares our results with these 
delivered by Capponi (2009). 
Concerning the scenarios, in which the investor is the receiver (protection seller) the results 
of both approaches seem to be quite stable (s. Table 15). The results resemble the ones 
delivered by Capponi (2009, p. 73). Notice, however, that he uses a different volatility term 
for the counterparty, explaining some of the deviations we have when the investor is the 
payer (protection buyer). In that case our results display higher uncertainty as seen in Table 
16 and Table 17, and made apparent by the standard error terms.155 This leads to some 
deviations, especially in some more (numerically seen) challenging scenarios (e.g. when the 
correlation coefficient is 0.99). Still, one can conclude that in total the deviations between the 
                                                 
155 In such cases it seems that the results are quite dependent on the discretization parameters of the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF). 
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three approaches seem to lie in an acceptable range, especially if the standard errors are 
considered. 
Beyond exhibiting the fitness of both the Fourier transformation technique implemented as 
well as the log-normal approximation these numerical examples shed light on the intuitive 
mechanisms of the algorithm as well as on its limits. 
Table 15 shows that if the investor is the protection seller the FTDCVA metric decreases 
with an increase in the correlation between the reference entity and the counterparty, 
reaching near-zero terms. This can be explained by the pattern already discussed in 
Schönbucher and Schubert (2000). If the counterparty defaults before the reference entity 
while having a negative (positive) correlation the survival probability of the reference entity 
will increase (decrease). Now if the survival probability of the reference entity increases 
(decreases) the conditional value of the CDS – from the perspective of the protection seller 
– will increase (decrease), implying higher (lower) adjustments.  
A contrary pattern is observed when the investor buys protection as seen in Table 16. The 
higher the correlation between the reference entity and the counterparty, the higher the 
adjustment. Table 17 shows that there is one exception to this rule, i.e. the case in which the 
reference entity and counterparty are almost perfectly correlated, i.e. 𝜌𝜌1,2 = 0.99, in which the 
adjustment decreases significantly. Because of the high correlations the default triggers are 
almost identical. If the counterparty defaults before the investor, the residual value of the 
CDS will be relatively low, because of the high probability that the reference entity would 
have had defaulted already. Brigo and Chourdakis (2009) classify the pattern as “somewhat 
reasonable”, showing that it loses some of its significance if the reference entity becomes 
riskier. It does, however, imply some inconsistency, especially when it comes to pricing 
wrong-way risk. After all, wrong way risk – as seen in the monoline example – can also be 
accompanied by presumably riskless references. In cases of extreme wrong way risk the 
model will deliver rather low (if not negligible) CVA values.  
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Table 17 also shows that the influence of correlation stops being as straightforward when 
other interdependencies are modelled as well, e.g. when the investor and the reference entity 
also display a default correlation. In these cases the probability of the counterparty defaulting 
first is reduced through default contagion between the investor and the reference entity. 
The volatility of the reference entity is one further item that is captured by the model. This is 
apparent from the last correlation combination given in Table 16. The volatility of the 
reference entity increases the value of the CDS contract – also the conditional value given a 
default – which in return induces a higher adjustment. 
Correlation matrix 
(𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏,𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟐𝟐,𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐) 𝝂𝝂𝟏𝟏: Implied CDS volatility 0.01 1.5% 0.1 15% 0.2 28% 0.3 37% 0.4 42% 0.5 42% 
(0, 0, -0.9) Lognormal distribution 25 (1) 25 (1) 25 (1) 27 (1) 26 (1) 24 (1) 
 Fourier transformation 26 (1) 26 (1) 26 (1) 28 (1) 27 (2) 25 (1) 
(0, 0, -0.6) Lognormal distribution 21 (1) 25 (1) 24 (1) 24 (1) 24 (1) 23 (1) 
 Fourier transformation 25 (1) 26 (2) 25 (1) 25 (1) 24 (1) 24 (1) 
(0, 0, -0.2) Lognormal distribution 6 (1) 9 (1) 9 (1) 9 (1) 7 (1) 6 (1) 
 Fourier transformation 9 (1) 12 (1) 11 (1) 11 (1) 8 (1) 12 (1) 
(0, 0, 0) Lognormal distribution 0 (0) 2 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 Fourier transformation 0 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 6 (1) 
(0, 0, 0.2) Lognormal distribution 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 Fourier transformation -0 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 4 (0) 
(0, 0, 0.6) Lognormal distribution 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 Fourier transformation -0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) 2 (0) 
(0, 0, 0.9) Lognormal distribution 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 Fourier transformation -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) 1 (0) 
Table 15: Comparison of the Model Results Using the Analytical Approximation and FRFT (Part I) 
The table summarizes the FTDCVA in basis points of the CDS receiver as computed using the 
lognormal distribution approximation and the Fast Fourier Transformation (FRFT) approach. The 
numbers in brackets stand for the standard errors. The investor (receiver) has the following 
parameters: y0 = 0.0001,κ0 = 0.9 µ0 = 0.001, ν0 = 0.01, LGD0 = 0.6. The reference entity has the 
following parameters: y1 = 0.01,κ1 = 0.8,µ1 = 0.02, LGD1 = 0.7. The counterparty (payer) has the 
following parameters: y2 = 0.03,κ2 = 0.5 µ2 = 0.05, ν2 = 0.5, LGD2 = 0.65. The interest free rate r is set 
to be 0.03. 
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Correlation matrix 
(𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏,𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟐𝟐,𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐) 𝝂𝝂𝟏𝟏: Implied CDS volatility 0.01 1.5% 0.1 15% 0.2 28% 0.3 37% 0.4 42% 0.5 42% 
(0, 0, -0.9) Lognormal distribution 0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) 
 Fourier transformation 0 (0) -0 (2) -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (1) 
(0, 0, -0.6) Lognormal distribution -0 (0) -0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 Fourier transformation -0 (0) 0 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) -0 (0) -0 (0) 
(0, 0, -0.2) Lognormal distribution 0 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 2 (0) 3 (0) 
 Fourier transformation 0 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0) 2 (1) 
(0, 0, 0) Lognormal distribution 9 (0) 8 (1) 9 (1) 9 (1) 9 (1) 13 (1) 
 Fourier transformation 3 (0) 6 (0) 6 (1) 7 (1) 8 (1) 9 (1) 
(0, 0, 0.2) Lognormal distribution 23 (2) 26 (2) 21 (2) 22 (2) 27 (2) 26 (2) 
 Fourier transformation 22 (1) 22 (2) 18 (1) 20 (1) 26 (2) 19 (1) 
(0, 0, 0.6) Lognormal distribution 60 (5) 58 (5) 57 (5) 62 (5) 62 (5) 67 (5) 
 Fourier transformation 55 (4) 55 (4) 53 (4) 59 (4) 61 (5) 54 (4) 
(0, 0, 0.9) Lognormal distribution 59 (6) 68 (6) 67 (6) 71 (6) 86 (7) 94 (7) 
 Fourier transformation 71 (7) 67 (6) 71 (6) 70 (6) 88 (7) 83 (7) 
Table 16: Comparison of the Model Results Using the Analytical Approximation and FRFT (Part II) 
The table summarizes the FTDCVA in basis points of the CDS payer as computed using the 
lognormal distribution approximation and the Fast Fourier Transformation (FRFT) approach. The 
numbers in brackets stand for the standard errors. The investor (payer) has the following 
parameters: 𝑦𝑦0 = 0.0001,𝜅𝜅0 = 0.9,𝜇𝜇0 = 0.001, 𝜈𝜈0 = 0.01,𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷0 = 0.6. The reference entity has the 
following parameters: 𝑦𝑦1 = 0.01,𝜅𝜅1 = 0.8,𝜇𝜇1 = 0.02,𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷1 = 0.7. The counterparty (receiver) has the 
following parameters: 𝑦𝑦2 = 0.03,𝜅𝜅2 = 0.5, 𝜇𝜇2 = 0.05, 𝜈𝜈2 = 0.2, 𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷2 = 0.65. The interest free rate 𝑟𝑟 is set 
to be 0.03.  
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(𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏,𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟐𝟐,𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐
)  FTDCVA 
(𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏,𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟐𝟐,𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐
)  FTDCVA 
(0, 0, 0) Lognormal distrib. 5 (0) (0, 0.9, 0) Lognormal distrib. 6 (0) 
 Fourier transform. 6 (0)  Fourier transform. 6 (0) 
 Capponi (2009) 6 (0)  Capponi (2009) 5 (0) 
(0, 0, 0.1) Lognormal distrib. 12 (1) (0, 0.99, 0) Lognormal distrib. 5 (0) 
 Fourier transform. 12 (1)  Fourier transform. 6 (0) 
 Capponi (2009) 15 (1)  Capponi (2009) 5 (0) 
(0, 0, 0.3) Lognormal distrib. 26 (2) (0, 0.5, 0.5) Lognormal distrib. 48 (4) 
 Fourier transform. 30 (2)  Fourier transform. 46 (4) 
 Capponi (2009) 37 (2)  Capponi (2009) 55 (4) 
(0, 0, 0.6) Lognormal distrib. 64 (5) (0, 0.2, 0.9) Lognormal distrib. 61 (6) 
 Fourier transform. 52 (4)  Fourier transform. 53 (6) 
 Capponi (2009) 73 (4)  Capponi (2009) 73 (6) 
(0, 0, 0.9) Lognormal distrib. 51 (6) (0, 0.9, 0.2) Lognormal distrib. 22 (2) 
 Fourier transform. 68 (6)  Fourier transform. 22 (2) 
 Capponi (2009) 75 (6)  Capponi (2009) 21 (2) 
(0, 0, 0.99) Lognormal distrib. 13 (0.5, 0.5, 0) Lognormal distrib. 5 (0) 
 Fourier transform. 15  Fourier transform. 5 (0) 
 Capponi (2009) 25  Capponi (2009) 7 (0) 
(0, 0.1, 0) Lognormal distrib. 5 (0) (0.2, 0.9, 0) Lognormal distrib. 6 (0) 
 Fourier transform. 5 (0)  Fourier transform. 5 (0) 
 Capponi (2009) 6 (0)  Capponi (2009) 6 (0) 
(0, 0.6, 0) Lognormal distrib. 6 (0) (0.8, 0.5, 0.2) Lognormal distrib. 21 (2) 
 Fourier transform. 6 (0)  Fourier transform. 23 (2) 
 Capponi (2009) 6 (0)  Capponi (2009) 26 (1) 
(0.2, 0.2, 0.2) Lognormal distrib. 21 (2) (0.5, 0.5, 0.5) Lognormal distrib. 52 (4) 
 Fourier transform. 25 (2)  Fourier transform. 43 (3) 
 Capponi (2009) 25 (1)  Capponi (2009) 58 (4) 
Table 17: Comparison of Analytical Approximation with FRFT and Capponi (2009) (Part III) 
The table summarizes the FTDCVA in basis points of the CDS payer as computed using the 
lognormal distribution approximation and the Fast Fourier Transformation (FRFT) approach in 
comparison with the results published by Capponi (2009). The numbers in brackets stand for the 
standard errors. The investor (payer) has the following parameters: y0 = 0.0001,κ0 = 0.9, µ0 =0.001, ν0 = 0.1, LGD0 = 0.6. The reference entity has the following parameters: y1 = 0.01,κ1 =0.8, µ1 = 0.02, ν1 = 0.1, LGD1 = 0.7. The counterparty (receiver) has the following parameters: y2 = 0.03,κ2 = 0.5, µ2 = 0.05, ν2 = 0.1, LGD2 = 0.65. The interest free rate r is set to be 0.03. 
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4.4. CASE STUDY 
In the following we would like to return to our introductory example in which a financial 
institution buys protection in form of a CDS from a monoline insurance in order to hedge 
the credit risk arising from (one unit) senior structured note (RMBS). We assume a 5 year 
contract without a collateral agreement. 
The case study will describe needed computational steps in more detail, especially with 
respect to calibrating the models to market data. It will also explore the insights offered by 
the model as well as its limits. In order to capture the dynamics caused by the financial crisis 
we will compute the first-to-default CVA based on real market data from 2006 as well as 
2010. We especially expect to gain insights regarding the increasing significance of CVA in 
general and wrong way risk in particular. 
The investor is defined as an average bank. For this purpose we estimated the average of the 
CDS spreads of five leading banks as seen in Table 18.156 As an exemplary monoline insurer 
we chose Assured Corp., displaying the CDS spreads seen in Table 18. For the RMBS note 
we assume a constant CDS spread of 30 bps. and 400 bps. in the years 2006 and 2010, 
respectively. The significant shift in the curve of CDS spreads underlines the deteriorating 
credibility of all the parties involved due to the financial crisis. 
Following the procedure described in Subchapter  3.3.4 we estimate the implied default 
probabilities (PD) of all involved parties based on the assumed CDS spreads. We assume the 
recovery rate to be 40% (i.e. LGD to be 60%), standing in line with market practice (see also 
Subsection  3.3.4). In order to limit the effect of the LGD assumption we use the same LGD 
in order to strip the market implied survival probabilities as well as within the CVA 
calculation. 
                                                 
156 We used the same set of names in Subchapter  3.3.4 when we discussed calibration of default probabilities. 
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The CDS spreads imply the probabilities of defaults illustrated in Figure 19. The figure 
shows the drastic increase of default probabilities the market attributed (even to large and 
international) banks. While the market implied 5 year PD of an average bank was practically 
negligible before the crises, it exceeded 10% in 2010 as seen in Subfigure (b). Subfigure (a) 
shows how the market attributed almost credit risk-free status to monoline insurance 
companies before the crises, standing in line with their top rating. This changed dramatically 
in the course of the subprime crises. The situation in the monoline insurance market in 
general and the idiosyncratic risk of Assured Corp. in particular seem to have considerably 
increased the market implied probability of default across all maturities by 2010. 
Using the closed-form solutions for survival probability given in Equation (4.23) and the 
market implied survival probabilities we subsequently calibrate the CIR parameters using a 
straight-forward least square (LS) method. The calibration results are listed in Table 19. The 
increased risk of all parties is especially visible through the surge in the volatility term 𝜈𝜈.  
Figure 20 displays a key advantage of stochastic intensity models in general and the SSRD 
approach in particular. The model-based survival probabilities fit the market implied ones 
across the whole term structure in a very satisfying manner. 
We face the key shortfall of the CVA model however when estimating the correlation 
structure. As noted above we lack natural appropriate methodologies. For this reason we 
follow Cesari et al. (2009, p. 222) and study a range of possibilities instead of using one 
particular correlation matrix. Some scenarios seem plausible (e.g. the first example given in 
Table 20). Others are less plausible, but helpful to understand the mechanism of the model 
(e.g. the last scenario given in Table 20). 
We then run the algorithm illustrated in Figure 16, delivering first-to-default CVA metrics 
for the years 2006 and 2010. The calculation of the conditional value of the CDS needed 
within the algorithm is based on the proposed lognormal approximation (for the cumulative 
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distribution function, CDF). Note that we keep the maturity of the CDS contract (5 years) 
unchanged to exclude duration effects. 
07.07.2006 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 
Banks:         
Deutsche Bank    10 12.8 13.8 16.2 23.2 
Santander Bank    11 12.6 13.2 16 21 
Barclays Capital    7 9.1 10 11.8 16 
UniCredit    13.2 15.8 16.7 22 27 
Citi  5 7.4 9.5 11.1 12.5 18 21 
Banks’ average  5 7.4 10.4 12.3 13.2 16.8 21.64 
Monoline Insurer:         
Assured Corp.    18 21.6 26 32 41 
07.07.2006 6M 1Y 2Y 3Y 4Y 5Y 7Y 10Y 
Banks:         
Deutsche Bank 111.3 110.2 125.8 139.7 154.8 163.7 166.4 168.8 
Santander Bank 151.1 149.7 161.3 174.1 186.6 194.1 188.6 192.2 
Barclays Capital 110.0 109.1 124.2 138.4 150.4 159.8 164.7 168.4 
UniCredit 124.7 123.6 140 153.6 165.1 171.9 176.5 174.3 
Citi 138.2 136.9 142 147.5 153.5 176.0 159.0 158.1 
Banks’ average 127.1 125.9 138.7 150.7 162.1 173.1 171.0 172.4 
Monoline Insurer:         
Assured Corp. 846.3 867.7 888.3 888.5 887.3 914 858.5 826.5 
Table 18: CDS Spreads of Five Leading Banks and One Monoline Insurer 
The table summarizes the CDS spreads (in basis points) of five leading banks and one exemplary 
insurance company in the year 2006 and 2010, respectively. Source is Bloomberg. 
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2006 𝒚𝒚𝟎𝟎 𝜿𝜿 𝝁𝝁 𝝂𝝂 
Bank 0.0003 0.0312 0.0268 0.0942 
Reference Entity 0.0057 0.2000 0.0044 0.0000 
Monoliner 0.0000 0.1426 0.0152 0.0050 
2010 𝒚𝒚𝟎𝟎 𝜿𝜿 𝝁𝝁 𝝂𝝂 
Bank 0.0025 2.1462 0.0312 0.5000 
Reference Entity 0.0719 35.2474 0.0664 0.0040 
Monoliner 0.1522 0.0014 0.0009 0.1008 
Table 19: Calibrated CIR Parameters for the Three Entities 
The table summarizes the calibration results of the CIR process (intensity process) for the three 
entities, Bank (name “0”), Reference Entity (name “1”), and Monoliner (name “2”). 
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e) Market implied PDs for an exemplary  
monoline insurance company 
 
f) Market implied PDs for an exemplary bank 
Figure 19: Market Implied Probabilities of Default for an Exemplary Bank 
The figures display the market implied probabilities of default (PDs) calibrated using the CDS 
spreads provided in Table 18. 
Correlation matrix  
(𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟏𝟏,𝝆𝝆𝟎𝟎,𝟐𝟐,𝝆𝝆𝟏𝟏,𝟐𝟐) FTDCVA  (2006) FTDCVA  (2010) CVA (2010)  (% of CDS value) 
(0, 0.5, 0.5) 5 (0) 179 (4) 10% 
(0, 0.2, 0.9) 17 (2) 267 (4) 16% 
(0, 0.9, 0.2) 21 (3) 330 (9) 19% 
(0.5, 0.5, 0) 7 (1) 198 (5) 11% 
(0.2, 0.9, 0) 10 (1) 220 (5) 13% 
Table 20: First-to-default CVA Results 
The table summarizes the FTDCVA in basis points of the CDS payer as computed using the 
lognormal distribution approximation. The numbers in brackets stand for the standard errors. 
The CDS has a maturity of 5 years and a CDS-spread of 30 bps. The last column summons the 
adjustments w.r.t the value of the CDS in 2010 (i.e. 1726 bps.). The investor (payer) is an average 
bank, the reference entity is a structured note and the counterparty (receiver) is a monoline 
insurer. All are assumed to have an LGD of 0.6. The CIR parameters of the three parties are 
given in Table 19. 
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a) Survival Probabilities of the Bank in 2006 
 
b) Survival Probabilities of the Bank in 2010 
 
c) Survival Probabilities of the Monoliner in 2006 
 
d) Survival Probabilities of the Monoliner in 2010 
Figure 20: Market Implied Survival Probabilities vs. Model Implied Survival Probabilities 
The figures display the market implied survival probabilities in comparison with the model 
implied survival probabilities of the average bank and an exemplary monoline insurer in 2006 
and 2010, demonstrating the calibration of the CIR processes to market data. 
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The results shown in Table 20 are to be interpreted as follows. If the bank had bought a 
protection from a monoline insurer in 2006, it would have had to adjust the value of the 
CDS by 5 to 21 basis points, depending on the correlation matrix assumed. Assuming a 
correlation structure similar to the one in the first example might have already been 
conservative, and the CVA metric delivered is still rather negligible. This is due to the low 
CDS spreads observed (and the respective implied survival probabilities). Note that the 
initial value of the CDS in 2006 is zero. 
The picture changes significantly in 2010. In the meanwhile the counterparty credit risk-free 
value of the CDS increased from 0 to 1726 bps. due to the increased risk of the reference 
entity, this being a key driver behind the increase in the CVA metrics across the correlation 
scenarios. A further driver is of course the increased risk of the counterparty. This becomes 
evident if we look at the second correlation scenario which seems plausible for 2010. In this 
case the bank would need to adjust the value of the CDS by approximately 16%. Notice that 
for the monoline insurer the CVA increase (e.g. from 5 to 267 bps.) would imply a profit due 
to the worsening of own credit risk. 
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4.5. CRITICAL EVALUATION 
In the following we evaluate the model offered by Brigo and Capponi (2010), focusing on 
the capabilities of the approach in delivering its proclaimed target, i.e. “arbitrage-free 
framework” to price symmetric CVA for CDS. After discussing the theoretical and technical 
strengths and pitfalls we turn to discuss the practical “use test” of the model. Whilst some 
issues are only relevant for the specific approach at hand many arguments have a broader 
scope, aiming on intensity models, the use of (Gaussian) copula functions and derivative 
pricing models in general. 
In principle the framework does capture default dependency, delivering a theoretically 
coherent and symmetric first-to-default CVA, i.e. incorporating the credit risk of both the 
investor and the counterparty. By modeling the default dependency through a copula 
function the approach allows for separate modeling of credit spread dynamics on the one 
hand and the default dependency on the other. This can be seen as an advantage from a 
practicality perspective, less so if mathematical rigor is central. After all, the calibration of a 
function with two or more parameters should not be done sequentially but simultaneously. 
Credit spread dynamics are modelled through a standard stochastic intensity approach. 
Incorporating jumps would have facilitated the calibration of higher (but possible) implied 
volatilities as discussed in Brigo and El-Bachir (2008). Still, the chosen (and implemented) 
SSRD approach is not only mathematically convenient, it also captures market implied 
survival probabilities in a very satisfying manner. 
Default is defined when the cumulative intensity process exceeds a respective default trigger. 
A Gaussian copula captures the dependency of the default triggers of the investor, the 
counterparty and the reference entity. Whereas the possibility of joint default is excluded. 
This assumption does not, however, seem that unrealistic, especially if the discretization is 
subsequently done in relatively small time steps (e.g. trading days). The Gaussian copula 
introduces convenient analytical tractability to the model, e.g. with respect to computing 
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partial derivatives etc. The statistical rigor of using Gaussian copulas to model the 
dependency of default triggers remains controversial (see Mikosch, 2005). In addition to 
assuming constant default correlation, it fails to capture the “tails” of the distribution, 
systematically underestimating the conditional probability of default, which is exactly the 
proclaimed target of the “CVA with wrong-way risk” model. Moreover, as discussed above 
in Subchapter  4.3.5 the model tends to underestimate CVA in extreme scenarios when 
correlation between the reference entity and the counterparty is close to one, especially if the 
reference entity is relatively less risky. 
Besides default risk the approach assumes deterministic interest rates and constant recovery 
rates. While the small role interest rates play in this case might support the negligence of 
their stochasticity, this does not apply to recovery rates. Li (2009) shows that although not as 
important as default correlation the volatility of recovery rates can drive CVA significantly. 
Modeling stochastic recovery rates will, however, introduce a further layer of complication 
and uncertainties, especially with regards to calibrating the recovery rate volatility. 
A more relevant missing characteristic is collateralization. As seen in Table 14 credit 
derivatives are almost always collateralized. It needs, however, to be noted that especially in 
infamous examples of CDS contracts with wrong way risk (e.g. monoline insurers selling 
CDS on RMBS) no collateral agreements were put in place. Moreover, the framework has 
been extended by Brigo et al. (2013b) to model collateralization, allowing also for re-
hypothecation. 
More importantly while Brigo and Capponi (2010) do offer a risk-neutral framework to 
model CVA, they do not specify the needed duplication strategy. This can be pointed out as 
the key pitfall of the model, questioning the applicability and practicability of the model. 
First, we lack market quotes to calibrate a risk-neutral correlation matrix. Second, the 
duplication strategy would imply hedging own credit risk. As discussed in Subchapter 3.4.2 
hedging DVA is already an almost impossible task. Let alone hedging the sensitivity of a 
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first-to-default CVA to changes in own credit risk, which involves hedging sensitivities of 
conditional exposure values given a default of a counterparty and possible contagion effects. 
Thus, although theoretically coherent the model exhibits significant pitfalls that limit its 
practical use, especially when it comes to pricing and hedging. Following the terminology of 
Taleb and Martin (2012) a trader hedging his positions based on the model presented would 
resemble a pilot flying according to the map of a different territory. Bearing in mind that 
models will principally deviate from reality, the impossibility of structuring a duplicating 
strategy calls the whole approach into question. It can be argued that using such “flawed” 
models (“wrong maps”) might even increase the risk as it induces overconfidence – also 
referred to as “model-dope” (MacKenzie and Spears, 2014) – and allows for “charlatanism” 
(Taleb, 2012).157 This links into what Hayek (1942) calls “scientism”, i.e. the illusion of 
science. In their analysis of the Gaussian copula and its role in the financial crisis MacKenzie 
and Spears (2014) do confirm the risk of models being – “gamed” and exploited. They find, 
however, evidence that questions the existence of blind confidence in models, concluding 
that “model dope” notions should be treated as forms of “othering”.158 More importantly, 
they point to the coordinating role financial models play, facilitating communication within 
and between organizations, e.g. “providing a shared yardstick that enabled accountants and auditors to 
determine whether a valuation was correct and risk managers to assess whether a position was properly hedged 
[…]”. 
Returning to the model at hand this means that while bearing the risks of using the model in 
mind, we need to analyze its use as a communication tool. Because the model is based on a 
standard modeling approach (e.g. reduced form approach in conjunction with Gaussian 
copula) while preserving theoretical coherence it can provide a framework to discuss the 
                                                 
157 See also Taleb (2012), pp. 238-240, Taleb (2007), p. xxv or Taleb (1997), pp. 445-453. 
158 MacKenzie and Spears (2014) cite amongst others the following research papers that question the notion of 
model dope: Beunza and Stark (2010) and Svetlova (2012). Notice that also Haug and Taleb (2011) argue 
that traders are not “blind” to the pitfalls of the Black-Scholes formula. 
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dynamics of wrong-way risk but also of DVA pricing. Such a discussion is not only of 
academic nature, but can contribute relevant insights to the regulatory and accounting 
discourse, revealing the significance of wrong way risk (especially amid the financial crisis) 
and shedding light on the controversies of accounting for DVA (see previous Section  4.4). 
Yet, it is exactly this “theoretical coherence” that limits the use of the model for inter- and 
intra-organizational communication. Simpler approaches (as the one discussed in 
Subchapter  3.3.2) in which the different building blocks (esp. exposure profile) are derived 
and presented in a more straightforward manner seem more appropriate for this purpose. 
Still, the model at hand can facilitate discussions around the specific (and rare) case of CVA 
for a netting set consisting only of one CDS contract (with not collateralization). It can for 
example offer an inter-subjective framework for discussions between banks on the one 
hand, and auditors and supervisors on the other, e.g. “providing a shared yardstick” to determine 
whether they have correctly adjusted for the counterparty risk arising from the credit 
protections they bought from monoline insurers, referencing to RMBS notes. 
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4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We chose to focus on the implementation and analysis of the model proposed by Brigo and 
Capponi (2010), because it was one of the first CVA models promising an arbitrage-free 
framework for symmetric pricing in conjunction with dependency between probabilities of 
default and exposure. 
First, we laid the grounds for the analysis by revisiting the mechanisms behind CDS 
contracts. We then placed the approach offered by Brigo and Capponi (2010) within the 
category of reduced-form credit risk models that use (Gaussian) copula functions to model 
default dependency. Subsequently, we decomposed the model which allowed a thorough 
analysis of the benefits and pitfalls of the model. In addition, we provided a step-by-step 
implementation guide, especially going into detail into the aspects that Brigo and 
Capponi (2010) left relatively open – the computation of the survival probability of the 
reference entity conditional on the default of either the counterparty or the investor. It has 
been illustrated in detail how the fractional Fourier transform (FRFT) can be used for this 
purpose. We also proposed a computational tune-up through a heuristic approximation, 
which reduces the complexity of the elaborate implementation and speeds-up the 
computation, while delivering satisfying pricing results. 
We synthesize that while Brigo and Capponi (2010) do offer a coherent and risk-neutral 
framework, they do not specify the needed duplication strategy. The lack of instruments to 
calibrate a risk-neutral correlation matrix and possibility to hedge own credit risk puts the 
arbitrage-freedom of the model into question. In addition, we note that the theoretical 
coherence of the model actually limits its use for inter- and intra-organizational 
communication, and suggest that simpler approaches are more appropriate as they facilitate 
discussions around the different building blocks (e.g. exposure profile). 
This does not deprive the model from the possibility of facilitating discussions around the 
specific case of CVA for CDS contracts (with no collateralization). After all, the model is 
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able to explain the high adjustments needed for CDS on structured notes that were bought 
from monoline insurance, i.e. meeting the demand following the financial crisis. 
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CHAPTER 5: OVERALL CONCLUSION 
This thesis can be placed within the literature on market and counterparty credit risk, 
contributing along the following three dimensions: 
• Interest rate risk management. We gave an overview on asset liability management 
(ALM) in general and interest rate risk management in particular. In that respect we 
offered a novel procedure for structuring swap overlays for pensions funds, allowing 
for optimal hedging of interest rate risk without affecting the strategic asset 
allocation. We also extended the analysis of the Cairns (2004) stochastic interest rate 
model. Besides deriving respective model-based sensitivity measures (Cairns deltas), 
we applied the two-factor version of the model to the practical application of ALM 
for pension funds, analyzing its strengths and weaknesses when it comes to long-
term contracts. 
• Pricing and managing counterparty credit risk. We offered a compact overview on 
counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment (CVA), running unique 
analyses around valuation, relevant accounting and regulatory requirements as well as 
pricing and mitigation. We illustrated how the CVA capital charge shows the 
tautology behind many of the discussions around regulatory requirements. It reveals 
how financial institutions are heavily driven by regulatory requirements that originally 
aimed to actually mirror the way banks “do business”. In addition, we showed that 
the discourse around CVA and counterparty credit risk cannot be seen as a “pure 
scientific search for truth” as it is dominated by lobby-like argumentations. We 
agreed for example that the regulatory CVA capital charge will indeed lead to an 
increase in hedge costs. We questioned, however, whether the increase will be as 
significant as the evidence shows. We argued rather that banks have not been pricing 
for CVA adequately in the past. This might be due to the fact that banks did not 
think systematically about counterparty credit risk, because no metric pointed to it. 
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• CVA modeling and wrong way risk. We gave an overview on credit risk modeling in 
general and credit spreads in particular, revisiting the CVA for CDS model 
introduced by Brigo and Capponi (2010). We offered a step-by-step implementation 
guide, elaborating on the parts Brigo and Capponi (2010) left open. We especially 
offered a computational tune-up, and demonstrated its robustness across a variety of 
scenarios. After illustrating the use of the model using a realistic case study, we ran a 
novel analysis of the Brigo and Capponi (2010) model in particular and CVA 
modeling in general. 
With regards to the overall discourse around financial derivatives we were able to illustrate 
the value added by using swaps to hedge interest rate risk of pension funds. We showed that 
financial derivatives can offer considerable benefits, allowing risk to be borne by the ones 
most fit to do so. By immunizing their portfolios against changes in interest rates, fund 
managers pursue the noble objective of ensuring the funding of pension payments. The 
discussion around counterparty credit risk, however, reveals a range of risks and challenges 
derivatives imply. This means especially that while structuring a swap overlay fund managers 
will need to consider counterparty credit risk, possibly pricing (bilateral) CVA. Most 
importantly they will need to accommodate to the changing needs of their counterparties, i.e. 
banks that are under regulatory pressure to collateralize their derivative exposure. For 
pension fund managers full collateralization involves funding considerable amounts of liquid 
assets, possibly affecting the strategic asset allocation and thus questioning the benefits 
offered by derivatives in the first place. 
A similarly ambivalent evaluation is evident if we consider the models to price financial 
derivatives and to capture the dynamics of the underlying risk factors. In the case of the 
Cairns model we found an approach that can exhibit benefits, especially in modeling short- as 
well as long-term interest rates, facilitating founded discussions around investment 
discussions. However, by focusing on “realistic” modeling in times of considerable (and 
stochastic) basis spreads in combination with negative interest rates the model does also 
seem superseded. 
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Also in the case of Brigo and Capponi (2010) we were able to show that the model can be 
used for inter- and intra-organizational communication, albeit restricted to rather limited 
application. We concluded that while Brigo and Capponi (2010) do offer a coherent and risk-
neutral framework, they do not specify the needed duplication strategy. The lack of 
instruments to calibrate a risk-neutral correlation matrix and possibility to hedge own credit 
risk puts a question mark on the applicability and practicability of the model. A similar tone 
is echoed in our discussion around pricing and managing CVA in general as we reveal the 
limits of arbitrage-free valuation, especially when it comes to the practical implementation of 
pricing models or constructing adequate hedges. Clinging to use elaborate models that need 
overcomplicated calibration without reflecting on their economic sense might not only imply 
mere model and valuation risks, but also significant financial risks at the latest when it comes 
to hedging. 
We conclude that computational finance has been able to offer novel innovations, 
accompanied by elaborate mathematics that facilitate respective inter- and intra-
organizational communication. Still, the unlimited complication of the real world in general 
and financial markets in particular has continuously challenged these efforts fundamentally. 
This reminds us of how new this field of research is, having yet a long journey ahead of it. In 
the meantime a considerable amount of skepticism and humility will do both academics and 
practitioners well. An attitude this thesis cannot and does not want to free itself from. After 
all, as put by Popper (1945, p. 249): 
“You may be right and I may be wrong, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” 
 
  
 
APPENDIX A: THE FRAMEWORK OF FLESAKER AND HUGHSTON 
In the following we revisit the framework offered by Flesaker and Hughston (1996) for 
pricing zero coupon bonds, and elaborate on some extensions given by Cairns (2004). 
The general positive-interest rate framework of Flesaker and Hughston (1996) models bond 
prices with 
   𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) =  ∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡
∫ 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞0  (A.1) 
for some function 𝐻𝐻(𝑢𝑢, 𝑥𝑥). In order to proof the above let 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) be the price at time 𝑎𝑎 of a 
zero coupon bond that matures at time b (b > a). At maturity the bond price equals 1 unit. 
This price function is further differentiable at time b. Set 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎,𝑇𝑇) as the pricing measure 
(numeraire) so that 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏)
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎,𝑇𝑇) =  𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏). (A.2) 
It can be shown that 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) is a martingale. Because 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎) = 1 ⇒ 1
𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎). 
Equation (A.2) can be transformed to 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎,𝑇𝑇)𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 1
𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎) =  𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏)𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎). (A.3) 
The ratio of two bond prices is given as 
  
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐)
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎,𝑇𝑇)𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐)𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐) 1𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐)𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏). (A.4) 
If for 𝑐𝑐 >  𝑏𝑏, 𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏)
𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏) < 1 then positive interest rates are obtained. This is reached if 𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑐𝑐) <
𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏), meaning that the derivative of this martingale (which is a martingale in itself) is 
subject to 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁(𝑠𝑠,𝑏𝑏)
𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏
< 0. 
There exists a family of martingales 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) that for 0 ≤ 𝑎𝑎 ≤ 𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑠𝑠 has the following 
characteristics: 
1. 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠) = 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠[𝑀𝑀(𝑏𝑏, 𝑠𝑠)] 
2. 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠) > 0 
3. 𝑀𝑀(0, 𝑠𝑠) = 1 
4. lim𝑠𝑠→∞𝑀𝑀(0, 𝑠𝑠) = 1 
Using this family of martingales we define: 
𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏)
𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏
= 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁(0, 𝑏𝑏)
𝜕𝜕𝑏𝑏
𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏). (A.5) 
𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎,𝑇𝑇) being 1 and 𝑁𝑁(0, 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃(0,𝑏𝑏)
𝑃𝑃(0,𝑇𝑇) then: 
𝑁𝑁(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 1 − 1
𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑡𝑡)� 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠.𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏  (A.6) 
Then by Equation (A.3) we have: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑡𝑡) − ∫ 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑏𝑏
𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑡𝑡) − ∫ 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 . (A.7) 
By taking the maturity of the numeraire to infinity we obtain: 
  
 
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) = ∫ 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠∞𝑏𝑏
∫
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑠𝑠)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑀
(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠∞
𝑠𝑠
. (A.8) 
Cairns (2004) defines 𝜙𝜙(𝑠𝑠) = 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(0,𝑠𝑠)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠
s) so that: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = ∫ 𝜙𝜙(𝑠𝑠)𝑀𝑀(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠∞𝑏𝑏
∫
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃(0, 𝑠𝑠)
𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 𝑀𝑀
(𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠∞
𝑠𝑠
. (A.9) 
Cairns (2004) defines 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) by the following assumptions: 
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (A.10) 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑?̂?𝑍(𝑡𝑡),𝑌𝑌�(0) = 0, and ?̂?𝑍1(𝑡𝑡), … , ?̂?𝑍𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) are 𝑛𝑛 independent Brownian motions 
under measure 𝑃𝑃�. 𝐶𝐶 is calculated as a matrix with 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 such that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶′ = �𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1𝑛𝑛  is the 
instantaneous correlation matrix between the generated Brownian motions 𝑌𝑌�1(𝑡𝑡), … ,𝑌𝑌�𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) 
under the measure 𝑃𝑃�. Equation (A.10) can thus be written as: 
𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)�𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) (A.11) 
and 
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)′𝑌𝑌�(𝑡𝑡) − 12∑ 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)𝑑𝑑〈𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡),𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)〉���������
𝑒𝑒𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1 . (A.12) 
Defining 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡) then: 
  
 
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 � 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇−𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡
0
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
−
12 � 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 � 𝑒𝑒−�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�(𝑇𝑇−𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡0 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1  (A.13) 
or  
𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = �𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡) 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)���
∫ 𝑏𝑏−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇−𝑠𝑠)𝑒𝑒𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡0
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
−
12 � 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 � 𝑒𝑒−�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�(𝑇𝑇−𝑠𝑠)𝑡𝑡0 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1   
with 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) =  ∫ 𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑇𝑇−𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑡𝑡0 . So an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with 𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 0 and 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) =
−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is introduced as the risk generator. 
In addition to Flesaker and Hughston (1996), Cairns (2004) further defines 𝜙𝜙(𝑠𝑠) from 
Equation (A.9) as: 
𝜙𝜙(𝑠𝑠) = 𝜙𝜙𝑒𝑒 − 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 + �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
−
12 � 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒−�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1  (A.14) 
for the parameters 𝜙𝜙,𝛽𝛽, 𝑥𝑥�1, … , 𝑥𝑥�𝑛𝑛. Then, for 𝑡𝑡 <  𝑠𝑠: 
𝜙𝜙(𝑠𝑠)𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠) = 𝜙𝜙𝑒𝑒 − 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 + �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
−
12 � 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒−�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�(𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1  (A.15) 
whereas 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process under the measure 𝑃𝑃� . with 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(0) = 𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖 ,𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 =
𝑥𝑥�𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒
−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+𝑋𝑋�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) and 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = −𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌�𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) or: 
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑 ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑?̂?𝑍𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 . (A.16) 
Now if: 
𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = � 𝜙𝜙(𝑠𝑠)𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 = 𝜙𝜙𝑒𝑒−𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 � 𝐻𝐻�𝑢𝑢,𝑋𝑋(𝑡𝑡)�𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∞
𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡
∞
𝑇𝑇
 (A.17) 
where 
  
 
𝐻𝐻(𝑢𝑢, 𝑥𝑥) = 𝑒𝑒 − 𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢 + �𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
−
12 � 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒−�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖=1  (A.18) 
which returns us back to Equation (A.1). 
  
 
APPENDIX B: RISK-NEUTRAL VALUATION PARADIGM OF HARRISON 
AND PLISKA 
Following the terminology of Brigo and Mercurio (2006) we will shortly recall the risk-
neutral valuation paradigm offered by Harrison and Pliska (1983).  
Each derivative with a stochastic payment at a future time 𝑇𝑇 has a unique price at time 
period 𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 < 𝑇𝑇) under the risk-neutral expectation 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ. Given 𝑟𝑟 as the risk free instantaneous 
discount rate, the risk-neutral expectation can be formalized as follows: 
𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡
ℚ
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �−� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠�
�����������
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡)𝑇𝑇
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤. (A.19) 
Hence all underlying assets must have a deterministic (and risk free) drift rate as an expected 
return. In order to compute the current value of uncertain payoffs one has to build the mean 
out of expectations that are discounted at the relevant (risk free) rate. The groundbreaking 
aspect about option pricing theory is that the real growth rate of the underlying asset (e.g. 
return on a stock) is not needed for pricing the derivative. This implies that in order to 
valuate a derivative instrument (e.g. interest rate swap) two investors do not have to have the 
same expectations on the future growth rate of the underlying (e.g. growth of the reference 
interest rate). 
Assume a zero coupon bond (ZCB) with no credit risk that pays one unit of currency at 
time 𝑇𝑇. The value of the ZCB at time 𝑡𝑡 can thus be written as follows: 
   𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡ℚ �𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝 �−∫ 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 1��  , 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇,𝑇𝑇) = 1. (A.20) 
The remaining interest rates needed for the following discussion on models can be expressed 
using ZCB prices. 
  
 
The interbank reference spot Libor/Euribor rate with a maturity of 𝑇𝑇 at time 𝑡𝑡 can be 
expressed as:159 
   𝐿𝐿(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇)(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡)𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇). (A.21) 
The forward Libor rate at time 𝑡𝑡, expiry 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1 and maturity 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 can be computed as follows: 
 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1 �𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1)𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) − 1�. (A.22) 
The periodic fixed swap rate of an interest rate swap referencing to the Libor rate with the 
tenor structure 𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼, 𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼+1, …, 𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽 is given by:  
  𝑠𝑠𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽(𝑡𝑡) ≔ 𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝛼𝛼) − 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽�
∑ (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 − 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1)𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖=𝛼𝛼+1 �𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−1)𝑃𝑃(𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) − 1�. (A.23) 
Notice that swap rates are market rates with observable quotes in the market. While spot and 
forward Libor rates as well as swap rates can be stripped from ZCB, the price of ZCB is a 
function of the expected dynamics of the short rate. 
  
                                                 
159 Notice that we are working within the so-called “single curve” paradigm. We are assuming no default risk of 
the bond issuer. Within this paradigm the fixing frequency of a reference rate does not have an influence on 
the rate, implying for example that 12-month Euribor and 3-month Euribor must be equal (e.g. on a per 
annum basis). Since the financial crises begging in 2008 this assumption, however, has been greatly falsified. 
  
 
APPENDIX C: REVISITING THE PROOF FOR THE CONDITIONAL 
SURVIVAL FUNCTION 
In the following we give the proof of the survival probability formula used in the this paper 
as given by Brigo and Capponi (2009) and Capponi (2009) while elaborating on some issues 
in a more detailed manner. 
Proposition. The conditional survival of the Reference Entity is given by: 
1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏2ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2  � = (A.24) 1𝜏𝜏2≤𝑇𝑇1𝜏𝜏2≤𝜏𝜏0 �1?̅?𝐴 + 1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2 � 𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�− log(1 − 𝑢𝑢1) − Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶1|0,2(𝑢𝑢1;𝑈𝑈2)1
𝑈𝑈�1,2 � 
where 
𝐶𝐶1|0,2(𝑢𝑢1;𝑈𝑈2) = (A.25) 
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶1,2(𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢1)
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2
|𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢1�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶1,2�𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢1�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 + 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈21 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶0,2�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 − 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶1,2�𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 + 𝐶𝐶�𝑈𝑈�0,2,𝑈𝑈�1,2,𝑢𝑢2�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢2 |𝑢𝑢2=𝑈𝑈2 . 
Again, this is the survival probability of the reference entity, conditional on the default of the 
counterparty (given 𝜏𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏2). The term ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2� stands for the risk-neutral probability that 
the reference entity outlives the time period of computation 𝑡𝑡, given all information available 
when 𝜏𝜏2 becomes known. 1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷 takes on the value 1 when the counterparty defaults before 
the investor and the reference entity. 1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏2 ensures the consideration of the scenarios in 
which the default of the reference entity exceeds the default of the counterparty. 
  
 
Proof. The term for the survival probability can be given as 
1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏2ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2  � = 1𝜏𝜏2≤𝑇𝑇1𝜏𝜏2≤𝜏𝜏0�1𝑡𝑡<𝜏𝜏2<𝜏𝜏1 + 1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2𝔼𝔼�ℚ�Λ1(𝑡𝑡) < 𝜉𝜉1|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2 , 𝜉𝜉1�|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2��. (A.26) 
The term outside of the brackets means that we are only interested in the scenarios in which 
the counterparty defaults before the maturity of the contract and before the investor defaults 
(1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷~1𝜏𝜏2≤𝑇𝑇1𝜏𝜏2≤𝜏𝜏0). Inside the brackets we differentiate between two terms. The first term 
stands for the scenarios in which the default of the reference entity exceeds the default of 
the counterparty and the time period of computation (1𝑡𝑡<𝜏𝜏2<𝜏𝜏1). We define this scenario as ?̅?𝐴. 
The second term inside the brackets stands for the survival probability of the reference 
entity (i.e. the risk-neutral probability that the barrier exceeds the value of the intensity 
process) conditional on the scenarios, in which the counterparty has defaulted before the 
time period of the computation (1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡) and before the investor (1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2). After solving the 
brackets, we insert the conditions into the risk-neutral probability calculations as follows: 
1𝐶𝐶∪𝐷𝐷1𝜏𝜏1>𝜏𝜏2ℚ�𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑡𝑡|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2  � = 1𝜏𝜏2≤𝑇𝑇1𝜏𝜏2≤𝜏𝜏01?̅?𝐴 + 𝔼𝔼�1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏21𝜏𝜏2≤𝜏𝜏0ℚ�Λ1(𝑡𝑡) < 𝜉𝜉1|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2 , 𝜉𝜉1�|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2�. (A.27) 
Notice that Λ1(𝑡𝑡) < 𝜉𝜉1 is the same as Λ1(𝑡𝑡) − Λ2(𝜏𝜏2) < 𝜉𝜉1 − Λ2(𝜏𝜏2). Once we condition on the 
known terms 𝜉𝜉1 and 𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2, the term 𝜉𝜉1 − Λ2(𝜏𝜏2) becomes also known. We introduce 𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏2) 
as the cumulative distribution function of the integrated CIR process Λ1(𝑡𝑡) − Λ1(𝜏𝜏2). We then 
rewrite Equation (A.27) into 
1?̅?𝐴 + 1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2𝔼𝔼�𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�− log(1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖) −Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2 , {𝜉𝜉1 > Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)}, {𝜉𝜉0 > Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)}�. (A.28) 
In the next step we denote 𝑈𝑈�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 1 − exp�𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑗𝑗)�, where 𝑖𝑖;  𝑗𝑗 =  0,1, 2 stand for the three 
entities. This would in return imply that 𝜉𝜉1 − Λ1(𝜏𝜏2) equals − log�1 − 𝑈𝑈�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖� = Λ1(𝜏𝜏2). 
Equation (A.28) can then be rewritten as: 
  
 
1?̅?𝐴 + 1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2𝔼𝔼�𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�− log(1 − 𝑈𝑈1) −Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2 , �𝑈𝑈1 > Λ1�𝑈𝑈�1,2��, �𝑈𝑈0 > 𝑈𝑈�0,2��. (A.29) 
The risk-neutral probability term can be rewritten using the appropriate integral of the 
cumulative distribution function, multiplied with the marginal distribution. The right term of 
Equation (A.29) can be written as follows: 
1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2 � 𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)1
0
(− log(1 − 𝑈𝑈1))⋯
− �Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑈𝑈1 < 𝑢𝑢1)|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2 , �𝑈𝑈1 > 𝑈𝑈�1,2�, �𝑈𝑈0 > 𝑈𝑈�0,2� = (4.56) 
1𝜏𝜏2<𝑡𝑡1𝜏𝜏1≥𝜏𝜏2 � 𝐹𝐹Λ1(𝑡𝑡)−Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)1
𝑈𝑈�1,2 (− log(1 − 𝑈𝑈1))⋯
− �Λ1(𝜏𝜏2)�𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑈𝑈1 < 𝑢𝑢1)|𝒢𝒢𝜏𝜏2 , �𝑈𝑈1 > 𝑈𝑈�1,2�, �𝑈𝑈0 > 𝑈𝑈�0,2�.  
 
  
 
APPENDIX D: FIRST-TO-DEFAULT CVA FOR CDS –  
IMPLEMENTATION IN R 
In the following we have added snapshots of the code (written in R) for the main functions 
needed in the computation the model proposed. 
 
Figure 21: R Code for the Generation of CIR processes and Default Scenarios 
The figure displays the R-code for the simulation of the CIR processes and the correlated default 
scenarios. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 22: R Code for the Main Function of the Algorithm 
The figure displays the R-code for the main loop of the algorithm and for computing the 
conditional uniforms. 
  
 
 
Figure 23: R Code for Computing Probabilities at Default 
The figure displays the R-code for computing the survival probabilities of the reference entity at 
default of either the investor or the counterparty. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 24: R Code for Computing the Copula Terms Needed 
The figure displays the R-code for computing the trivariate copula term seen in Equations (4.33) 
and (4.34). 
  
 
 
Figure 25: The Code for Computing the Fractional Fourier Transform 
The figure displays the R-code for computing the characteristic function, the fractional Fourier 
Transform as well as heuristic used for the parameterization of the radius 𝑡𝑡. 
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